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Abstract 
FIST is an emerging and unproven rapid acquisition model.  There are four FIST 
values that stand for Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny and 18 FIST activities. The 
premise of the FIST theory is that programs that emphasize these four values will be 
successful in delivering weapon systems on time and within budget by utilizing the tools 
and activities presented in the FIST model.   
The purpose of this research was to develop an Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) model to be applied as a comparative tool against the original FIST model.  The 
AHP model is developed through an experiment that surveys project managers from 
military and civilian sectors.  The results determine the strengths, weaknesses, 
repeatability, and validity of the FIST model.  Additionally, recommendations are 
provided for future use and improvements of the FIST framework.  As an added benefit, 
value differences between different segments of program managers are examined to 
determine if there are any ideological disconnects in the community. 
The results suggest that the FIST model is reproducible with the AHP theory and 
that there are certain program characteristics that denote if a program would benefit from 
being developed by FIST.  However, there are distinct weaknesses to the model that 
signify not all programs would succeed if FIST was employed during development.  
Eleven additional activities are recommended for inclusion in the FIST model.  Overall, 
FIST is a starting point that requires additional attributes to truly be among the viable 
solutions to the Department of Defense acquisition problem. 
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FIST & THE ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS: 
COMPARATIVE MODELING 
 
I. Introduction 
Ward (2004) created the acquisition model named FIST with the goal of producing an 
effective change in the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
processes.  The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a proven decision-making theory 
that provides decision-makers with a framework for decomposing and structuring a 
decision problem. The purpose of this thesis is to create a comparative model of FIST 
utilizing AHP.  This research tests the decision-making ability of AHP against an 
emerging FIST theory on successful system development and delivery.   
General Issue 
The U.S. DoD defines the defense acquisition system as, “The management 
process by which the Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely 
systems to the users” (DoD Directive, 2003:4).  According to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the share of programs with a 25 percent or more increase 
in program acquisition unit cost has increased to 44 percent (GAO, 2008).  This is an 
increase of seven percent from 2000 to 2008.  A subsequent GAO report stated that the 
total cost of the DoD’s current portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs has 
grown by over $74.4 billion, or five percent of the $1.58 trillion overall budget, in only 
one year (GAO, 2012).  Decomposing the budget reveals acquisition inefficiencies in 
production attribute $31.1 billion to the growth with an additional $29.6 billion due to 
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quantity changes (GAO, 2012).  The DoD is clearly failing to provide users with the 
promised effective, affordable, and timely systems.   
Over the next 10 years, $600 billion in budget cuts will impact the DoD.  These 
budget cuts will lead to the “smallest U.S. Air Force in history in terms of personnel, 
smallest ground force since 1940, and smallest number of Navy ships since 1915” 
(Hodge, 2012).  If budget cuts are administered indiscriminately across all programs, 
individual acquisition programs could realize as much as a nine percent reduction in 
budget.  With almost half of all DoD programs already over budget, financial cuts would 
be devastating.   American Enterprise Institute scholar Mackenzie Eaglen stated “the cut 
in the program side now is tending to hurt programs that are safety nets to bridge the 
military for the next conflict” (Hodge, 2012).  U.S. military forces may be fighting future 
wars with outdated technology due to a failed acquisitions process.   
Budget overruns are not the only problems facing DoD acquisitions.  In 1986, the 
Packard Commission stated, “Unreasonable long acquisitions cycles – ten to fifteen years 
for major weapon systems is a central problem from which most other acquisition 
problems stem” (Blue Ribbon, 1986:8).  The GAO states that the average delay in 
delivering initial operational capability for major defense acquisition programs has 
increased by 32 percent, or 23 months, since the completion of the first schedule 
estimates for the program.  Longer development times lead to bloated budgets and 
technology designed to counter threats that may no longer exist (Ward, 2009:11).  This 
was the case with the U.S. Army Comanche helicopter program that began in 1982 with 
the intention of countering Soviet Union capabilities.  In 2004, the Army cancelled the 
Comanche program after having spent 22 years and $6.9 billion developing the weapon 
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system (Ward, 2012b).  No Comanche helicopters were built and the doctrinal niche that 
the system filled disappeared.  During the Comanche’s 22-year development time, new 
wars and threats emerged that made the Comanche’s mission obsolete and too expensive 
to continue development.  When weapon systems have too long of a development 
timeline, the technology becomes obsolete, and the threat may have already vanished 
(Ward, 2012b).    
Based on the above, the current environment of DoD acquisitions produces 
defense programs that are inefficient, unaffordable, and behind schedule.  This 
acquisitions environment cannot coexist with the budget cuts set to occur in 2013, and 
war-fighters cannot wait decades to receive new weapon systems.  An effective change in 
the way the DoD manages the acquisition process must transpire for the war-fighter to 
continue to receive the weapons needed to conduct and win future wars. 
Background 
“Innovation is not necessarily or even primarily a function of budget.  Many of 
the interwar innovations came at a time of low budgets and small forces” (Fitzsimonds 
and Van Tol, 1994:29).  This idea was further developed by Ward and Quaid (2006b), 
who stated that restrained program budgets allow program managers to reject 
requirements creep and remain focused on the primary mission of the weapon system.  
When program managers are not allowed to use additional funding and schedule delays 
as tactics to solving programmatic issues, innovation often occurs to solve the problems.  
Innovations may include accepting reduced performance or creating cost-effective 
solutions.  Smaller budgets produce shorter schedules because programs cannot afford a 
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prolonged development.  Shorter schedules lead to less personnel turnover in the program 
office and greater accountability because project managers are forced to witness the 
outcome of any program management oversights.  Additionally, shorter schedules 
provide the user with a new weapon system sooner and releases funding for other 
programs.  According to Ward (2009:1), “Smaller expenditures clearly correlate with 
better operational performance and… better programmatic outcomes.” 
Ward (2009:iv) outlines the FIST value set as an effective approach to system 
development, which “enhances project stability, increases project leader’s control and 
accountability, optimizes failure, fosters ‘luck,’ and facilitates learning.”  The FIST 
model stands for Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny.  Project managers should 
emphasize these mutually reinforcing values when making programmatic decisions.   
Fast is a value that can be expressed in a program through maintaining deadlines, 
reducing development times, and placing an emphasis on program speed.  Program 
managers do not accept schedule delays as solutions to problems.  Instead, tradeoffs are 
made to solve the problem within the time allotted, even at the cost of reduced system 
performance.  Programs that value being Fast benefit from having increased reliability in 
funding and requirements, and decreased personnel turnover and obsolescence.  Under 
this value, program offices provide the war-fighter with weapon systems ahead of 
schedule.  Fielding weapon systems sooner allows the technology to be deployed against 
the threat it was designed to counter instead of decades in the future on an unknown 
battlefield, facing unknown threats (Ward, 2009:9-14).   
Inexpensive is a trait found in programs that work within the budget and 
deliberately seek low-cost solutions.  Program managers are willing to sacrifice project 
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performance and attributes, as well as contractually incentivize contractors to finish under 
budget, to ensure program costs remain under control while meeting program objectives.  
Having a small budget fosters innovation because project managers must expend funds 
wisely and create unique, low-cost solutions (Ward, 2009).  Ward (2009) states that there 
is an inverse relationship between cost and effectiveness; this concept means that 
programs become less effective when additional funding is used as a program 
management tool.  Inexpensive is related to Fast in that small budgets cannot afford long, 
expensive schedules.  Inexpensive is also related to Simple due to small budget programs 
choosing to leverage existing technology instead of developing new, unnecessary state-
of-the-art technology (Ward, 2009).     
The concept of Simple refers to maintaining a focus on meeting reasonable 
operational requirements and leveraging available technology.  Too often, program 
managers, engineers, and users interpret complex technology as sophisticated solutions.  
Complexity and beyond state-of-the-art technology increase schedules, budgets, and risks 
because the program must bear the burden of developing and debugging new technology 
from concept to delivery.   Simple can also be interpreted as reducing the length and 
complexity of formal procedures, briefings, and contracts.  Simple, by its very definition, 
reinforces the values of Fast and Inexpensive (Ward, 2009).  
The last value of Tiny is an “inescapable outcome of the three previous values.  If 
your project is inexpensive, it has a Tiny budget.  If it is Fast, it has a Tiny schedule.  A 
simple project has a Tiny degree of complexity” (Quaid & Ward, 2006:31).   The Tiny 
value means having a small project team that can effectively communicate with one 
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another and to external parties.  At some point, a large team becomes counterproductive 
to the program (Ward, 2009). 
Problem Statement 
The FIST model is an emerging and unproven theory that has not been tested 
thoroughly.  The purpose of this thesis is to discover the strengths and weakness of the 
FIST model by comparing it to a proven decision-making theory, AHP.  Furthermore, 
this research highlights if the FIST process is reproducible and reliable for analyzing 
acquisition programs and successful system development.  Next, is FIST a valid program 
management tool that can be used in the acquisition community?  In other words, does 
FIST have enough depth and thoroughness to allow a program manager to use the FIST 
framework to successfully manage a program?  A byproduct of this research examines 
the value differences in the military and civilian project management communities.  
Lastly, areas of improvement to the FIST model and recommendations for future use are 
given. 
Methodology 
The FIST values can be used as criteria for decision-makers as they choose 
among alternatives and make funding decisions for programs.  AHP incorporates 
intangible and qualitative criteria into a quantitative decision-making process.  The FIST 
values can be applied to AHP as criteria to quantitatively establish the best choice among 
alternatives.  Criteria weights will be derived through an experiment by polling program 
managers in the military and civilian industries.  The FIST model’s internal reliability is 
tested as a product of the experiment results.  The AHP model is then used to create an 
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evaluation framework for programs.  This framework can be used to evaluate acquisition 
programs at competition or any point during development.  Eleven programs from 
Ward’s (2009) thesis will be analyzed by an AHP model based on the FIST values and 
FIST grading rubric. 
This research produced a best-to-worst ranking of the 11 programs using the AHP 
model.  By comparing the AHP model results with FIST results, it is hoped that insights 
into FIST’s application, strengths, weaknesses, and repeatability can be discovered.  If 
FIST can be substantiated to be as accurate as a proven decision-making process, such as 
AHP, it will significantly advance the knowledge and validity of the emerging theory.  
Furthermore, the internal validity of the FIST model can be determined by gaining 
consensus from the program management community on which aspects of the FIST 
model are deemed most important.  FIST advertises itself to be the solution to a troubled 
DoD acquisition system with looming budget cuts.  This research should further FIST’s 
argument for adoption, recommend improvements, or expose FIST’s limitations. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
The Systems Engineering Efficiency Research (SEER) project was created to 
provide greater visibility into the FIST model.  A SEER phase I report was completed at 
Arizona State University by Wu and Bhattacharya (2012).   This thesis creates a 
comparative model of FIST and AHP.  The AHP model created will investigate the 11 
programs that Ward (2009) analyzed.  It is assumed that Ward (2009) ranked the 
programs correctly using available information and the FIST scoring rubric.  The AHP 
model will only be as accurate as the depth of information available to analyze.  
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Information on programs may be difficult to unearth due to individual program 
sensitivities, classification, and age. 
Additionally, the AHP methodology limits the number of alternatives to nine 
(Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995).  Therefore, this research was not able to analyze all 22 
programs from Ward’s (2009) thesis.  Lastly, the alternatives analysis will have to be 
conducted by only the primary researcher of this study.  It would be difficult to find 
participants that are experts on each of the programs being evaluated.  The alternatives 
analysis was built off of Ward’s (2009) research.  Since mission analysis was a 
significant portion of his thesis, these researches choose to search for evidence that was 
missing or inconclusive from his original examination.  
Preview 
The FIST model has been promoted as the solution to the currently unsustainable 
state of DoD acquisitions. Chapter II will provide an extensive literature review of related 
material on both the FIST model and the application of the AHP to weapon system 
development and screening.  Chapter III will describe the methodology of creating the 
AHP model to which the FIST results will be compared.  Furthermore, the process of 
analyzing and ranking the 11 weapon system programs will be described.  The results of 
the AHP analysis will be presented in Chapter IV along with a restatement of Ward’s 
(2009) FIST results on the same programs.  Chapter V will provide a comparison of FIST 
to AHP and discuss the strengths, weaknesses, and any recommended improvements to 
the FIST model.  Additionally, program characteristics will be highlighted that indicate if 
a program should be developed under the FIST framework.   
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II. Literature Review 
With a development structure that has “unreasonably long acquisitions cycles” 
and cost overruns due to acquisition inefficiencies, the current Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition environment cannot be sustained with $600 billion in budget cuts 
beginning in 2013 (Blue Ribbon, 1986:8).  The United States (U.S.) DoD value system 
rewards weapon systems under development that have large budgets, long timelines, and 
complex technologies.  Often, this practice leads to programs that overpromise 
performance and overrun schedules.  Ward (2009) developed FIST in an attempt to 
change DoD acquisitions and provide program managers with an alternative value set to 
utilize.  The FIST model states that program managers should focus on the values of 
being Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny when managing weapon system development 
(Ward, 2009).  The proposed result is a program that remains on schedule, on budget, and 
delivers only the necessary technology to fulfill the capabilities required by the war-
fighter.  Since FIST is an emerging and less mature model, this thesis uses the proven 
decision-making theory of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a comparative 
model to the FIST framework.   
A chronological review of FIST publications will show the evolution of the 
theory.  Next, a brief history of AHP will be presented along with evidence that 
demonstrations AHP as an effective comparative model.  Lastly, current literature 
describing project management and rapid acquisition success factors will be examined as 
evidence of important activities not included in the FIST model. 
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Relevant Research 
 The FIST concept has evolved from a series of publications beginning with Doing 
Less with More in which Inexpensive is described (Ward, 2004). Simple is explained in 
Ward’s (2005) publication, The Simplicity Cycle.  Ward (2006) introduces Fast through a 
publication entitled It’s About Time and Tiny through, FIST, Part 5.  Ward continues to 
publish material promoting the FIST model, its advantages, and uses.   
Revolutions in Military Affairs 
 “Future revolutions will occur much more rapidly, offering far less time for 
adaptation to new methods of warfare… rapid response to changing conditions in order to 
survive in an intensely competitive environment is surely instruction for military affairs” 
(Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, 1994:29).  This means that the DoD should have a flexible 
acquisitions system that delivers new capabilities rapidly to counter emerging threats not 
previously envisioned.  The F-22 Raptor is an example of a program that was initiated in 
1985 with a designed operational capability to counter Soviet Union fighter aircraft.  By 
2005, when the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was achieved for the F-22, the Soviet 
Union threat no longer existed, but a new terrorist threat had emerged.  The F-22 program 
expended $32.1 billion in procurement costs.  Currently, the Raptor lacks a viable 
opponent and adds little value to counter the insurgency threat (Ferran et al., 2012).  
Although this article was written 10 years before the FIST model first appeared, it serves 
as support for the FIST value of Fast.  According to Ward (2009), a Fast acquisition 
system will produce weapon systems that can counter current threats.  Threats and 
capability gaps are not always predicted 20 years in advance to allow time for weapon 
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development.  An extended development timeline produces systems that may be obsolete 
at completion or worse, may not be ready when needed, thereby preventing the U.S. from 
winning future engagements. 
The article states that often innovation stems from small budgets.  Small budgets 
force project managers to be more resourceful and exercise unconstrained thinking to 
solve problems when adding cost is not a viable option (Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, 
1994:29).  The authors cite the development of the devastating German Blitzkrieg as an 
example of an innovation developed under the tight budget restrictions of the Versailles 
Treaty after World War I (WWI).  Blitzkrieg was a revolution in military tactics that used 
speed, deception, and surprise to defeat a numerically superior force.  Germany forced 
France’s surrender in a 6-week campaign during World War II (WWII) using Blitzkrieg 
(Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, 1994:24).  The Blitzkrieg development supports the FIST 
value of Inexpensive by demonstrating innovation and technology advancement with a 
small budget.   Inexpensive technologies can prove just as effective if resourcefully 
employed.  Furthermore, Blitzkrieg is an example of the FIST value of Simple since the 
same technology utilizing aircraft, tanks, radios, and soldiers were common to both sides 
in WWII.  Operational exploitation of these resources allowed Blitzkrieg to become an 
effective, not complex, technologically-superior weapon system.   
Doing Less with More: The Pitfalls of Overfunding 
 The FIST model is not directly mentioned in this article, but the concept is clearly 
being formed (Ward, 2004).  This article is the first installment of a five-part series 
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describing FIST.  The purpose of this article is to describe the significance of the 
Inexpensive portion of the FIST model but also provides support for the Fast value.   
The conclusion of the article states, “It is hard to avoid concluding that small 
teams + thin budgets + short timelines tends to = significant innovation and combat 
effectiveness” (Ward, 2004:34).  This formula for success unmistakably resembles the 
Fast, Inexpensive, and Tiny aspects of FIST.  Ward (2004) supported his equation with 
two examples of weapon system developments, the Bazooka and the M16 Assault Rifle.   
The U.S. created the Bazooka during WWII with a development time of 30 days 
and at a cost of $19 per unit.  Immediate fielding of the Bazooka allowed the war-fighter 
to provide critical feedback on the Bazooka’s flaws and shortcomings.  The resulting 
feedback allowed the engineers to make corrections to the design and add necessary 
upgrades based on actual battlefield recommendations.  Because the Bazooka was 
inexpensive to produce, there was little fear in allowing soldiers to combat field-test the 
new technology (Ward, 2004).   
The M16 Assault Rifle took 20 years to develop and, like the Bazooka, initially 
did not perform as expected.  The differences in programs are that design flaws in the 
Bazooka were quickly identified and corrected, allowing the weapon to be reissued 
during WWII.  User feedback for the M16 required 20 years to be incorporated into the 
design of the weapon. “It does show the M16’s decades-long, disciplined, neat, orderly, 
and well-funded development effort didn’t guarantee the system’s operational 
effectiveness over the Bazooka’s month-long, quick-and-dirty, low cost approach.  The 
key to field success in both situations was… actual field experience and direct user 
feedback” (Ward, 2004:32). 
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These two weapon system anecdotes provide the basis for the FIST model.  
Furthermore, the Bazooka – M16 comparison supports Ward’s (2004) formula that rapid 
development of inexpensive and simple technologies produce superior results and 
combat-effective systems.  Being Fast in weapon development is a key in this article as it 
allows user feedback to be directly integrated into the final product.  “Technology 
developers tend to have facts about technology and fantasies about the operational (i.e. 
combat) environment.  In contrast, users tend to have facts about the operational 
environment, and fantasies about what technology can do” (Ward, 2004:32).  Being 
Inexpensive allows more units to be produced, tested, and fielded.  More testing is 
completed on inexpensive systems because there is less fear of destroying the low-cost 
unit (Ward, 2004).   
The last point in this article states that DoD acquisition professionals view 
programs that have more funding as prestigious and advantageous for their careers.  
Furthermore, expensive acquisition programs receive more oversight regardless of the 
capability or importance.  Instead of rewarding successful program managers with more 
expensive programs, they should be challenged to oversee a program with smaller 
funding where mistakes cannot be overcome by a huge budget.  Next, programs that 
provide a vital capability should be considered a major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) even if the funding level is below requirements.  According to the article, DoD 
acquisitions should start to place emphasis on programs that deliver critical capabilities to 
the war-fighter, not just expensive programs (Ward, 2004). 
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On Failure 
 Failures in acquisition programs are inevitable.  An important aspect of the FIST 
model is that failures in FIST programs are optimized failures. Optimized failures are 
where “exposure to loss is low and opportunities for learning are high” (Ward et al., 
2009:26).  In traditional large programs that take decades to develop, failures are 
expensive with few lessons learned to prevent future project management disasters from 
occurring.  Many of the original decision-makers in large programs have moved on to 
different jobs and do not have the opportunity to witness the outcome. “Learning requires 
both observation of the phenomena and timely reflection followed by action” (Ward et 
al., 2009:26). 
 By FIST programs maintaining fast schedules, FIST failures are more likely to 
convey meaningful insights to project managers because the project team is still intact to 
witness the consequence of their decisions. The lessons learned will be used in future 
programs and passed on to upcoming project managers.  Additionally, since the FIST 
approach promotes inexpensive programs, failures are more tolerable and affordable. 
 In the 1990s, NASA initiated a program coined Faster, Better, Cheaper.  Then 
NASA administrator Daniel Goldin stated, “[A] project that’s 20 for 20 isn’t successful.  
It’s proof that we’re playing it too safe” (Ward et al., 2009:27).  Rather than measure 
failure based on a per-attempt basis, perhaps the acquisition community should judge 
failure on a per-dollar basis.  This is because one failed Major Defense Acquisition 
Program (MDAP) could cost more than a dozen FIST program failures (Ward et al., 
2009:27). 
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Faster, Better, Cheaper Revisited 
Goldin (1992) originated NASA’s goal to produce missions that were faster, 
better, and cheaper.  In 8 years under the Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) initiative, 16 
missions were launched with ten successes and six failures.  Missions included “five 
missions to Mars, one mission to the moon, three space telescopes, two comet and 
asteroid rendezvous, four Earth-orbiting satellites, and one ion propulsion test vehicle” 
(Ward, 2010:50).  One successful mission example from FBC is the Near Earth Asteroid 
Rendezvous (NEAR) project that launched in 1996.  The program was completed in 27 
months and for $122 million instead of the previously estimated $200 million.  The FBC 
initiative was cancelled in 1999 after four out of five missions failed.  The success rate 
was deemed unacceptably low (Ward, 2010). 
Looking further into the data shows that the FBC missions were incredibly low 
cost.  The 1997 Pathfinder mission to Mars cost one-fifteenth that of the traditionally 
managed Viking mission (Ward, 2010).  Furthermore, all 16 FBC missions combined 
cost less than the Cassini mission to Saturn.  For the cost of one traditional NASA 
mission, FBC launched ten successful missions and was able to leverage the lessons 
learned from an additional six failed missions.  “The only real constraint on our activity is 
the amount of time and money we can spend.  In other words, the important thing is not 
how much success we get out of 100 tries, but rather, how much success we get out of 
100 dollars” (Ward, 2010:50).        
McCurdy observed that failed FBC missions were due to project leaders having 
“reduced cost and schedule faster than they lessened complexity” (Ward, 2010:51).  
McCurdy concludes, “Engineers and other experts can reduce the cost of spaceflight and 
16 
the time necessary to prepare missions for flight.  Moreover, they can do so without 
significant loss of reliability.  They can also do so with only modest reductions in 
spacecraft capability” (Ward, 2010:52).   
Successful missions, such as NEAR, used 3-minute meetings and 12-line 
schedules.  Additionally, many good ideas engineers created were rejected because it 
would have increased the schedule, budget, or both.  NEAR’s project manager states, 
“Had I incorporated even half of these good ideas, the spacecraft would never have been 
built.  Only those changes that could be made with negligible or minimal disruption were 
even considered” (Ward, 2010:52). 
  Under FBC, NASA “created a cultural framework of principles, priorities, and 
values, which shaped their decision-making and guided their organizational behavior” 
(Ward, 2010:52).  Project managers sought out solutions to problems that allowed them 
to maintain schedule and budget while only minimally impacting capability.  FIST values 
are extremely similar to those found in the FBC initiative and FIST advocates programs 
analogous to those under FBC.  
The Simplicity Cycle 
 The concept of Simple and The Simplicity Cycle was first described in a 
publication by Ward (2005) however a later, self-published book describes the concept in 
greater detail.  Ward (2011:8) defines complexity by stating, “Lots of interconnected 
parts equal a high degree of complexity.  Few interconnected parts equal a low degree of 
complexity.”  An efficient system should strive to have just the right amount of 
interconnected parts so that each component contributes to the overall operation of the 
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system.  Furthermore, an efficient system operates with as little waste and effort as 
possible (Ward, 2011).  Figure 1 depicts the Simplicity Cycle.  Goodness is depicted on 
the horizontal axis and is described as the functionality, utility, and design maturity of the 
program.  A high level of goodness is the overall goal of the Simplicity Cycle.  System 
Complexity is on the vertical axis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When development begins, programs are at the origin of the diagram.  The first 
movement from the origin is towards the middle of the figure where Goodness and 
Complexity both increase proportionally.   This progress in program development is the 
Complexity Slope and “can be described as learning and creating” (Ward, 2011:18).  The 
middle of the chart is the region of the Complex, in which increasing Complexity no 
longer increases Goodness.  From this region, only two paths are possible.  Continuing to 
Figure 1:  The Simplicity Cycle (Ward, 2011) 
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the upper right quadrant is unfeasible. “There is a real danger in believing that the upper 
right quadrant is either reachable or desirable” (Ward, 2011:38).  Eventually, every 
system reaches a point where Complexity and Goodness no longer increase 
proportionally.  At this intersection, managers must decide to simplify and streamline the 
existing design, or to continue trying to increase Complexity. 
One of the paths from this middle region is the Complication Slope.  The 
Complication Slope unnecessarily increases the complexity of the system at the cost of 
reducing the Goodness. The perceived benefits gained from Complexity are 
overshadowed by the problems created.  The second path out of the region of Complex is 
the Simplification Slope.  The Simplification Slope represents the improvement in 
Goodness through simplifying the system and reducing the number of interconnected 
parts (Ward, 2011).  “Complexity in this context is connected to the idea of efficiency. 
And a high level of complexity indicates excessive inefficiency” (Ward, 2011:26). 
Complexity is necessary and unavoidable in every project.  However, what Ward 
(2011) refers to as complicatedness should be avoided.  Complicatedness is the inclusion 
of non-value-added parts that end up weakening the design (Ward, 2011).  “Increasing 
complexity beyond the degree required to reach the region of the Complex actually 
indicates a decrease in understanding design maturity, and functional utility – that is, a 
decrease in goodness” (Ward, 2011:30). 
At the end of the Simplification Slope, the product has Goodness with the least 
Complexity required.  However, as time progresses and new technologies, trends, and 
threats change, the simple product has less and less Goodness and transitions down the x-
axis toward the origin.  It is at this point that the Complexity Slope begins again in order 
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to improve the product and incorporate new technology.  The process of learning on the 
Complexity Slope and simplifying on the Simplification Slope resembles a sine wave and 
can continue infinitely (Ward, 2011).     
 The Simplicity Cycle describes the Simple value in FIST.  Creating a Simple 
weapon system does not mean that the product lacks sophistication, complexity, or 
technological advancements.  It means that the weapon system is refined, and all the parts 
add value to the overall operation of the system.  
It’s About Time 
 In this article, Ward and Quaid (2006) offer a brief history of acquisition timelines 
and include examples from various experts to support the position that the DoD 
acquisition cycle is too prolonged.  In 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
stated, “the most important way technology could enhance our military capability would 
be to cut the acquisition cycle time in half” (Ward and Quaid, 2006:14).  Development 
timelines in the private industry for cars, aircraft, electronics, and spacecraft has 
decreased by 50-75 percent due to competition.  The Boeing Company cannot afford to 
design a new aircraft unless the development time is less than two and half years.  While 
the development trend in private industry decreases, the same trend in all branches of the 
military has increased or remained relatively unchanged (Ward and Quaid, 2006).  Figure 
2 illustrates this point by comparing the automobile industry’s development timelines to 
the branches of the military.    
 
  
20 
 
 
 
The authors state that 90% of the DoD contracts contain no schedule incentive to 
finish early.  Whether contractors finish a milestone on time or late, there is no impact.  
Furthermore, some contractors are even penalized if they submit a proposal that includes 
a schedule that finishes early.  They are deemed non-responsive bidders.  Without 
competition and incentives, the development timelines have only increased for the DoD.  
McNutt (1998) examined 320 defense projects and concluded that an average defense 
project could be completed in 50-65 percent of the scheduled time (Ward and Quaid, 
2006).  
 Ward and Quaid (2006) emphasize that the DoD development time needs to be 
completed much faster.  Additionally, private industry has been able to achieve shorter 
timelines with astonishing results.  The authors conclude the article with three 
Figure 2:  Average Development Cycle Times (Ward and Quaid, 2006) 
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recommendations.  First, an aggressive goal should be set to reduce development time by 
50 percent.  This reduction can be accomplished by individual project managers or DoD-
wide.  Second, “start generating, collecting, tracking, analyzing, and publishing cycle-
time metrics.  Then discontinue/disallow the practice of dictating schedules” (Ward and 
Quaid, 2006:17).  Project managers should include schedule incentives in contracts and 
seek contractors that set aggressive schedules.  Last, personnel in the acquisition system 
who are content with the status quo should be removed or retrained.  Shortening the 
development timeframe may produce new issues, but program timelines should be fixed, 
and the resulting problems should be addressed as they arise (Ward and Quaid, 2006:17). 
FIST, Part 5 
 This article concludes Ward and Quaid’s (2006b) five-part series on FIST by 
describing the Tiny value.  The authors describe the four FIST values as a “collection of 
philosophical assertions, designed to drive actions and inform decision-making” (Ward 
and Quaid, 2006b:31).  To follow the FIST model properly, all aspects of a project need 
to be Tiny or no larger than necessary.  Schedules, budgets, and complexity should be 
minimized.  Large program offices, unnecessary paperwork, and complex schedules 
hinder programs from achieving Tiny.  “Smaller teams are better able to communicate 
with internal and external team members… adding more people becomes 
counterproductive” (Ward and Quaid, 2006b:32).  The F-16 is an example of Tiny in that 
the statement of work was 25 pages long, and contractor proposals were limited to 50 
pages.  The F-16 was completed in half the time and for half the price and size of its 
22 
predecessors.  The results are an agile fighter that is operational in 24 different countries, 
with over 4,000 aircraft eventually being produced (Ward and Quaid, 2006b). 
The authors conclude by stating that customers already desire products that are 
faster, cheaper, simpler, and tiny.  Such products as cell phones, computers, ATMs, and 
fast food are examples of this trend.  “Bringing the FIST values to work simply involves 
approaching system development and acquisitions the same way we approach other 
things in life: with a preference for rapid availability, inexpensive quality, simple 
interfaces, and smaller sizes” (Ward and Quaid, 2006b:33). 
The Effect of Values on System Development Project Outcomes 
 In Ward’s (2009) master’s thesis, 22 acquisition projects are investigated for 
value clues that suggest if the program incorporated Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, or Tiny 
elements of the FIST model.  The programs receive a score of 10, 5, 0, or -5 for each of 
the four FIST values.  Appendix A contains the FIST grading rubric used to score each 
program.  The most FISTy programs receive a score of 40 and programs that appear to 
ignore the FIST model all together, obtain a score of -20.  The programs receive an 
outcome score of an ‘A’ if the program met or surpassed operational requirements and 
delivered an operational capability.  The programs receive an ‘F’ if it was cancelled, 
rejected by users, or failed to deliver operational capabilities.  By comparing the 
programs’ FIST score with the actual outcome, Ward (2009) attempts to validate the 
FIST model.   
The results of Ward’s (2009) analysis are in Appendix B.  Six of the 22 programs 
have contradicting FIST and outcome scores.  The F-20 Tigershark and XP-75 Eagle 
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were both high FIST scoring programs that ended up as failures.  Conversely, Ward 
(2009) indicates that the F-15 Eagle, C-5 Galaxy, V-22 Osprey, and NASA’s Viking 
Mission were all low FIST scoring programs.  Although these programs were an 
operational success, they delivered the system behind schedule and over budget.  Cutting-
edge technology was preferred over mature, proven technology which led to delays and 
cost overruns.  While these programs were an operational success, the system 
development was far from exemplary.  Two of the programs received mediocre scores, 
the MRAP at 15 points and the E-3 Sentry at 5 points.  The MRAP and E-3 are both 
operationally successful but not conclusively FISTy.  The remaining 14 programs have 
matching FIST and outcome scores (Ward, 2009).   
 Ward (2009) states that FIST enhances program stability.  By being Fast, a 
program is completed in a timely manner before new developments in technology, 
threats, or changes in the political environment can render the system obsolete.  The 
system can be developed quickly and avoid costly changes and enhancements that cause 
delay and budget overruns.  By being Inexpensive, programs reduce the chance of having 
funding cut or not secured for future years.  Small budget programs are less likely to have 
funds relinquished because there are no excess funds in the tight budget.  Lastly, keeping 
a project Simple by using existing technology enhances the accuracy of the budget and 
schedule estimates since new technology, with many unknown factors, is not included in 
the program (Ward, 2009). 
According to Ward (2009), FIST programs are easier to cancel because they are a 
smaller investment with small, streamlined teams.  Many programs become so large they 
are impossible to cancel.  The V-22 Osprey had nearly 2,000 suppliers spread across 40 
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states.  Furthermore, Congressmen would lose too many constituent jobs if the program 
was cancelled.  FIST programs, by design, are small in footprint, funding, and personnel.  
Ward (2009:86) contends that FIST is a “single idea, with four internally-consistent and 
mutually-reinforcing elements, not as a series of independent alternatives for project 
leaders to weigh against each other in trade-off analyses.”  Project managers should not 
focus on picking two elements or sacrificing one value for another.  Pick all three FIST 
values with Tiny being an inescapable outcome of Fast, Inexpensive, and Simple.  By a 
project being Simple, it will inherently have a shorter development timeline and lower 
costs because risky technology is not being used.  On the other hand, achieving a 
complex, beyond-state-of-the-art technology may not be attainable with a tight budget 
and strict schedule.  This is further evidence that FIST is a value set that must be 
incorporated as a single idea (Ward, 2009). 
The use of mature technology in system development is a significant theme in 
FIST literature and for the Simple value.  Mature technology can decrease the schedule 
and budget through reduced risks and greater understanding of the capability of the 
technology.  Ward (2009:89) states “mature technology is almost always available, and 
project leaders need only resist the temptation to stake their outcome on a hoped-for-but-
currently-unavailable technology.”  In support of mature technology, Ward (2009) cites a 
1983 Time Magazine article that argues complex weapons cost too much, are 
consequently produced in less quantity, and result in questionable effectiveness.  The 
article continues to state “whether a weapon can be afforded in adequate numbers should 
be a more important concern than whether it is state-of-the-art…” (Isaacson, 1983:12).  
Technological breakthroughs can rarely be accomplished successfully in the timeframe of 
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a project.  Project managers should leverage existing scientific discoveries and research 
in order to create captivating ways to deliver new capabilities.   
There is a significant difference between being Fast, Inexpensive and Simple, and 
merely being Hasty, Cheap and Simplistic. Adhering to a project’s schedule or 
budget is meaningless if the necessary requirements are not satisfied by the 
expenditure, and mature technologies are only good if they perform the required 
functions. (Ward, 2009:94)     
The FIST literature suggests that failure to understand the FIST values could result in a 
failed project.  FIST is most successful when done iteratively and risky when used only 
once.  Ward (2009) lists the following general principles to be used as FIST vectors.  
FIST Heuristics (Ward, 2009:102-103) 
1. Spending less time gives you more time.  
2. To finish early, start early.  
3. The tortoise was faster than the hare.  
4. The distance between planning and execution should be as short as possible (i.e. if you 
wait to the last minute, it only takes a minute – so take the minute now.)  
5. If I don’t have enough money, don’t give me more time.  
6. The best way to run a program is quickly. (Gregory, 1985:162)  
7. The best way to unleash talent is not to have too much of it.  
8. Talent trumps process.  
9. Generalize the people, specialize the tools (the Batman Principle).  
10. You can’t make a discovery according to a schedule.  
11. Don’t deal with complexity by adding more complexity. Deal with complexity by 
removing it.  
12. Worse is better (aka the best is the enemy of the good enough).  
13. Theory Y management is simpler than Theory X.  
14. Complexity and reliability are inversely proportional.  
15. Only ask for one miracle per program. (Rep. Heather Wilson, House Intelligence 
Committee)  
16. Don’t tinker – it increases complexity, costs time, costs money, introduces instability.  
17. Increasing complexity is a cost. (Spinney, 1993:3)  
18. Better, faster, cheaper – if you pick two, you’ll only get two.  
19. Better, faster, cheaper – pick three.  
20. The project leader’s influence over the development is inversely proportional to the 
budget and schedule.  
21. FIST failures are optimized failures.  
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History of AHP 
 The history of AHP traces back to the 1960’s when founder Thomas Saaty was 
overseeing research projects for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the U.S. 
Department of State.  Thomas Saaty is one of the forerunners of Operations Research and 
author of the first Mathematical Methods of Operations Research textbook and the first 
queuing textbook (Forman and Gass, 2001:4).  During Saaty’s tenure at the U.S. 
Department of State, he was afforded a generous budget that allowed him to be able to 
recruit a talented team of some of the world’s leading economists and game and utility 
theorists.  However, Saaty (1996) was disappointed with the results produced by the 
team, stating:  
Two things stand out in my mind from that experience.  The first is that the 
theories and models of the scientists were often too general and abstract to be 
adaptable to particular weapon tradeoff needs.  It was difficult for those who 
prepared the U.S. position to include their diverse concerns… and to come up 
with practical and sharp answers.  The second is that the U.S. position was 
prepared by lawyers who had a great understanding of legal matters, but were not 
better than the scientists in accessing the value of the weapon systems to be traded 
off. 
 
Years later at the Wharton School, Saaty (1987) recognized the absence of a practical 
systematic approach to decision-making and priority setting.  From 1971 to 1975, Saaty 
(1987) developed AHP as a solution to help ordinary people solve complex decisions.  
Since then, AHP has received widespread acceptance in the U.S. and throughout the 
world.  Some of the world’s leading information technology companies as well as the 
American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) have implemented AHP as the 
“standard practice for multiattribute decision analysis” (Forman and  Gass, 2001:5).  
Furthermore, AHP has been utilized extensively in numerous universities and in the 
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Central Intelligence Agency.  “The best way we can describe AHP is to describe its three 
basic functions: (1) structuring complexity, (2) measuring on a ratio scale, and (3) 
synthesizing” (Forman and Gass, 2001:4). 
A Hybrid Approach to Screen Weapon Systems Projects 
Greiner et al. discuss the topic of the U.S. DoD making informed decisions about 
converting resources and development proposals into fielded weapon systems.  Past 
research has shown that the DoD has screened, evaluated, selected, and allocated 
resources for programs while not taking advantage of available structured decision 
methodology.  The authors investigate using a hybrid decision support methodology 
which integrates AHP with a 0-1 integer portfolio optimization modeling for screening 
weapon systems in development.   
Their methodology uses a mathematical model created by combining AHP with 
integer programming to optimize a portfolio of defense programs.  While AHP is a stand-
alone technique that derives an overall priority for the alternatives, it cannot, however, 
optimize the selection of projects in light of budget, resource, technology, and other 
constraints.  Integer programming is utilized to provide this optimization capability to the 
model.  This model is applied to 15 historical developmental programs with six 
independent Air Force personnel acting as evaluators (Greiner et al., 2003).   
The model provides each of the 15 programs a fully fund or do not fund status.  
Three overall funding solutions are developed by the model.  The original Air Force 
solution to the portfolio is used as a baseline for comparing new solutions.  Each solution 
is judged based on how many programs are able to be funded with higher priority 
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programs being valued higher.  The three new solutions each surpass the original Air 
Force solution by using less funding and having a greater overall portfolio value.  The 
hybrid optimized solution has a 51.1% improvement over the Air Force solution (Greiner 
et al., 2003:198-200).  These results demonstrate that the AHP model can be used to 
reduce program costs and fund more valuable programs to the war-fighter. 
The “Real” Success Factors on Projects 
 A comprehensive answer to which factors lead to project success has been 
researched since at least the late 1960s.  A successful project can be interpreted in a 
variety of ways.  Project success is defined as the project outcomes measured against the 
overall objectives of the project (Cooke-Davies, 2002).  Project success focuses on 
whether the project met the stakeholders’ vision, needs, and capability requirements 
(Cooke-Davies, 2002).   Project management success is calculated against the traditional 
performance measures of cost, time, and quality (Cooke-Davies, 2002).  Success factors 
are inputs into the management system that produce successful projects either directly or 
indirectly (Cooke-Davies, 2002).  FIST judges programs based on their project 
management success.  The FIST framework proposes that through rapid project 
management success, project success will follow.   
 Cooke-Davies (2002) analyzed 136 European projects to develop critical factors 
to project success.  Some of the prominent factors are maintaining a 3-year or less 
development timeline and “allow changes to scope only through a mature scope change 
control process” (Cooke-Davies, 2002:186).  Additionally, organizations should align 
their decision-making and strategy with the current projects being developed.  This idea 
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shows that rapid acquisition organizations need to be structured in a way that enables 
rapid development.   
 Cooke-Davies (2002) found that comparing project performance to the budget 
was a better measure of success than comparing it to the schedule.  Furthermore, 
delivering project success is harder than achieving project management success because 
program management delivers only a product or service and it is left to operations 
management to optimize the benefits derived from the product.  Project success cannot be 
measured until after project completion.  However, project management performance can 
be measured throughout the life of the project.   
 The article concludes that research and development (R&D) projects should 
maximize the return on R&D by improving the time to market.  Releasing a new R&D 
product as soon as possible keeps the technology relevant and in a competitive position 
(Cooke-Davies, 2002).    
Expedited Systems Engineering for Rapid Capability and Urgent Needs 
 Lepore et al (2012). conducted interviews with over 30 individuals and 
organizations, in both the DoD and civilian sectors, with experience in rapid 
development.  The goal of the research is to identify factors that contribute positively to 
rapid acquisition outcomes.  “One can hypothesize that certain critical success factors 
from those organizations that do rapid acquisition may well be transferrable to traditional 
acquisition” (Lepore et al., 2012:3).  This hypothesis is similar to the FIST concept.  The 
research team found that 11 observations emerged from the interviews.  These 
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observations are integrated with current best practices to produce a proposed rapid 
acquisitions framework (Lepore et al., 2012). 
• Use Mature Technology – Focus on the State of the Possible  
• Incremental Deployment (Development) is Part of the Product Plan  
• Strive for a Defined Set of Stable Requirements Focused on Warfighter Needs  
• Work to Exploit Maximum Flexibility Allowed  
• Designing out All Risk Takes Forever…Accept Some Risk  
• Keep an Eye on “Normalization”  
• Build and Maintain Trust  
• Populate Your Team with Specific Skills and Experience  
• Maintain High Levels of Motivation and Expectations  
• The Government Team Leads the Way  
• Right-size the Program - Eliminate or Reduce Major Program Oversight  
 
Many of these observations are similar to the principles found in FIST.  However, many 
findings are missing from the FIST framework.  Incremental development is a key 
concept in this article.  This tool, also referred to as Generational Development, 
intentionally plans for future technology advancements to be incorporated into the 
system.  Incremental development provides faster upgrade possibilities, extended system 
lifespan, and the flexibility to change to a dynamic operational environment (Lepore et 
al., 2012).    
 Another seemingly absent area in FIST is a thorough requirements gathering 
activity.  Lepore et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of stable, capability-based 
requirements, generated in face-to-face meetings with the customer, early in the process.  
Then, project teams must fight possible scope creep and additional requirements to 
maintain the rapid development timeline (Lepore et al., 2012).  Next, the authors observe 
that in rapid acquisitions, it is often impossible to provide the user with a 100% solution 
to meet their needs.  Often customers’ capability requirements will be met with a 23% to 
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80% solution (Lepore et al., 2012).  The last prominent observation in relation to FIST is 
the concept of ambidextrous organizations.  This dual structured organization has an 
exploring team that generates new technologies and an exploiting team which focuses on 
efficiently executing a program using program management techniques (Lepore et al., 
2012). 
Summary 
The DoD acquisition processes is too lengthy, costs too much, and develops 
overtly complex technologies (Blue Ribbon, 1986).  A proposed solution named FIST has 
been developed and published through a series of articles.  The FIST literature uses 
historical examples of weapon system programs that illustrate the FIST values and how 
they can lead to successful project development.   
The computer, airline, and electronic industries have been forced to shorten their 
development times by 50-75 percent in the last 50 years to remain competitive.  Over the 
same timeframe, the average development times for the military have increased or 
remained the same (Ward and Quaid, 2006b).  Currently, military development length is 
four times that of the automotive industry.  The private industry has pioneered the 
movement of shortening development times while maintaining project success.   
The literature and historical examples suggest that large budgets are not necessary 
for technological advancements.  Having an Inexpensive project can compel project 
managers to be resourceful and innovative by working within the confines of their 
budget.  Furthermore, inexpensive projects often develop simple technology because 
expensive, drawn-out testing cannot be financed.  Simple technology can be fielded and 
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receive feedback more rapidly.  Complex and expensive technology may never be 
released to the field due to an overwhelmingly long development process required to 
produce state-of-the-art technology.  Ward (2011) attempted to show through The 
Simplicity Cycle that project development reaches a certain point where adding 
complexity to a system reduces the overall goodness and functionality of the end-product.  
The last FIST value of Tiny is an inescapable result of the first three values.  To honor the 
first three values, Tiny must be incorporated throughout the program, generating smaller 
development teams, schedules, and reducing unnecessary paperwork.   
AHP is a proven decision-making tool that has been used in a wide variety of 
fields.  It has already been employed to create criteria weights for a portfolio of 
development projects that require a funding decision.  There are additional factors outside 
of cost, schedule, and quality that have an impact on project success.  Understanding 
these factors can be used to improve the FIST model.   
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III. Methodology 
The methodology used to subject the FIST model to a theory-testing empirical 
study will be the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).  The development of the theory-
testing model is directly influenced by Ward’s (2009) FIST thesis rubric and FIST values.  
Criteria weights for the model are derived from an experiment that is completed by 
civilian and military program managers.  The results of the experiment are used to show 
which activities different groups of project managers value.  The AHP model results 
produce a rank order of the programs from most successful to least successful based on 
the criteria and weights in the AHP model.  The AHP results can then be compared to the 
FIST results, as well as the actual outcomes of the programs.  A comparison of this data 
highlights the strengths, weaknesses, repeatability, and validity of the FIST model.  The 
outcome of this research provides recommended changes and future applications of the 
FIST model.   
 Ward’s (2009) FIST methodology is first examined in this chapter to create a 
better understanding of this research’s chosen approach.  Once the weaknesses to the 
FIST methodology are explained, the process of creating an AHP model is described.  
Next, the empirical steps used to produce the FIST-AHP model and the alternatives 
analysis is explained.  The last section of this chapter is devoted to the participants that 
comprise this research.   
FIST Methodology 
 The FIST methodology is a combination of reflective practice and case study 
research.  Ward (2009:4) describes reflective practice as the “examination of one’s 
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experiences combined with formal academic knowledge in order to establish deeper 
understanding of the practice in question.”  This means that much of the FIST framework 
was developed from anecdotal personal experience and observations.  “The initial FIST 
research clearly belongs in the realm of reflective practice, since its foundation largely 
rests on ‘knowing-in-practice,’ and was bolstered by, rather than established on, 
academic oriented studies” (Ward, 2009:4).  While Ward (2009) was initially 
commended and labeled a Reflective Practitioner by Dr. Alexander Laufer of Israel’s 
Technion University, this methodology has been scrutinized as being too subjective to 
one person’s interpretation of case studies and personal experiences.   
Ward’s use of quotations and interviews were manipulated by interpretation and 
used to fit into the FIST model.  Although, some statements and quotes that were 
on target with the concept values that FIST conveys Ward choose wisely to sculpt 
other phrases and statements to make a direct tie to aspects of FIST, which were 
clearly not directly specified or intended for it. (Tran and Ocampo, 2012:8-9) 
 
Much of the case study research methodology is based on Eisenhardt’s (1989) research, 
in which the process for building a theory based on case studies is explained.  This 
research includes selecting “cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent 
theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989:537).  Eisenhardt (1989) also advocates the use of multiple 
investigators, which Ward (2009) uses to a small extent in the analysis.  Ward (2009) 
chose to have only six of the 22 case studies investigated by an independent party.  He 
states the benefits to case study research include its replication because the grading rubric 
and case study information is available to other researchers.  However, four of the six co-
evaluators produced different scores from the case studies. The E-3 Sentry case study, in 
which Ward (2009) gave the program an overall low score of 5, received a high score of 
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ALTERNATIVES F I S T TOTAL OUTCOME
NASA Pathfinder Mission - Ward 10 10 10 10 40 A
Co-Evaluator 5 10 10 10 35 A
F-16 Falcon - Ward 10 10 10 10 40 A
Co-Evaluator 10 10 10 10 40 A
NASA NEAR Mission - Ward 10 10 10 10 40 A
Co-Evaluator 10 10 10 10 40 A
F-20 Tigershark - Ward 5 10 10 10 35 F
Co-Evaluator 0 10 10 10 30 F
E-3 Sentry (AWACS) - Ward 5 0 0 0 5 A
Co-Evaluator 10 10 5 0 25 A
F-15 Eagle - Ward -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 A
Co-Evaluator n/a 0 0 0 0 A
25 from the co-evaluator.  These differing results were not examined in the thesis and 
only provided as reference in his appendices.  The co-evaluator rankings are in Table 1. 
 
 
Ward (2009) uses the strengths of case study research to support his methodology. 
However, the weaknesses of this methodology are not addressed in his thesis.  The 
strengths of case study research are described by Eisenhardt (1989) as being able to 
create a novel theory from insights that arise from contradicting evidence.  Furthermore, 
the emerging theory is likely to be testable because the concepts can easily be measured 
and hypothesized (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Lastly, “The likelihood of a valid theory is high 
because the theory-building process is so intimately tied with evidence that is very likely 
that the resultant theory will be consistent with empirical observation” (Eisenhardt, 
1989:547).  This strength leads directly into a weakness of case study methodology.   
Eisenhardt (1989) states that a resultant theory, built-off case studies, is likely to 
be empirically valid.  However, FIST lacks empirical studies.  FIST’s scientific basis is 
Table 1: Co-Evaluator FIST Rankings 
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tenuous without additional empirically based studies to support the theory.  To truly 
validate FIST as an applicable rapid acquisition approach, numerous quantitative, theory-
testing studies are required.   
Such theories are likely to be testable, novel, and empirically valid, but they do 
lack the sweep of theories… They are essentially theories about specific 
phenomena… ultimately they are not theories about organization in any grand 
sense.  Perhaps ‘grand’ theory requires multiple studies – an accumulation of both 
theory-building and theory-testing empirical studies. (Eisenhardt, 1989:547) 
 
Theory-building from case studies also risks the phenomenon of not being able to rise to 
a level generality.  In other words, such theories are only valid for small subset of the 
population.  The resultant theories can be narrow and idiosyncratic (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
With only 22 programs analyzed by Ward (2009), there is a great possibility that FIST 
has limited usage.        
The AHP Process 
Saaty (1990) developed AHP as a multi-criteria decision-making approach.  AHP 
is a decision support tool that can solve complex decision problems with numerous 
criteria.  AHP permits decision-makers to model intricate problems as a hierarchical 
structure that shows the relationship between the goal, primary criteria, sub-criteria, and 
alternatives.  The application of AHP includes studies in project management, 
environmental policy, information systems, risk assessment, and project screening 
(Greiner et al., 2003).  AHP is an appropriate methodology for insight into FIST because 
AHP can integrate quantitative and qualitative criteria into the decision-making process.  
The decision-makers’ input is vital to accurate model creation. 
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Figure 3:  Decision making as a Hierarchical Structure (Yau, 2009) 
 The first step in AHP is to define the objective or goal of the model.  Next, the 
alternatives, primary criteria, and sub-criteria are established.  The criteria should be 
chosen to “represent the problem as thoroughly as possible, but not so thoroughly as to 
lose sensitivity to change in the elements” (Saaty, 1990:9).  Decision-makers can 
visualize an overall assessment of the complex relationships that compose a problem by 
arranging the goals and criteria of a problem into a hierarchy structure.  Furthermore, 
decision-makers can compare the criteria at each level of the hierarchy to make sure they 
are the same order of magnitude.  “A decision-maker can insert or eliminate levels and 
elements as necessary to clarify the task of setting priorities or to sharpen the focus on 
one of more parts of the system” (Saaty, 1990:9).  As seen in Figure 3, the decision-
makers decompose the problem into a decision hierarchy starting with the goal through 
the criteria, sub-criteria, and alternatives at the lowest level. 
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Saaty (1990:12) states the “most effective way to concentrate judgments is to take 
a pair of elements [criteria] and compare them on a single property without concern for 
other properties or other elements.”  This is the second step of AHP in which decision-
makers use pairwise comparisons of second level criteria to determine criteria weights.  
The comparisons are accomplished by judging which criterion is more beneficial to the 
overall goal of the system.  Pairwise comparisons are completed for the primary decision 
criteria by comparing two criteria at a time, based on their importance to the overall goal.  
Values of one through nine and their reciprocals are given to each pairwise comparison.  
Table 2 provides an explanation of the values.   
 
 Once the pairwise comparisons are completed, a judgment matrix for each level 
of the hierarchy will be created.  Figure 4 depicts a judgment matrix for weights (W) and 
1 Equal Importance
Two activities contribute equally 
to the objective
3 Moderate importance of one over another
Experience and judgment 
strongly favor one activity over 
another
5 Essential or strong importance
Experience and judgment 
strongly favor one activity over 
7 Very strong importance
An activity is strongly favored and 
its dominance demonstrated in 
9 Extreme importance
The evidence favoring one 
activity over another is of the 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgments When compromise is needed
Reciprocals
If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal 
value when compared with i
Rationals Ratios arising from the scale
If consistency were to be forced 
by obtaining n numerical values 
to span the matrix
Intensity of Importance 
on an Absolute Scale
Definition Explanation
Table 2:  The Fundamental Scale (Saaty, 1990:15) 
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(n) number of decision criteria (C).  Each W in the matrix represents the fundamental 
scale value associated with the pairwise comparison of the two criteria.  To calculate the 
weights of each criterion, the maximum left eigenvector is approximated by multiplying 
the elements in each row with each other and then taking the n
th
 root.  These values are 
normalized by dividing the value by their sum to produce the final priority vector, or 
weight, of each criterion (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The judgment matrix must be consistent, in that A12 = A13 × A32.  The consistency 
of the matrix is calculated through the consistency ratio (CR).  A judgment matrix is 
considered adequate if the corresponding CR is less than 10%.  To establish the CR, first 
the maximum eigenvalue (max) must be calculated by summing each column of the 
judgment matrix and multiplying that value by the vector weight.  Then the consistency 
index (CI) is calculated using the formula: 
                                                            
        
     
      (1) 
Figure 4:  Judgment Matrix 
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Last, the CR is determined by dividing the CI by the Random Consistency index (RCI) 
that is provided in Table 3 (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995). 
 
 At this point, all the criteria and sub-criteria have priority vectors.  The 
alternatives now need to be analyzed using the established framework.  If a problem has 
N number of criteria and M alternatives, the decision-maker must now create N judgment 
matrices.  This produces one matrix per criteria in order to compare all alternatives 
against each other based on the lowest-level criteria.  The same pairwise comparison 
process is completed to derive priority vectors for each alternative under each criterion.  
Figure 5 shows the final decision matrix.  Value a11 in the decision matrix represents the 
priority vector for alternative one (A1) under criteria one (C1) (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 
1995).  Wn represents the weight of each criterion as established in step two of the 
process.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Decision Matrix (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995) 
Table 3: RCI Values for Different Values of n (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995:5) 
41 
The final priority of the alternatives is denoted as A
i
AHP and is calculated by the 
following formula (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995:2): 
 
(2) 
 
This formula establishes the final weight through the summation of the alternatives’ 
priority vector (aij), multiplied by that criteria’s weight (wj). 
The FIST-AHP Model 
Ward (2009) uses 18 activities in the FIST rubric to score acquisition programs.  
These 18 activities are used to create the hierarchical structure in Figure 6.  More 
information is available about the FIST rubric in Appendix A.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6:  FIST Hierarchal Structure 
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 To calculate the weights of both the FIST values and the FIST sub-criteria 
activities, an experiment is used to survey participants for pairwise comparisons between 
all the FIST values and FIST activities using the fundamental scale.  Participants’ 
answers are recorded in Microsoft Excel and transferred into Expert Choice 
TM
 for 
analysis.  Appendix C contains the directions of the experiment while Appendix D and E 
show a sample of the actual experiment.  Appendix D asks participants to compare the 
FIST values of Fast, Inexpensive, Simple and Tiny.  Since most participants are unaware 
of the FIST model, definitions of each value, based on Ward’s (2009) thesis, are provided 
in this section of the experiment.  Participants will make high-level judgments based on 
which FIST values they deemed most important to successful project development.  The 
outcome of this section of the experiment produces the weights for each of the four FIST 
values.  More information on participants is found in a forthcoming section.   
Additional demographic information was gathered in the experiment such as the 
number of years’ experience in project management, if the participant has official 
leadership experience, and the participants’ highest rank obtained while in project 
management.   This demographic information was used to divide participants into the 
following groups: All Participants, Leaders, Non-Leaders, Military, Civilian, Consistent 
Responses, and Expert Responses.  Consistent responses are determined if the resulting 
consistency ratio (CR) of the judgment matrix is less than 10%.  Experts were segregated 
from the population if they had more than 15 years of experience in project management 
or an advanced academic degree directly related to project management.  The variations 
in organizational values between military and civilian, leaders and non-leaders, as well as 
experts to all others, will come to light through the analysis of the data.  Civilian project 
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management firms must not only be successful in project management but also be able to 
create profit, otherwise the company would be bankrupt.  Gaining insight from this 
population of successful project managers will be invaluable to improving the DoD 
acquisitions and analyzing the FIST model. 
The next section of the experiment is described in Appendix E.  It combines all 18 
activities in Ward’s (2009) FIST rubric.  The activities were presented in a randomly 
assorted order so that it was not easily discernible which activity was related to each 
FIST value.  Furthermore, participants were not informed that the activities were related 
to the FIST values in the first section of the experiment.  This was purposely designed to 
prevent participants from attempting to judge the 18 activities artificially more or less 
significant to match their answers in the first section.  The answers to this second section 
serve two purposes.  First, the pairwise comparisons form the weight of each sub-
criterion for the model.  Second, the internal reliability of the FIST model can be 
analyzed.  If the FIST model is consistent, then the summation of the activities under 
each FIST value should match the rankings completed in the first section of the 
experiment.  For example, if a participant ranked Fast as the most important FIST value 
in the first section, then the summation of the five separate Fast activities in part two 
should be greater than the summation of activities for Inexpensive, Simple, or Tiny.  If 
participants deem Fast as the most influential value but then rank the Inexpensive tasks as 
the most important group of activities, a disconnect in the model becomes apparent or the 
activities are not properly designed to cover the FIST value.  A disconnect in FIST values 
and activities could lead to recommendations to change, remove, or add activities to 
better encompass the FIST values.   
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Once all the pairwise comparisons for the FIST values and FIST activities were 
collected from the participants, the data was inputted into the software program called 
Expert Choice 
TM
.  Expert Choice 
TM
 uses AHP to allow the decision-maker to 
decompose the problem into a hierarchy of criteria and sub-criteria.  In this case, the 
criteria are the four FIST values and the sub-criteria are the 18 FIST activities.  The 
decision-maker then inputs the pairwise comparison judgments into the program to arrive 
at overall weights for the criteria.  The participants’ responses to the experiment create 
the weights for the criteria and sub-criteria.  By selecting certain participants’ responses 
to be included in a model, it is possible to create seven different models that are not 
mutually exclusive to represent All Participants, Leaders, Non-Leaders, Military, 
Civilian, Consistent Responses, and Experts.  Once the models were created, an 
alternatives analysis was conducted and the subsequent judgments were placed into 
Expert Choice 
TM
 to be evaluated by the different models.   
It was not possible to have participants become familiar enough with each 
alternative to be able to pass proper judgments on programs and make comparisons.  
However, participants’ opinions were used for the criteria because they were basing their 
judgments on experience in project management.  Expert Choice 
TM
 is then used to 
calculate an overall score for each program.  High scores are related to programs that 
exhibit FIST qualities and low scores are representative of programs that ignored the 
FIST theory of development.  Additionally, Expert Choice 
TM
 can provide additional 
analysis such as sensitivity graphs to help explain the results.     
Miller (1956) showed that participants cannot simultaneously compare more than 
seven objects, plus or minus two, at one time.  Saaty (1990) set the upper limit of 
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MISSION OUTCOME FIST SCORE
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 40
P-51 Mustang A 35
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 35
F-20 Tigershark F 35
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 25
MRAP A 15
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 5
NASA Mars Viking Mission A -10
C-5 Galaxy A -15
V-22 Osprey A -20
RAH-66 Comanche F -20
alternatives in AHP to nine (Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1995).  Taking this upper limit 
into account, 11 programs are used as alternatives from Ward’s (2009) 22 original 
programs to be analyzed under the AHP model.  The reason for increasing the number of 
alternatives over the rule of nine is that a large number of alternatives are required to see 
if the FIST process is reproducible and to be able to encompass the entire spectrum of 
programs.  A variety of programs can test if FIST is adequately generalizable to be used 
on space, aircraft, and ground vehicle programs.  Alternatives were also selected that had 
contradicting FIST and real-world scores.  These contradicting alternatives can highlight 
weaknesses in FIST.   Programs that score mediocre on the FIST scale do not strongly 
suggest if the mission is a failure or success.  These alternatives were chosen to analyze 
missions that are only partially FISTy.   
The primary researcher selected 11 programs that best covered a variety of 
outcomes, FIST scores, and types of programs.  Included in the analysis were space 
launch, helicopter, fighter aircraft, cargo aircraft, and ground vehicle development 
programs.  Table 4 shows the missions selected for AHP analysis, the real-world outcome 
grade, and the original FIST score from Ward’s (2009) thesis. 
Table 4:  Missions Analyzed Under AHP Model 
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Alternatives Analysis 
Each of the 11 missions was analyzed independently and received a Poor, 
Average, Good, or Excellent rating for the 18 FIST activities.  The rating was 
qualitatively determined by the author on how well the program incorporated the FIST 
activity in the program’s development, not necessarily the outcome.  This score is 
determined through case study analysis.  It is worth noting that a mission could receive an 
Excellent score for fully incorporating a certain FIST activity even if the outcome from 
that activity was negative.  Appendix F contains the results of the alternative analysis of 
the 11 programs.  Once the qualitative score was determined for each program based on 
each activity, a quantitative pairwise comparison was completed by using Saaty’s 
fundamental scale.  This pairwise comparison is then entered into Expert Choice 
TM
.  
Expert Choice 
TM
 evaluates the data according to the criteria weights of that model.  The 
output is a rank ordering of mission from most FISTy to least.  The alternatives’ pairwise 
comparison does not change between models.  The only changes that occur between 
models are the criteria weights.  The weights are reflections of the category of program 
manager whose opinion was used in that model.   
A large portion of the alternatives analysis builds off the examination already 
completed by Ward (2009).  Since mission analysis was a significant portion of his thesis, 
this analysis chooses to build off his foundation rather than scrutinize his examination.  If 
Ward (2009) provides evidence that a mission integrated or ignored certain FIST 
activities, that proof was used in this analysis.  Where evidence was missing or not 
mentioned, further research was then conducted into confirming the activity’s presence or 
absence in the mission development.  
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Participants 
As of September 2012, there were 2,258 Air Force officers in the acquisition 
career field of project management.  To collect a statistically correct sample with a 95% 
confidence level with + 10 confidence interval, 92 participants should be surveyed.  
However, due to this large number of participants and the length of the experiment, the 
experiment was sent to military, government civilian, and civilian project managers to 
gain enough of a consensus to be able to draw a conclusion on the FIST model.  As 
previously stated, this provides the added benefit of gathering data from a diverse 
population, thereby adding to the breadth of the analysis.  This research was able to 
obtain 75 responses, with only 33 participants being active duty Air Force officers.  With 
33 responses, a confidence interval of + 16.94 at the 95% confidence level is achieved. 
 One of the civilian project management firms selected for the experiment was 
Parsons Brinkerhoff (PB).  Twenty-eight civilian participants were surveyed from PB.  
PB was founded in New York City in 1885 and today employees 14,000 people in 150 
offices on five continents. “Parsons Brinckerhoff is a global consulting firm assisting 
public and private clients to plan, develop, design, construct, operate and maintain 
thousands of critical infrastructure projects around the world” (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 
2012).  PB’s projects include infrastructure, transportation, power, energy, community 
development, water, mining, and environment.  Respondents from PB have managed 
such programs as the $2.5 billion Woodrow Wilson Bridge Replacement program and the 
$5 billion Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Capital Improvement 
Program.   “Program management is a partnership with owners that fosters effective, 
cost-efficient and innovative project delivery... Program management at Parsons 
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Brinckerhoff means working with our clients to anticipate the key issues that could 
impact successful completion of not only the individual projects that make up a program, 
but the overall program itself” (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2012).  Due in part to the immense 
project management experience from PB respondents, an expert AHP model was able to 
be developed.   
Summary 
Ward’s (2009) theory-building methodology utilizing reflective practice merged 
with case study research has been criticized as being too subjective and lacking theory-
testing empirical studies.  Grand theories require the accumulation of multiple theory-
building and theory-testing empirical studies to support the framework and generalize its 
use for a wider audience (Eisenhardt, 1989).  FIST’s scientific foundation is 
unsubstantiated without further empirical based studies.   
To summarize the AHP methodology, project managers from across a variety of 
disciplines were surveyed to collect their opinions on the FIST values and 18 sub-criteria 
activities.  Those opinions, or pairwise comparisons, were used to determine criteria 
weights in seven different AHP models.  Furthermore, those pairwise comparisons were 
used to examine the internal reliability of the FIST model itself by comparing FIST 
values with FIST activities.  Once the AHP models were developed, 11 selected 
programs were used as alternatives.  The results show a rank order of the 11 programs 
from most FISTy to least.  From the results, conclusion can be drawn about the reliability, 
strengths, and weaknesses of FIST. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
As per the approach outlined in the methodology chapter, the results will be 
presented and then further separated into seven groups according to participant category: 
All Participants, Leaders, Non-Leaders, Military, Civilian, Consistent Responses, and 
Experts.  Seven Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) models were created, one for each 
group, to compare the values of each group of project managers.  The only differences 
between the models are the criteria weights derived from the different groups of project 
managers.  The pairwise comparisons for the alternatives remain the same for all models 
but the end results will differ due to differences in criteria weights. 
The experiment collected 75 responses from project managers.  The participants’ 
identities are anonymous, and any voluntary feedback on the experiment that is used in 
this thesis was approved by the participant.  Forty participants were civilians with no 
military experience, and 35 participants were military project managers ranging in rank 
from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel.  There were also two government 
civilians (GS) in the military group who are project managers that work for the Air Force 
as civilians.  Forty-three participants had leadership positions in project management, and 
32 participants had no leadership experience. CGO is an abbreviation of Company Grade 
Officer and represents the ranks of Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, and Captain.  
FGO stands for Field Grade Officer and represents the ranks of Major, Lieutenant 
Colonel, and Colonel.  While the sample of GS and FGOs is too small to interpret, their 
inclusion in the various models bolsters the number of participants.  To increase the 
reliability of the models, more participants are required.  Table 5 depicts the number of 
participants in each group. 
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Avg. Years of Experience 11.21
CGO 28
FGO 5
GS 2
Civilian 40
TOTAL 75
Leaders 42
Non-Leaders 33
TOTAL 75
DEMOGRAPHICS
All Leader Non-Leader Military Civilian Consistent Expert
Avg. Years of Experience 11.21 14.53 6.94 5.83 15.85 8.41 17.25
CGO 28 12 16 28 0 14 0
FGO 5 4 1 5 0 3 3
GS 2 1 1 2 0 0 0
Civilian 40 25 15 0 40 11 34
TOTAL 75 42 33 35 40 28 37
Leaders 42 42 0 17 25 10 25
Non-Leaders 33 0 33 18 15 18 12
TOTAL 75 42 33 35 40 28 37
 
  
All Participants Results 
The All Participants model includes every response to the experiment with no 
distinction for military, experience, or consistency of answers.  As seen in Table 6, there 
were 75 participants with an average of 11.2 years of project management experience.  
These 75 responses created the model seen in Table 7.  The numbers in the table denote 
the priority vector or weight of each criterion. 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
Table 6:  All Participants Model Demographic 
Information 
Table 5: Participants by Model 
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FIST-AHP MODEL All
FAST 0.324
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.135
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.249
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.243
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.171
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.202
INEXPENSIVE 0.216
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.226
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.211
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.161
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.270
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.132
SIMPLE 0.313
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.108
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.186
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.246
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.272
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.188
TINY 0.147
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.293
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.381
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.326
   
Of the four FIST values, Fast was ranked the highest at 0.324, followed by Simple 
(0.313), Inexpensive (0.216), and Tiny (0.147).  The sub-criteria activities are only 
compared to other activities within the same FIST value.  In other words, each Fast 
activity is only compared to other Fast activities.  The activity weights represent which 
activity is deemed most prominent only under that FIST value.  A comparison cannot be 
made between different FIST sub-criteria activities using this model.  For example, one 
cannot compare the Fast activity of Formal commitment to maintain deadlines to the 
Inexpensive activity of Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost because 
the activities are part of different FIST values.     
However, in order to be able to compare all the FIST activities to one another, 
regardless of FIST value, a sub-criteria model was created.  This model is based on 
Table 7:  All Participants FIST-AHP Model 
52 
RANK WEIGHT
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 1 0.083
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 2 0.081
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 3 0.081
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 4 0.079
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 5 0.077
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas 6 0.076
Formal commitment to maintain budget 7 0.068
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 8 0.065
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 9 0.064
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 10 0.051
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 11 0.043
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 12 0.041
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 13 0.039
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 14 0.037
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 15 0.031
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 16 0.031
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 17 0.027
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 18 0.025
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
All
responses from project managers that compared all the FIST activities to one another 
with no distinction for which activities belonged to each FIST value.  Table 8 shows a 
ranked order of the FIST activities from most valued to least in regard to system 
development and project management.  The top three activities are Importance of 
Simplicity, Importance of Low-Cost, and Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines.  
Interestingly, each of these top activities belongs to a different FIST value (Simple, 
Inexpensive, and Fast).  The least valued activities are Accept Risk to Reduce Cost, 
System Capability Less than Previous System, and Importance of Small.   
 
 
Table 8:  All Participants Sub-Criteria Model 
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Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.17 1 FAST 0.324 FAST 0.307
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.169 0.996 SIMPLE 0.313 SIMPLE 0.304
F-20 Tigershark F 0.126 0.743 INEXPENSIVE 0.216 INEXPENSIVE 0.281
P-51 Mustang A 0.111 0.655 TINY 0.147 TINY 0.107
MRAP A 0.109 0.642
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.103 0.609
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.091 0.537
C-5 Galaxy A 0.07 0.412
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.018 0.107
V-22 Osprey A 0.017 0.099
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.093
All
FIST Combined Activity RankingFIST Value Ranking
Using the model developed in Table 7, the 11 programs were evaluated based on 
the 18 sub-criteria activities.  Appendix G contains the raw results from Expert Choice 
TM
.  Table 9 summarizes the results of the All Participants model.   The missions are 
ranked from most FISTy to least.  The Actual Outcome column identifies if the program 
was deemed a real world success qualitatively by delivering promised capabilities and 
fulfilling program requirements. An outcome score of an ‘A’ signifies a successful 
program and an ‘F’ signifies a failure.  This score does not take into account if the 
program remained on budget or schedule, only if the eventual product was an operational 
success.   
The FIST Value Ranking column shows a rank order of importance for the FIST 
values derived from Table 7.  The FIST Combined Activity Ranking column is a 
summation of the activities in Table 8, per FIST value.  By comparing the FIST Value 
Ranking and FIST Combined Activity Ranking columns, one can infer on the internal 
validity of the model.   
  
 
Table 9:  All Participants Model Results 
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In this model, the A-10 Thunderbolt II and NASA Mars Pathfinder mission were 
the highest ranked programs.  This shows that these programs were the most FISTy in 
their development.  The A-10 and Mars Pathfinder were also deemed a success 
operationally.  The V-22 Osprey and RAH-66 Comanche had exceedingly low scores 
because their development was lengthy, expensive, and complicated.  The V-22 was 
considered an operational success despite its poor development whereas the RAH-66 was 
a total failure by not delivering a single aircraft.  It is worth noting that the F-20 
Tigershark and XP-75 Eagle received high FIST scores while being considered failures 
operationally.  This disconnect will be further examined in Chapter V. This model has 
matching internal validity as participants ranked the FIST values and FIST activities in 
the same order of importance.   
Leaders Results 
 This model includes all the respondents who stated they have leadership positions 
in the project management field.  This model contains both military and civilian leaders 
and will serve as a basis of comparison against the Non-Leader model.  By observing the 
difference in the values, conclusions can be drawn as to whether project managers are 
using the same vision as the leaders.  The difference in values could account for some 
project management failures.  As shown in Table 10, there were 42 participants in this 
model with an average of 14.5 years of experience. 
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Avg. Years of Experience 14.53
CGO 12
FGO 4
GS 1
Civilian 25
TOTAL 42
Leaders 42
Non-Leaders 0
TOTAL 42
LEADER DEMOGRAPHICS
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 11 displays the weights derived from the leaders’ input.  Leaders’ 
emphasized the importance of Fast and Simple values and placed low prominence on 
Tiny.  Tiny seems to be a low ranked FIST value because many projects are not supposed 
to be small such as cargo aircraft, bridges, or highway systems.  Based on feedback from 
project managers, the Tiny concept was understood as maintaining a small team and 
minimal documentation.  Nevertheless, leaders did not rank Tiny as a highly important 
value.  
  
Table 10:  Leader Model Demographic Information 
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FIST-AHP MODEL Leader
FAST 0.337
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.151
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.277
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.210
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.161
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.201
INEXPENSIVE 0.208
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.252
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.192
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.161
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.251
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.144
SIMPLE 0.290
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.125
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.169
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.250
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.270
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.187
TINY 0.165
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.301
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.374
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.325
 
The sub-criteria model, shown in Table 12, allows all the FIST activities to be 
compared to each other.  Leaders deemed Formal commitments to maintain deadlines 
and budget as the most important activities in the FIST framework. 
Table 11:  Leader FIST-AHP Model 
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RANK WEIGHT
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 1 0.090
Formal commitment to maintain budget 2 0.077
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 3 0.069
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 3 0.069
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 3 0.069
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 4 0.068
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 5 0.062
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 6 0.061
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 7 0.052
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 8 0.051
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 10 0.049
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 9 0.049
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 11 0.045
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 12 0.044
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 13 0.040
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 14 0.040
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 15 0.036
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 16 0.029
Leader
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Table 13:  Leaders Model Results 
Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.17 1 FAST 0.337 FAST 0.329
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.17 0.999 SIMPLE 0.29 INEXPENSIVE 0.298
F-20 Tigershark F 0.126 0.74 INEXPENSIVE 0.208 SIMPLE 0.252
P-51 Mustang A 0.113 0.662 TINY 0.165 TINY 0.121
MRAP A 0.11 0.646
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.1 0.588
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.091 0.537
C-5 Galaxy A 0.069 0.407
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.018 0.108
V-22 Osprey A 0.017 0.099
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.093
Leader
FIST Combined Activity RankingFIST Value Ranking
   
Table 13 summarizes the results of the Leaders Model.  The shaded cells in the 
FIST Value Rankings and FIST Combined Activity Rankings columns represent 
inconsistencies in this model.  The leaders ranked Simple as the second most influential 
FIST value.  However, the summation of all the FIST activities shows leaders place more 
importance on Inexpensive activities rather than Simple activities.  With the project 
managers being leaders in this model, it is not surprising that they ranked individual 
budget activities high.  There are minimal differences between this model and the All 
Participants model results.    
Table 12:  Leaders Sub-Criteria Model 
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Avg. Years of Experience 6.94
CGO 16
FGO 1
GS 1
Civilian 15
TOTAL 33
Leaders 0
Non-Leaders 33
TOTAL 33
NON-LEADER DEMOGRAPHICS
Non-Leaders Results 
 The Non-Leader model consists of 33 participants who answered they had no 
leadership experience in project management.  With an average of 6.9 years of 
experience, this model is almost half military and half civilian.  The purpose of this 
model is to capture the opinion of the project managers who oversee the daily activities 
of a project.  These are the frontline project managers who interpret and execute the 
strategic direction of leadership into managing the project.   Table 14 summarizes the 
participants who were used in creating this model. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 15 displays the Non-Leader model weights for each FIST value and 
activity.  Simple was the most important FIST value in this model followed by Fast.  This 
differs from that of the leadership model where Fast is the highest ranked value. 
 
Table 14:  Non-Leader Model Demographic Information 
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RANK WEIGHT
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 1 0.084
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 2 0.082
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 3 0.080
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 4 0.074
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 5 0.072
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 6 0.065
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 6 0.065
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 7 0.064
Formal commitment to maintain budget 8 0.057
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 8 0.057
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 9 0.052
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 10 0.047
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 11 0.042
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 12 0.037
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 13 0.034
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 14 0.031
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 14 0.031
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 15 0.026
Non-Leader
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
FIST-AHP MODEL Non-Leader
FAST 0.305
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.114
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.209
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.294
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.184
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.200
INEXPENSIVE 0.225
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.192
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.237
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.159
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.259
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.115
SIMPLE 0.346
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.088
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.212
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.239
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.270
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.189
TINY 0.124
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.281
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.392
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.326
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 depicts a rank order of which FIST sub-criteria activities Non-Leaders 
considered most valuable.  These results are consistent with the previous models’ results.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15:  Non-Leader FIST-AHP Model 
Table 16:  Non-Leaders Sub-Criteria Model 
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Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.169 1 SIMPLE 0.346 SIMPLE 0.311
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.168 0.991 FAST 0.305 FAST 0.299
F-20 Tigershark F 0.127 0.75 INEXPENSIVE 0.225 INEXPENSIVE 0.275
P-51 Mustang A 0.109 0.645 TINY 0.124 TINY 0.115
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.108 0.637
MRAP A 0.107 0.633
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.091 0.539
C-5 Galaxy A 0.07 0.416
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.018 0.104
V-22 Osprey A 0.017 0.098
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.094
Non-Leader
FIST Value Ranking FIST Combined Activity Ranking
Table 17 provides a summary of the results for this model.  The Non-Leader 
model was consistent in that participants’ judgments on the FIST values matched those of 
the FIST activities. 
 
There are minimal differences in this model’s rankings of alternatives compared 
to the previous models.  Specifically, the MRAP was ranked sixth in this model and the 
XP-75 Eagle was ranked fifth.  Most models reversed this ranking with the MRAP being 
ranked higher than the XP-75.  Lastly, this is the first model to rank both the Simple value 
and combined Simple activities as most important.   
  
Table 17:  Non-Leaders Model Results 
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Avg. Years of Experience 5.83
CGO 28
FGO 5
GS 2
Civilian 0
TOTAL 35
Leaders 17
Non-Leaders 18
TOTAL 35
MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS
Military Results 
 The Military model consists of only military officers and government civilian 
project managers.  Their experience in project management is shaped by DoD policy and 
government programs.  This model was used as a basis of comparison against the 
Civilian model in order to discern if the military was ignoring any private industry 
practices in project management.  These project managers have an average of 5.8 years of 
experience, which is the least experience of all the models.  Almost half of this model’s 
participants are leaders, but the vast majority are young CGOs.  Table 18 summarizes the 
participants for this model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The FIST-AHP model is shown in Table 19.  Simple and Fast are the highest 
ranked FIST values, with Simple marginally more important.  Tiny is by far the least 
significant value to this group of project managers. 
  
Table 18:  Military Model Demographic Information 
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FIST-AHP MODEL Military
FAST 0.325
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.129
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.190
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.290
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.169
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.221
INEXPENSIVE 0.232
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.190
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.255
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.157
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.276
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.123
SIMPLE 0.327
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.105
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.224
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.257
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.272
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.142
TINY 0.115
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.276
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.397
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.327
  
  Table 20 shows a rank order of the FIST activities that military project 
managers’ value.  Military project managers find it important to be proactive in reducing 
both development time and cost.  Furthermore, low-cost solutions are a highly ranked 
activity.  Further differences between military and civilian project management values 
will be explored in Chapter V.   
 
 
  
Table 19:  Military FIST-AHP Model 
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RANK WEIGHT
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 1 0.083
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 2 0.082
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 3 0.075
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 4 0.074
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 5 0.073
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 5 0.073
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 6 0.068
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 8 0.062
Formal commitment to maintain budget 7 0.062
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 9 0.053
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 10 0.051
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 11 0.042
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 11 0.042
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 12 0.038
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 13 0.037
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 14 0.031
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 15 0.027
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 16 0.026
Military
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
  
The results of the military model are summarized in Table 21. The shaded cells 
represent disconnects between FIST values and FIST activities.  For example, the 
military valued Simple (0.327) as the highest FIST value but the combination of the five 
Simple activities (0.279) ranked third in the sub-criteria model.  This could be due to 
Simple and Fast being closely ranked in the FIST-AHP model.  Moreover, combining 
military leaders and non-leaders may have disrupted the consistency of this model.  
  The Military model ranked the XP-75 Eagle fourth.  This is the highest this 
program was ranked in any of the models.  This failed WWII fighter aircraft outranked 
the successful P-51 Mustang.    
 
 
 
Table 20:  Military Sub-Criteria Model 
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Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.17 1 SIMPLE 0.327 FAST 0.311
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.166 0.976 FAST 0.325 INEXPENSIVE 0.31
F-20 Tigershark F 0.123 0.722 INEXPENSIVE 0.232 SIMPLE 0.279
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.112 0.657 TINY 0.115 TINY 0.099
P-51 Mustang A 0.109 0.642
MRAP A 0.108 0.631
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.094 0.55
C-5 Galaxy A 0.068 0.397
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.018 0.103
V-22 Osprey A 0.017 0.097
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.093
Military
FIST Value Ranking FIST Combined Activity Ranking
  
Civilian Model Results 
 This population of participants was selected from private industry companies 
specializing in the project management profession.  These project managers have 
completed such projects as hospitals, highway systems, and bridges.  Since most project 
managers in these companies started out as engineers and became project managers as 
they advanced and gained knowledge, this model has an average of 15.9 years of project 
management experience.  The civilian project managers do not have any experience with 
DoD projects, and their experience is acquired from profit and performance driven goals.  
Not only must these project managers ensure the project reaches completion with the 
desired capabilities, but they must earn a profit. Therefore, these project managers are 
particularly concerned with maintaining the schedule and budget.  Table 22 summarizes 
the demographics of the civilian participants. 
 
  
 
 
Table 21:  Military Model Results 
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FIST-AHP MODEL Civilian
FAST 0.321
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.138
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.308
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.205
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.169
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.181
INEXPENSIVE 0.200
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.260
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.177
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.163
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.262
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.138
SIMPLE 0.298
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.110
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.155
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.231
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.267
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.237
TINY 0.181
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.308
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.368
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.324
Avg. Years of Experience 15.85
CGO 0
FGO 0
GS 0
Civilian 40
TOTAL 40
Leaders 25
Non-Leaders 15
TOTAL 40
CIVILIAN DEMOGRAPHICS
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Civilian model is summarized in Table 23.  Civilian project managers ranked 
Fast as the highest FIST value followed by Simple and Inexpensive.  The Civilian model 
is similar to the All Participants and Leader models. 
  
 
Table 22:  Civilian Model Demographic Information 
Table 23:  Civilian FIST-AHP Model 
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RANK WEIGHT
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 1 0.097
Formal commitment to maintain budget 2 0.075
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 3 0.074
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 4 0.070
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 5 0.069
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 6 0.067
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 7 0.063
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 8 0.058
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 9 0.052
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 10 0.050
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 11 0.048
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 12 0.047
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 13 0.043
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 14 0.042
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 14 0.042
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 15 0.041
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 16 0.034
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 17 0.028
Civilian
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
 
Table 24 depicts the FIST activities in order of importance judged by civilian 
project managers.  One point of interest is that civilians ranked accepting risk as low in 
importance.   Furthermore, the civilians ranked Emphasis on the importance of and 
reliance on employees’ talent higher than any other model.  
  
 
  The results from the Civilian model are presented in Table 25.  There is only a 
slight inconsistency between the FIST values and FIST activities of Simple and 
Inexpensive.  The alternatives rankings are similar to previous models with no 
noteworthy differences. 
Table 24:  Civilian Sub-Criteria Model 
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Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.172 1 FAST 0.321 FAST 0.321
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.169 0.983 SIMPLE 0.298 INEXPENSIVE 0.272
F-20 Tigershark F 0.13 0.755 INEXPENSIVE 0.2 SIMPLE 0.271
P-51 Mustang A 0.113 0.657 TINY 0.181 TINY 0.136
MRAP A 0.11 0.64
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.095 0.554
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.089 0.519
C-5 Galaxy A 0.072 0.417
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.019 0.109
V-22 Osprey A 0.017 0.099
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.092
Civilian
FIST Value Ranking FIST Combined Activity Ranking
 
Consistent Response Results 
 The Consistent model was developed due to the AHP principle that judgment 
matrices are only considered adequate if the consistency ratio (CR) is less than 10%.  
Expert Choice 
TM
 software calculates the CR for both the FIST value experiment and the 
FIST sub-criteria activities experiment.  Almost all participants had valid FIST value CRs 
because there are only six judgments required.  The fewer the number of judgments, the 
easier it is to gain consistency.  The FIST sub-criteria activities model had 153 judgments 
and consistency was much more difficult to maintain.  Therefore, only participants who 
have a CR of 0.10 or less in the FIST sub-criteria model are included in this model.  
Table 26 outlines the demographics for this model’s participants.  This model contains 28 
participants and is a combination of military, civilian, leaders, and non-leaders with an 
average experience of 8.4 years.  The model does not reflect the beliefs of a certain group 
or experience level of project managers but rather participants who were consistent in 
their answers.  The benefit of consistency is that the results should be more valid in that 
they do not contradict each other.  Likewise, perhaps more time and thought was put into 
answering the comparisons to obtain acceptable consistency.  
Table 25:  Civilian Model Results 
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Avg. Years of Experience 8.41
CGO 14
FGO 3
GS 0
Civilian 11
TOTAL 28
Leaders 10
Non-Leaders 18
TOTAL 28
CONSISTENT DEMOGRAPHICS
FIST-AHP MODEL Consistent
FAST 0.297
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.127
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.229
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.280
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.159
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.206
INEXPENSIVE 0.206
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.225
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.281
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.138
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.246
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.111
SIMPLE 0.374
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.098
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.243
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.244
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.269
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.146
TINY 0.123
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.248
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.456
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.296
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 describes the Consistent model and weights for each criterion.  Simple 
and Fast were heavily favored in this model.  Tiny was ranked of low importance in this 
model similar to the previous models described. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26:  Consistent Model Demographic Information 
Table 27:  Consistent FIST-AHP Model 
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Table 29:  Consistent Sub-Criteria Model 
RANK WEIGHT
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 1 0.082
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 2 0.081
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 3 0.078
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 4 0.075
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 4 0.075
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 5 0.073
Formal commitment to maintain budget 6 0.067
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 7 0.066
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 8 0.064
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 9 0.055
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 10 0.047
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 11 0.043
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 12 0.041
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 13 0.037
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 14 0.032
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 15 0.031
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 16 0.028
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 17 0.027
Consistent
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.169 1 SIMPLE 0.374 SIMPLE 0.303
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.168 0.997 FAST 0.297 FAST 0.299
F-20 Tigershark F 0.128 0.756 INEXPENSIVE 0.206 INEXPENSIVE 0.286
P-51 Mustang A 0.111 0.655 TINY 0.123 TINY 0.114
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.11 0.651
MRAP A 0.105 0.622
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.093 0.549
C-5 Galaxy A 0.068 0.402
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.017 0.103
V-22 Osprey A 0.016 0.097
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.092
Consistent
FIST Value Ranking FIST Combined Activity Ranking
The sub-criteria model is presented in Table 28.  Many of the Simple activities are 
ranked high in this model.  The Consistent model results are shown in Table 29.  The 
model’s consistency matches as the FIST values and FIST activities match in order of 
importance.   
  
 
Table 28:  Consistent Model Results 
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Avg. Years of Experience 17.25
CGO 0
FGO 3
GS 0
Civilian 34
TOTAL 37
Leaders 25
Non-Leaders 12
TOTAL 37
EXPERT DEMOGRAPHICS
Expert Model Results 
 The Expert model was developed to incorporate all the project managers who had 
15 years of experience or more in project management, advanced degrees in 
management, or taken part in large programs.  Most of the participants that meet these 
criteria are civilians with the addition of three Lieutenant Colonels.  The average 
experience of this group is 17.2 years and is the most experienced of all the models.  This 
model is considered the most useful in analyzing FIST because these respondents have 
participated in a litany of projects varying in size and complexity.  Having experienced 
many different projects, these 37 participants understand what activities and philosophies 
are truly beneficial to a project.  Table 30 shows the demographics of the expert 
population. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experts ranked the Fast and Simple values exceptionally high compared to 
Inexpensive and Tiny.  Table 31 shows the weights of the four FIST values and 18 FIST 
activities.  This is the only model that does not rank Tiny as the lowest value.   
 
Table 30:  Expert Model Demographic Information 
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FIST-AHP MODEL Expert
FAST 0.326
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 0.141
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 0.295
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 0.198
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 0.178
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 0.188
INEXPENSIVE 0.182
Formal commitment to maintain budget 0.257
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 0.174
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 0.165
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 0.270
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 0.133
SIMPLE 0.309
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 0.112
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 0.156
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 0.245
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 0.269
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 0.218
TINY 0.183
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 0.326
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 0.344
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 0.330
  
Table 32 lists the FIST activities in order of importance according to the experts.  
It is interesting to note that Heavy reliance on existing technology, Accepting project risk 
to reduce cost, and maintain schedule were all low-ranked activities.  These activities 
were much higher ranked in other models. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 31:  Expert FIST-AHP Model 
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RANK WEIGHT
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 1 0.096
Formal commitment to maintain budget 2 0.075
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 3 0.073
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 4 0.070
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 5 0.066
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 5 0.066
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 6 0.062
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization) 7 0.057
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 8 0.056
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 9 0.050
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 10 0.048
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 11 0.046
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 12 0.044
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 13 0.043
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 13 0.043
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 14 0.042
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 15 0.034
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 16 0.028
Expert
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Alternatives Actual Outcome Priority Standardized
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 0.17 1 FAST 0.326 FAST 0.328
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 0.169 0.992 SIMPLE 0.309 INEXPENSIVE 0.272
F-20 Tigershark F 0.129 0.757 TINY 0.183 SIMPLE 0.262
P-51 Mustang A 0.113 0.663 INEXPENSIVE 0.182 TINY 0.137
MRAP A 0.111 0.652
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 0.096 0.563
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 0.088 0.516
C-5 Galaxy A 0.072 0.423
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 0.019 0.109
V-22 Osprey A 0.017 0.1
RAH-66 Comanche F 0.016 0.093
FIST Value Ranking FIST Combined Activity Ranking
Expert
  
  The experts’ results are summarized in Tabled 33.  The inconsistencies are 
highlighted where Inexpensive is the lowest ranked value, but the second ranked 
cumulative FIST activity.  It is worth noting that there is only a small difference in the 
ranking between Inexpensive and Simple in the FIST Combined Activity Ranking.  
Furthermore, it is a reoccurring theme that Inexpensive FIST activities are receiving a 
higher ranking than the Inexpensive FIST value.  This could be due to Inexpensive not 
being fully understood as a value but appreciated when decomposed into activities. 
Table 32:  Expert Sub-Criteria Model 
Table 33:  Expert Model Results 
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Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the seven models derived from the 
acquisition experiment and the ensuing alternatives ranking.  The various models were 
purposely developed to facilitate a comparison analysis between the different populations 
of project managers.  It is now possible to quantitatively analyze any differences between 
civilian project managers and their military counterparts which could explain the 
separation in performance.  Additionally, other questions can be evaluated such as, is 
leadership and non-leaders valuing the same ideas?  Could the differences between the 
two groups be due to leaders’ antiquated view of project management?  Or, is it that non-
leaders do not have the experience embodied by leadership, to run a successful project?  
Lastly, based on the All Participants and Experts models, is FIST a valid model to 
develop a program?    Now that the results have been presented and described, the 
significance of the results can be explored in Chapter V. 
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Alternatives OUTCOME WARD'S All Leader Non-Leader Military Civilian Consistent Expert AVERAGE
A-10 Thunderbolt II A 2 (35) 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1.57
NASA Mars Pathfinder A 1 (40) 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1.43
F-20 Tigershark F 2 (35) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00
P-51 Mustang A 2 (35) 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4.14
MRAP A 4 (15) 5 5 6 6 5 6 5 5.43
XP-75 / P-75 Eagle F 3 (25) 6 6 5 4 6 5 6 5.43
E-3 Sentry AWACS A 5 (5) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.00
C-5 Galaxy A 7 (-15) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8.00
NASA Mars Viking Mission A 6 (-10) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9.00
V-22 Osprey A 8 (-20) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10.00
RAH-66 Comanche F 8 (-20) 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11.00
ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS RESULTS
V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this research was to empirically theory-test FIST through the 
development of an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) model to be applied as a 
comparative tool.  It appears certain programs are more determined to succeed under 
FIST than other types of programs.  Direct comparisons between similar programs will be 
explored to reveal FIST short comings.  These new insights will lead to recommendations 
for changes to the FIST model, FIST’s validity, and future use.  Last, the difference in 
results between groups of program managers will reveal insights into the values of each 
population.   
Results Discussion 
 When a program receives a high FIST score, either under Ward’s (2009) FIST 
model or the FIST-AHP model, this means the program was developed in accordance to 
the FIST theory.  This does not mean that the program will be an operational success.  
Table 34 shows how each project management group ranked each program.  The table is 
sorted by the All Participants model, and the shaded cells represent deviations from this 
model.    
  
Table 34:  Alternatives Analysis Results 
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Remarkably, there are not significant differences between the models.  Also, the 
results are similar to Ward’s (2009) ranking of the programs.  This is not surprising as the 
AHP model is based on the FIST rubric with the only alterations being different weights 
for each activity.  Therefore, the results are artificially correlated due to having the same 
activities for measures.   
Table 35 is the accumulation of all FIST rankings to date on Ward’s (2009) 
original 22 programs.  In the table, the bold program title represents Ward’s (2009) 
original FIST ranking.  The Co-Evaluator rankings are also taken from his thesis.  The 
Primary Investigator ranking represents the research completed in this thesis that 
analyzes the previously stated 11 programs.  The Capstone Report ranking is acquired 
from the capstone project report on FIST completed by Tran and Ocampo (2012).    
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ALTERNATIVES F I S T TOTAL OUTCOME
NASA Pathfinder Mission 10 10 10 10 40 A
Co-Evaluator 5 10 10 10 35 A
Primary Investigator 10 10 10 10 40 A
NASA NEAR Mission 10 10 10 10 40 A
Co-Evaluator 10 10 10 10 40 A
F-16 Falcon 10 10 10 10 40 A
Co-Evaluator 10 10 10 10 40 A
A-10 Thunderbolt 10 10 10 5 35 A
Capstone Report 5 5 5 0 15 A
Primary Investigator 10 10 10 10 40 A
Pave Low III 10 10 10 10 40 A
Skunkworks 10 10 10 10 40 A
P-51 Mustang 10 5 10 10 35 A
Primary Investigator 10 5 10 10 35 A
F-5 Freedom Fighter 5 10 10 10 35 A
F-20 Tigershark 5 10 10 10 35 F
Co-Evaluator 0 10 10 10 30 F
Primary Investigator 5 10 10 5 30 F
AD Skyraider 10 5 10 5 30 A
E-3 Sentry (AWACS) 5 0 0 0 5 A
Co-Evaluator 10 10 5 0 25 A
Primary Investigator 5 10 5 5 25 A
XP-75 Eagle 10 10 5 0 25 F
Primary Investigator 0 10 5 -5 10 F
C-5 Galaxy 0 -5 -5 -5 -15 A
Primary Investigator 5 5 5 0 15 A
Capstone Report 0 5 0 0 5 A
MRAP 10 0 5 0 15 A
Primary Investigator 5 -5 0 -5 -5 F
F-15 Eagle -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 A
Co-Evaluator n/a 0 0 0 0 A
Crusader Artillery -5 -5 0 -5 -15 F
NASA Viking Mission 0 -5 -5 0 -10 A
Primary Investigator -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 A
V-22 Osprey -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 A
Primary Investigator -5 -5 -5 0 -15 A
Future Imagery Architecture -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F
Division Air Defense (DIVAD) -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F
F-22 Raptor -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F
RH-66 Comanche -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F
Primary Investigator -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is immediately evident that there is a better rankings consensus among 
programs that scored extremely well or extremely poor.  This is not a strength of the 
FIST model as these programs were such standout developmental successes or failures 
that their performance is evident.  What is interesting is how dissimilar many of the 
Table 35: FIST Rankings of all 22 Programs 
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rankings are for programs that were not such obvious successes or failures.  The FIST 
rubric’s reliability is crucial for programs with undistinguished development.  For 
example, the C-5 Galaxy program received a -15 score from Ward (2009) but a 15 and 5 
from subsequent investigators.  Furthermore, the MRAP received a FIST score of 15 
from Ward (2009) as well as an A for outcome but this research ranked the program with 
a FIST score of -5 and an F for outcome.  Table 35 shows that there are significant 
deviations between rankings completed by different investigators.  If the original FIST 
rubric analysis was truly reproducible, these rankings should be significantly more 
similar. 
The FIST-AHP model is largely able to replicate Ward’s (2009) findings by 
analyzing missions based on each of the 18 FIST activities.  However, the same 
replication is not realized when the programs are scored based on the four FIST values.  
The difference is accounted for in the subjectivity of the four FIST values.  Multiple 
researchers can read the same case study and leave with differing opinions on a 
program’s incorporation of the FIST values because of the vagueness of the rubric and 
definition of the values.  However, when researchers are only analyzing one of the 18 
FIST activities at a time, the subjectively is reduced.  As seen in the alternatives analysis, 
when the researcher scrutinizes one discrete event in a program history, it becomes 
apparent if the activity was completed, ignored, or if the information was not available.   
XP-75 Eagle vs. P-51 Mustang 
The XP-75 Eagle and P-51 Mustang are two WWII fighter aircraft that score well 
under the FIST model but operationally, are opposites.  The failed XP-75 Eagle program 
receives lower scores in the AHP model than in the FIST model.  The XP-75 performed 
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poorly in the formal commitment to maintain deadline activity as a six month delay ended 
up cancelling the program.  The delay forced production to occur too late in the war.  
Also, the Tiny aspect of the program was not appreciated as the XP-75 was substantially 
heavier than any other successful WWII fighter aircraft (Holley, 1987:592).  The factor 
that led to these problems was utilizing the FIST activity, heavy reliance on existing, 
mature, proven technology.  “… More and more evidence emerged to indict the whole 
scheme to use off-the-shelf stock components to build a superior high-performance 
aircraft” (Holley, 1987:591).  Consequently, the XP-75 had to be continuously modified 
and redesigned to use preexisting parts from other airframes successfully.  These factors 
drove down the XP-75’s score under the AHP model.  A sensitivity graph comparing 
these two programs is shown in Figure 7.  The graph shows that the Tiny aspect of the P-
51 program was significantly better than the XP-75.   
 
Figure 7: P-51 vs. XP-75 Sensitivity Graph 
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During the same time as the XP-75, the P-51 Mustang was an operational success 
and follower of the FIST theory.  The Mustang was developed quickly in 117 days and 
was a cost effective capability to field (Ward, 2009).  The P-51 was simple and “does not 
to any extent embody previously unknown engineering features, but rather employed 
refinements of known accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129).  Furthermore, the 
Mustang was Tiny.  It could easily be maintained with existing tools and did not require 
an extensive supply chain (Sanders, 1942).  
So why was the XP-75 a failure and the P-51 a success if both programs score 
well under the FIST model, both were developed during the same time period, and both 
had similar capabilities?  The key is the use of existing technology.  The P-51 refined 
existing technology to design a superior aircraft, whereas the XP-75 tried to brute-force, 
piecemeal an advanced aircraft from parts in production from other airframes.  This 
teaches a valuable lesson in how to incorporate existing technology.  If done 
inappropriately, the consequences can ruin a program through costly redesigns and 
schedule delays.  “Many assume that reuse of existing components will reduce risk and 
deployment time directly.  Rather, a different risk is realized – the risk of using a 
component in a potentially different application, with an unknown requirements and 
development (and manufacturing) history” (Lepore et al., 2012:20).   
This example also highlights a weakness in the FIST model.  The FIST model 
should advocate incremental development to accompany the use of existing technology.  
When existing technology and incremental development are utilized from the beginning 
of a program, known and unknown technical enhancements can be integrated into the 
system easily.  Incremental development is successful when employing “open 
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architectures, modular concepts, clearly defining system interfaces, and utilizing industry 
standards” (Lepore et al., 2012:20).  The pairing of existing technology and incremental 
development reduces system complexity, extends system lifecycle, and enhances the 
system’s ability to adapt to emerging threats and technology.  Upgrading a current system 
is much more cost efficient and faster than developing a whole new platform, merely to 
incorporate a single new piece of technology.  By planning to use incremental 
development from project initiation, upgrading is easy and efficient because the system 
has been modularly designed with appropriate interfaces to accept advancements.  “The 
record of North American’s P-51 Mustang fighter proves, however, that it is both 
possible and practical to create a single basic design that can be modified, as military 
needs dictate, to keep abreast of requirements” (Nelson, 1944:127). 
NASA Mars Viking vs. Pathfinder Mission 
The NASA Viking and Pathfinder missions were both operational successes but 
on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of following a FIST development.  The Viking 
mission was launched in 1975 and upon landing on Mars in 1976, was the first space 
probe to obtain images of the surface of Mars.  Originally designed to operate for 90 days 
on the Martian surface, the Viking spacecraft collected data for six years (Viking: 
Mission to Mars).  The Mars Pathfinder was launched 20 years later in December 1996.  
The purpose of its mission was to demonstrate the technology to deliver a lander and 
rover on the Martian surface in a low cost and efficient manner. 
 The Viking mission is considered a developmental failure when viewed through a 
FIST framework (Ward, 2009).  The Viking mission was rampant with complexity, 
delays, and cost overruns.  The project team was massive and geographically spread out.  
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Conversely, the Pathfinder mission followed the FIST ideology almost perfectly by 
adhering to an aggressive schedule and budget by sacrificing performance and system 
redundancy.  Inexpensive was the primary driver of the Pathfinder mission, and Simple 
and Tiny were the means of achieving it (Ward, 2009).  A sensitivity graph in Figure 8 
compares the two NASA programs which clearly shows the Pathfinder mission as the 
more FISTy program. 
 
  
This example is used to expose another weakness of the FIST methodology.  This 
weakness is that certain programs are a better fit for FIST than others.  The Pathfinder 
mission had 20 years of technology advancements and gained knowledge from the 
Viking mission to use during its development.  "The Viking team didn't know the 
Martian atmosphere very well, we had almost no idea about the terrain or the rocks…” 
(Viking: Mission to Mars).  While it is stated that the Pathfinder team was asked to 
design, build, and launch their spacecraft in three years as opposed to the six years 
Figure 8: Viking vs. Pathfinder Sensitivity Graph 
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afforded to the Viking mission, the Pathfinder program was replicating much of the 
existing technology developed by the Viking mission (McCurdy, 2001).  The timeline did 
not need to be as long as the Viking mission, which produced the first two spacecraft to 
land on Mars successfully (Viking: Mission to Mars).  The Pathfinder team had 
information available to them on the atmospheric and surface conditions of Mars as well 
as shock and vibration environments experienced by the Viking lander and rover.  
Therefore, the Pathfinder team had a baseline to work from and could sacrifice 
redundancy and performance without the fear of crippling the entire mission. 
 What this comparison shows is that FIST is a poor fit for programs accomplishing 
a first-time feat with minimum proven technology and information available.  There are 
always going to be programs that are the first to use a new technology or fill a new 
capability gap.  These programs cannot effectively be fully Simple or inherently Fast and 
Inexpensive because the purpose of such programs is to advance the DoD capability 
beyond what is currently available.  If the purpose of a program was not to improve the 
capability of a currently available system, then the current solution would simply be 
maintained.  There is always going to be a need to improve military capability in order to 
remain ahead of the enemy and adapt to the ever-changing battlefield.  Maturing new 
technology and incorporating it into a system takes a certain amount of time that is only 
hampered if developed under the FIST theory.  The V-22 Osprey and F-22 Raptor would 
look much different if they were developed by FIST.  Instead of an advanced technology 
platform, the programs would probably consist of upgrades to current systems in which 
the proven worth of the upgrades could be questioned in the coming years.  FIST may be 
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considered a Band-Aid solution model that produces an immediate product but requires a 
better solution to be fully developed in the future.    
The FIST theory has advantages in certain programs, but if FIST was blindly 
applied to all programs, the DoD portfolio would be full of cheap and available systems 
that do not fully meet the users’ needs.  FIST advocates accepting risks, reducing 
capability, and using low-cost solutions in order to maintain schedule and budget 
constraints.  This philosophy can be advantageous for repetitive and non-critical 
missions.  It can be argued that if a program is too expensive and lengthy, it will never be 
produced or used on the battlefield.  This was witnessed with RAH-66 Comanche 
helicopter program that was described in Chapter I.  The reverse of this argument is also 
valid.  A system being developed to win the next war is rendered useless if its capability 
is reduced beyond a certain point only to maintain the artificial budget and schedule.  
Reflecting on the two NASA Mars missions, the weakness in FIST’s Simple value is 
observed:   
Inexpensive was the primary driver, and simplicity had to be enforced to bring the 
program in on budget. Simplicity was implemented, but forced a reduction in 
capability. These capability cutbacks were often to the disappointment of the 
users (i.e. the science community), who had to sacrifice the number and types of 
instruments, as well as the duration of the mission. While the Pathfinder 
development team was able to take advantage of technical learning curves and 
didn’t have to pay the cost of invention by their focus on simplicity, the users 
weren’t getting the latest cutting edge science results. According to the FIST 
principles, however, reductions in capability along with the use of mature 
technology are both expected in the pursuit of simplicity. (Ward, 2009:115)  
 
 At what point does the simplification of a mission, in order to meet schedule and 
budget constraints, cause the project to become obsolete or not worth the cost of 
production?  Simple is a double-edged sword with one side being too complex and 
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expensive to pursue and the other being not technologically advanced to meet the user’s 
requirements.  
F-20 Tigershark vs. F-16 Fighting Falcon  
 The F-20 Tigershark fighter aircraft program was a privately funded venture by 
the Northrop Corporation.  In 1986, the program was cancelled after ten years and over 
$1.2 billion spent in development (Martin and Schmidt, 1987).  Northrop and FIST 
consider the development of the F-20 to be a success.  However, not a single F-20 was 
sold to foreign or domestic markets to replace the aging F-5 Freedom Fighter.  The F-20 
program started out with a one page memo stating the Tigershark should have 80 percent 
of the capability of the F-16 at half the cost (Martin and Schmidt, 1987).  The first 
Tigershark was produced 32 months after program initiation and was one month ahead of 
schedule.  After 1500 test flights, Northrop considered the Tigershark to be comparable 
to the F-16 in performance but vastly superior in maintainability and reliability (Martin 
and Schmidt, 1987). 
 The F-20 represents another example of a program that fits well with the FIST 
framework.  The F-20 did not push the technological boundary, was not the first-of-a-
kind product, and had extensive data from previous fighter development programs to 
leverage.  Northrop “obviously benefitted from the technical lessons learned during the 
development of the F-15 and F-16.  They did not push for the cutting edge of 
technology… Northrop’s willingness to derate extra performance for extra reliability and 
maintainability reflected this realization” (Martin and Schmidt, 1987:9).   
 The F-20 Tigershark’s main competitor was the F-16.  The F-20 was 
characterized as an “intermediate-level fighter with less than top-line capabilities and 
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technologies” (Martin and Schmidt, 1987:21).  The F-20s focus was on maintainability, 
reliability, and cost effectiveness of the aircraft.  This adheres to the FIST mindset.  With 
the lenient export policies of the Reagan administration, the F-16 became available for 
purchase by foreign countries.  Countries such as Venezuela and Taiwan demanded the 
highest level of performance in their fighter purchase and chose the F-16 over the F-20 
(Martin and Schmidt, 1987).  Furthermore, the F-16 was being sold at cut-rate prices with 
the tab partially being picked up the U.S. Government (Eskow, 1986).  While the F-20 
program is a FIST developed system, the simplicity of the airframe ended up being its 
undoing.  Ward (2009:64) states, “The FIST values are very possibly the primary cause 
of the failure.”   
It can be argued that the F-20 customers did not have the same values as the 
Tigershark’s developmental team.  Customers ended up valuing performance over 
reliability and maintainability.  Also, most foreign countries did not have the need, from a 
threat standpoint, or the budget to support the F-16 purchase.  However, countries viewed 
the F-16 as an advanced fighter that was thoroughly tested and qualified to outmatch the 
F-20.  If a country purchased the F-20, a neighboring enemy could threaten the whole 
fleet by purchasing F-16s.  “Thus, the foreign governments reasoned, it would be foolish 
to spend $20 million on a plane the Americans won’t fly when you can pay less than that 
for one they will fly” (Eskow, 1986:145).    
 The F-16 Fighting Falcon was not analyzed in this research but was included in 
Ward’s (2009) thesis.  The F-16 was a banner program for following FIST.  The 
difference is that while Simple did contribute to the aircraft’s successful development, it 
did not decrease the performance below what customers deemed acceptable levels.  
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Simple is a complicated value to master in the FIST theory.  Too much Simple and the 
project becomes the F-20 and is outclassed in performance.  Not enough Simple and the 
program turns into the never-ending development like the RAH-66 Comanche and is 
never produced.   A project manager on the NASA Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous 
(NEAR) program stated, “had I incorporated even half of these good ideas, the spacecraft 
would never have been built. Only those changes that could be made with negligible or 
minimal disruption were even considered” (Laufer, 2000:123).  Recommendations for 
how to achieve Simple will be discussed in detail later. 
V-22 Osprey 
The V-22 Osprey program began in the wake of the failed 1980 Iran hostage 
rescue.  Military planners realized the need for a system to have the range and speed of a 
fixed-winged aircraft but the agility and vertical landing of a conventional helicopter.  
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft capable of short takeoff and landing as well as vertical 
takeoff and landing.  The Osprey combines the performance of a helicopter with the long 
range capability of a turboprop aircraft.  The V-22 took 25 years to develop, and price-
per-aircraft was double that of the original estimate.  The Osprey received the worst 
possible FIST score in Ward’s (2009) thesis and was also ranked low in the FIST-AHP 
model.  The program clearly did not follow a FIST mindset for development.  Ward 
(2009) characterized the V-22 as an operational triumph but cautioned that the platform’s 
short track record had not confirmed the Osprey as a true success.  Since the time of his 
thesis, the V-22 has made impressive strides operationally. 
 On 22 March 2011, two V-22 Ospreys launched from a Marine amphibious 
assault vessel in the Mediterranean Sea, and within 90 minutes, rescued an Air Force 
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pilot who crashed in Libya.  “It was the first time Marines had used the V-22 in such a 
mission, and the operation went very well owing to the fact that the V-22 is the only 
aircraft in the world that can fly as far and fast as a turboprop airplane, and then hover or 
land like a helicopter” (Thompson, 2011).  In Ward’s (2009:184) thesis, the V-22 
received the lowest Simple score possible, and he stated, “Simpler, mature alternatives 
are available, such as the EH-101… Project leaders consistently reject these alternatives 
in favor of the new, exciting ‘breakthrough’ tilt-rotor capability.”  In fact, the V-22 is 
changing the way the military conducts operations in a way that any conventional 
helicopter cannot match.  “The unrefueled combat radius of the V-22 is more than twice 
that of the aging Sea Knight helicopters it is replacing, and the V-22 flies over a hundred 
miles per hour faster” (Thompson, 2011). Search-and-rescue missions are conducted in 
hostile territory, and the V-22 is less susceptible to damage than a conventional helicopter 
due to its speed, reduced noise, and design for survivability.  “Designers have built so 
much protection and redundancy into the V-22 that it is probably the safest rotorcraft ever 
constructed” (Thompson, 2011).  It is easy to see why the Osprey received such low 
scores for Simple, but contrary to Ward’s (2009) assertion that alternatives are available 
like the EH-101, the V-22 is operationally unrivaled.  The V-22 is truly a unique 
capability that is saving lives, impressing commanders, and increasing operational 
mission success.  “As one Marine commander in Iraq put it, the Osprey ‘turns Texas into 
Rhode Island,’ greatly increasing the reach of U.S. ground forces with an aircraft that is 
both more versatile and more survivable than any conventional helicopter” (Thompson, 
2011). 
88 
 The V-22 is an example of a program that is not a good fit for the FIST model.  It 
is a new, costly technology that was required to be developed to fill a capability gap.  
Merely upgrading current helicopters would not fulfill the capability gap the V-22 is 
currently accomplishing.  If future tilt-rotor aircraft models are produced, the program 
should consider the FIST approach to development because the technology has been 
matured by the V-22 platform.  When a critical need is realized, utilizing the FIST 
mentality will create a temporary fix, only postponing the complete solution that needs to 
eventually be developed.     
Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle 
 The MRAP program is clearly a program that should have grasped the FIST 
concept during development.  There is an urgent need to provide troops with vehicles that 
can provide protection from roadside bombs.  Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the 
biggest single killer of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq (Sisk, 2012).  The flat-
bottomed Humvee was not adequately protecting troops from this threat.   
There are four reasons the MRAP is the perfect program, from the onset, to be 
developed under FIST.  First, the system needs to reach the war-fighter as quickly as 
possible.  Every day the troops are without this capability, casualties are occurring.  The 
FIST value of Fast can help accomplish rapid development.  Second, a vast number of 
MRAPs are needed on the battlefield to ensure every unit has access to the system.  
Creating an inexpensive system will ensure enough MRAPs can be produced to meet 
demand.  The Inexpensive value in the FIST theory will provide guidance to achieve a 
cost-effective solution.  Third, the blast-defecting, V-shaped hulls are not advanced 
technology that requires time and money to develop.  The technology is not complicated 
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as the MRAP is fundamentally a Humvee with protection from IEDs.  FIST’s Simple 
value can ensure the program maintains performance while not slowing down 
development to incorporate every brilliant idea engineers cultivate.  Fourth, the MRAP 
must consider the Tiny value of FIST.  The MRAP should have weight constraints that 
allow it to be transported by helicopter, ship, and aircraft.  If the weight is not controlled, 
there will be little difference between the MRAP and the medium-armored class of 
vehicles.  Also, the supply chain, such as replacement parts and tools required to service 
the vehicle should be minimized to improve the maintainability and reliability of the 
vehicle.  Tiny has the potential to ensure these characteristics are considered and planned 
for during development.   
The MRAP scored 15 out of 40 possible points in Ward’s (2009) thesis and 
averaged fifth place out of 11 in the AHP model.  The program certainty exhibited some 
aspects of FIST, especially Fast, but not to the extent possible.  While considered an 
operational success by Ward (2009), the MRAP in 2012 is already seeing a decreased 
role.  The last MRAP was moved out of Iraq in April of 2012.  In Afghanistan, only 
limited numbers are still in use (Ewing, 2012).  As of September 2012, the Marine Corps’ 
plan is to retain about 2,500 of the 27,740 vehicles that were produced.  The price of the 
MRAP is between $535,000 and $600,000 depending on the model, but with spare parts 
and upgrades, the vehicle costs an average of $1.29 million each (Sisk, 2012). “The 
heavily-protected vehicles were no more effective at reducing casualties than the medium 
armored vehicles” and the MRAPs are “three times as expensive as medium protected 
vehicles” (Rohlfs and Sullivan, 2012).  Now, having spent nearly $50 billion on the 
MRAP fleet, the military finds little use for it.  Consequently, many newly produced 
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MRAPs will never see the theater and instead will be placed straight into storage (Rogers, 
2012).   
It can be argued that the MRAP was a limited success but ended up being too 
heavy and expensive.  The MRAP is seeing an early retirement after only five years of 
service.  This analysis considers the MRAP a failure due to its limit role and short 
operational life.  This example is used to show that if FIST was properly utilized on the 
MRAP program, the cost and weight might have been reduced to acceptable levels.  
Additionally, the MRAP program highlights many of the characteristics that make a 
program acceptable to be developed by FIST. 
Programs Fit for FIST 
The MRAP concept is an example of a program that fits perfectly within the FIST 
framework for development.  Four characteristics have emerged from the analysis that 
point towards a program using FIST for development: 
 Urgent Need Capabilities 
 Budget Constrained Programs 
 Repeated Programs 
 Not Advancing Technology 
 
Urgent Need Capabilities 
FIST works particularly well with programs that have an urgent need to reach the 
battlefield.  In this case, the project development team must rely on mature technology 
and maintaining deadlines over developing the complete solution.  “Rapid programs 
rarely provide the customer with 100% of what they ask for.  Interviewees expressed the 
typical ‘80% solution’ concept, but also a more realistic… ‘23% solution’ in practice” 
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(Lepore et al., 2012:23).  It is more important for the system to reach the battlefield and 
be used to win the current war, or save lives, than to delay development in pursuit of the 
never-ending 100% solution.  Incremental development and clear customer requirements 
can be applied to get a product quickly into production with the ability to upgrade future 
versions with maturing technology that would otherwise drag development pace to a 
crawl.  Fielding the system quickly and then developing modular block upgrades will 
save money and time as well as increase the lifespan of the system.  Furthermore, 
customers often ask for more capability than they actually need and there is simply not 
enough time to give the customer everything.  Customers have unrealistic expectations of 
the current state of technology, difficulty of requests, and the price of certain capabilities.  
Collaborating in face-to-face meetings with the customer and developing a stable set of 
realistic requirements is crucial to delivering an operationally successful system.  
Requirements should be certified with the customer early and often to establish needs 
based on capabilities.  Requirements creep negatively impacts a program’s schedule, 
budget, and design, and also weakens the scope.  If the project team is uncertain of the 
main purpose of the system due to requirements creep, the operational success is in 
jeopardy. “The acquiring organization must be willing to push back against unfeasible 
requirements, or schedule impacting requirements, in the interest of time” (Lepore et al., 
2012:22).   Incremental development and requirements definition are two areas the FIST 
theory currently does not incorporate.  With research such as that published by Lepore et 
al., showing the importance of these activities in rapid acquisition, these tools should be 
added to the FIST model to ensure urgent needed weapon systems reach the war-fighter 
in a timely manner. 
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Budget Constrained Programs 
Programs that have small, constrained budgets are good candidates for FIST 
development.  Project teams that realize they will not receive additional funding, or that 
future funding could be in danger, would benefit from the FIST framework.  Inexpensive 
programs do not have the budget for a long, drawn-out schedule or for maturing 
technology that is currently undeveloped.  FIST optimizes programs with small budgets 
by using the Simple and Tiny values as tools to maintain schedule and budget.  FIST 
emphasizes implementing existing technology, accepting risks, creating a small 
development team, seeking low-cost solutions, and formally committing to the budget 
and schedule. 
The A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft is a concrete example of a budget constrained, 
successful FIST program.  In the early 1960s, the Air Force emphasized strategic 
bombing and air superiority over close air support (CAS).  While CAS was officially an 
Air Force role, the Air Force did not have a dedicated aircraft specifically designed for 
ground attack and CAS.  As a result, the Army started arming helicopters to supplement 
CAS.  In 1966, The Research and Development Corporation (RAND) conducted a CAS 
study and stated, “The Air Force should take immediate and positive steps to obtain a 
specialized close air support aircraft, simpler and cheaper than the A-7, and with equal or 
better characteristics than the A-1” (Goldberg and Smith, 1971:33).   This statement 
shows, from project initiation, that the A-10 should be simple and inexpensive and also 
utilize technology that is already fielded.  These characteristics are the strengths of the 
FIST model.     
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During the A-10 program development timeline, the Air Force was advancing the 
expensive stealth technology and there was little room in the budget for the A-10 to be 
costly.  Therefore, the emphasis was on fulfilling the capability gap of CAS with the most 
cost-effective solution possible.  What resulted was a proposal for 600 aircraft with a 
design-to-cost goal of $1.4 million unit flyaway cost (FY70$) (Jacques, D. and Strouble, 
2008).  The program produced an aircraft that met cost goals and fulfilled the CAS role.  
In fact, the A-10 is still in use today and has proven its worth in combat over many 
airframes that cost exponentially more to produce.  
As further evidence of the importance of incremental analysis in rapid 
acquisitions, the A-10 developed several different packages of technology in order to 
meet the initial operational capability (IOC) of December 1970.  “The avionics for the A-
X were specified in terms of a ‘skeleton’ package (below minimum requirements), a 
‘lean’ package (met only minimum requirements), and three add-on packages that would 
supplement the ‘lean’ package” (Jacques and Strouble, 2008:20).  Each add-on package 
increased the strike capability of the A-10 but was presented as options to the Air Force, 
each with different costs.  This allowed the Air Force to choose the A-10 package that 
matched the budget with the potential to upgrade in the future should the threat 
environment change.  Incremental development is a technique that fields the system 
quickly and inexpensively while leaving room for future add-ons to increase the 
capability to the desired level.  The added benefit of quick delivery and incremental 
improvement is receiving early feedback from the war-fighter on the system.  Perceived 
upgrades and planned future capabilities may not be required or may go a different 
direction than initially realized.  It is impossible to understand fully how the system will 
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be deployed in the field and which upgrades will be required as opposed to which 
upgrades are a waste of development time and funding.  Allow the war-fighter to use the 
basic system as quickly as possible and incorporate their feedback into block upgrades 
instead of pursuing enhancements that engineers stateside deem as important. 
Repeated Programs 
The previously compared NASA Mars Viking and Pathfinder missions lead into 
the next characteristic of a program fit for FIST.  Programs that are repeated or have vast 
historical data are acceptable programs to be developed under FIST.  The Mars Viking 
mission was not FISTy in its development because it was accomplishing a first-of-a-kind 
mission with little information on the Martian environment.  The Mars Pathfinder 
mission, launched 20 years later, was FISTy and leveraged the lessons learned and data 
derived from the Viking mission to speed up development and reduce costs.  The 
Pathfinder team was able to scale-back technology and redundancy in order to maintain 
schedule and budget. 
Repeat programs, often frequent with space launch missions, can utilize FIST by 
striving to reuse proven technology and leveraging data from previous efforts.  The focus 
should be on integrating the legacy system with new, developed technology as necessary 
based on mission requirements.  Existing technology can be innovatively integrated into a 
platform to create a short term, rapid solution.  In rapid acquisitions, there is not 
sufficient time to mature unproven technology.  Immature technology is a pitfall that 
requires time and money to foster.  “In Technology Readiness Level (TRL) terms, this 
means nothing less than a TRL 6, preferably 7 or 8” to incorporate technology into a 
rapid development program (Lepore et al., 2012:19).  The MRAP vehicle could have 
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taken a FIST approach to development by taking advantage of existing vehicle designs 
and adding the blast-deflecting hulls.  Utilizing proven technology and designs, 
minimizes rework which generally does not add value to a program.  “Rework is perhaps 
the most common form of time-sink that system development projects experience” 
(Lepore et al., 2012:36).  Instead of testing, verification, and validation of an entire 
design, attention can be centered on the upgrades such as the mine-resistant hull of the 
MRAP.  Any program that is merely an evolution of previous systems should employ 
FIST in order to maintain focus on developing the end product quickly while avoiding the 
pitfalls of beyond-state-of-the-art technology and requirements creep.   
Not Advancing Technology 
FIST, with the addition of incremental development, could be used when a system 
can meet user requirements without the use of immature technology.  If the technology 
needed is already in use in other platforms, or is at a sufficient readiness level, the 
program can be developed rapidly.  There are many benefits to rapid development 
including greater stability in project requirements, funding, and personnel.  The project is 
completed so fast that there is a reduced chance of leadership and political change 
affecting the program.  More importantly, the war-fighter receives the capability before 
the threat environment can change and render the platform obsolete.     
FIST can ensure the program makes the correct trade-offs between performance, 
cost, and time.  Incremental development can ensure the program plans for advancements 
to be seamlessly incorporated into the design in the future.  This will keep the system 
relevant and allow emerging technology to be matured in the labs instead of in the 
program office where it would hold up production. 
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The A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft serves as yet another example of the use of 
existing technology innovatively assembled to create a superior capability.  Engineers 
chose a simple design and did not hold up production for the latest advancements because 
the technology was readily available to build a CAS aircraft that met Air Force criteria. 
“The nose of the plane is pointed at the target and a burst of cannon shells squeezed off—
simply, quickly and efficiently” (Burton, 1993:25). 
Programs Unfit for FIST 
 Certain programs in the analysis were operational successes with imperative 
capabilities.  Nevertheless, they were developmental failures and did not resemble the 
FIST methodology.  While these capabilities still needed to be developed, program 
characteristics emerged that showed certain types of programs do not fit the FIST 
development model: 
 Large Systems 
 Inherently Expensive 
 First-of-a-Kind Programs     
 Advancing Technology  
 
Large Systems 
One of the most misunderstood FIST values during the experiment was Tiny.  
Project managers understood the concept of reducing the team size, process, and 
documentation but thought it had little to do with overall program success when 
compared to the other values.  When managing programs, such as massive highway 
systems or the C-5 Galaxy aircraft, the best solution was not to reduce the size of the 
project because size is what made the project a success.  If the C-5 Galaxy was reduced in 
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size, it would not meet operational objectives.  Large projects, such as cargo aircraft, 
naval ships, civilian bridges and buildings, need to be large by design.  Massive projects 
often have long schedules due to the amount of work that needs to be accomplished.  
Longer schedules produce larger budgets.  Often complications arise on large programs 
because there are more areas for problems to surface and there may be remarkably little 
historical data to leverage.   
When the C-5 was developed in 1970, it was the largest aircraft in the world 
(Griffin, 2005).  Making an aircraft larger than anything else built before is bound to have 
unknown issues and a lack of existing technology.  This makes the Simple value hard to 
enforce. “But building a big airplane like the C-5A was not just a matter of scaling up the 
smaller C-141.  When the increase in size passed a certain point, technical challenges and 
changes cropped up” (Gregory, 1989:110).  Large programs require a larger project team 
compared to smaller endeavors.   More workers, machinery, and larger facilities are 
required to complete the work.   
All four FIST values seem to have issues with a program that is characteristically 
large.  Of course, large programs can find value in following FIST, such as using existing 
technology where possible, maintaining the deadline and budget, and choosing low-cost, 
simple solutions.  Yet, many of these concepts are basic project management skills, not 
unique ideas belonging to FIST.  Project managers are always attempting to complete 
programs on schedule, budget, and performance while making tradeoffs for capability, 
risk, and cost.  Large programs just do not fit the FIST model because FIST emphasizes a 
fast pace, lowest-cost, simple solution, and small-as-possible system.  Large programs 
often have to invent their own technology to handle the load or expanse of the project 
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because there may be no other project like it in the world.  Immature technology has 
proven to be slow, expensive, and complicated to develop.  This illustrates that large 
programs may not be able to employ FIST successfully.     
Inherently Expensive Programs 
Programs that are inescapably expensive are going to be a poor fit for the FIST 
model.  Expensive projects can occur when a program is developing an emerging 
technology, completing a first-of-a-kind task, or conducting a project that is so vast, it has 
a great deal of oversight and unforeseen issues.  Expensive programs are projects that are 
so imperative to national defense or saving human life that corners cannot be cut and 
risks cannot be accepted.   
In some fields, such as space launch programs, the customer may state there is no 
limit to the amount of additional funding they would pay to increase mission reliability 
from 99.5 to 99.9 percent.  That is how important success is to certain missions.  Space 
and material programs are decidedly different.  Often satellites are irreplaceable if lost 
due to a launch anomaly.  The reason is that satellites are often so complex, one-of-a-
kind, and expensive that funding will never exist to replicate the undertaking.  Often the 
space community will never observe the outcome of the technology developed in a lost 
satellite mission because the program will never be repeated. 
When a program’s success is vital to win the next war, defend national security, 
or maintain the U.S. technological advantage, the program is going to be inherently 
expensive.  These types of programs are needed to be accomplished to maintain 
battlefield superiority regardless of cost or schedule.  As a closing example, the V-22 
Osprey may have taken 25 years and billions in cost overruns to produce, but there is not 
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a system capable of replicating its versatility.  Now that the V-22 is operational, it is 
saving lives, raising morale, and changing military doctrine unlike any conventional 
helicopter.    
First-of-a-Kind Programs     
 First-of-a-kind, revolutionary programs are undertakings that have little to no 
legacy systems and historic information to exploit.  In this analysis, the V-22 Osprey’s 
tilt-rotor, the C-5 Galaxy’s size, and the NASA Viking mission’s first landing on Mars all 
represent projects that blazed a new path technologically.  These three missions were all 
operational successes and all considered FIST failures.  These missions dealt with 
unknown challenges and technology.  Existing, proven technology was either limited or 
non-existent.  Therefore, producing unique solutions was costly, time consuming, and 
decisively not FISTy.   The pattern from the analysis indicates that programs that are first-
of-a-kind are all FIST failures.  Some of these FIST failures are operational successes, 
and some are disasters, such as the RAH-66 Comanche.     
 While these aforementioned programs were not FISTy, they were not developed 
under the rapid development mindset.  The solution to first-time projects may be a term 
known as technical debt.  Technical debt was developed by Cunningham (2013) in the 
early 1990s in relation to software design and was later applied to rapid acquisitions in a 
technical report published by the Systems Engineering Research Center.  Technical debt 
“is a way to describe the risks and compromises made in rapid acquisitions” (Lepore et 
al., 2012:26).  Technical debt includes the processes or technology that is chosen not to 
be completed immediately, but to be delayed until it is more developed or understood.  
The development progresses by designing the areas or subsystems that are understood, all 
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the while leaving room in the design to include the postponed technology.  When the 
deferred technology has reached an adequate level of maturity, it can be designed into the 
system or incorporated via a modular upgrade to existing units.   As more and more items 
are postponed for development, technical debt is incurred.  Interest is paid on this debt by 
having to revisit and incorporate the postponed technology into the system while hoping 
the design has left adequate room without too much costly redesign.  Programs should 
not get into too much technical debt by attempting to incorporate vast amounts of 
immature technology on the gamble that it will be ready for integration during program 
development.  Cunningham explains technical debt in the following interview excerpt: 
Let’s take part of what we understand and express that. And then react to that and 
express more. And react to that and express more. It’s an incremental approach. I 
think it’s important if you’re going to take an incremental approach, you might 
learn something tomorrow that influences design decisions you’ve made today. 
That should be considered a good thing – to be able to take tomorrow’s learning 
and not discard it because you’ve made a decision today. That requires a set of 
practices that were unfamiliar early on… where you had to make a bunch of 
decisions up front early. (Cunningham, 2013) 
 
 When too much technical debt is accumulated, the engineers try to utilize too 
much advanced technology and are never able to finish the program.  However, when 
technical debt is executed properly, the project team is able to delay final decisions about 
emerging technology until later in the program when the advancements are better 
understood.  Minimizing and choosing only key sub-systems to postpone will add to the 
success of utilizing the tool of technical debt.   
Advancing Technology  
 When the purpose of a program is to adapt cutting-edge technology into a system, 
so as to deliver an innovative capability, FIST is not an appropriate model to follow.  
101 
Also, FIST is not advantageous for research labs that are maturing a technology to be 
used in future programs.  The reason being, FIST is designed to meet a war-fighter need 
quickly, with available technology, so that the new system can be deployed against the 
enemy of the current engagement, not the next war.  Advanced technology is always 
going to need to be developed in order to stay ahead of enemy capabilities.  Failures in 
advanced technology programs still provide a leap forward in technology that can be 
harnessed in other programs inexpensively.  Optimizing the failure can occur anywhere 
from learning from mistakes to capitalizing on newly developed technology.  The 
solution to developing advanced technology may lie in an ambidextrous organizational 
structure. 
Lepore et al. (2012) explores the concept of an ambidextrous organization.  
Ambidextrous organizations consist of an exploration and exploitation structure.  The 
exploration structure is tasked with inventing and developing new technology and is 
commonly associated with the early concept development phase.  “Personnel working in 
exploration structures tend to be rewarded for taking risks, generating new information or 
technologies, and creating new opportunities for the program” (Lepore et al., 2012:42). 
The exploitation structure is focused on implementing the technology developed by the 
exploration team.  “Exploitation generally has substantial routines in place, including 
milestones, project management practices, and specific work activities identified that 
should be performed in particular order” (Lepore et al., 2012:42).   
Technology development should take place in an exploration structure in which 
the team’s priority is to create technology that is suitable to be used in a weapon system.  
The exploitation structure should develop actual weapon systems, utilizing only 
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technology that has been advanced far enough by the exploration team to be used in a 
program.  With exploration and exploitation organizations working in concert, the 
exploitation team can use incremental development and technology debt to incorporate 
new technology from the exploration team.  The exploration team should keep the 
exploitation unit abreast of the current advances in technology with realistic timeframes 
so projects are not artificially delayed for technology that is years from maturity.   
FIST Activities 
 One of the many outcomes stemming from the experiment was a ranking of the 
FIST activities from most important to project development success to least.  Table 36 
shows how each of the seven groups of project managers ranked the FIST activities.  The 
table is sorted by the All Participants model.  The Rank column lists the ranking of each 
activity corresponding to each group.  The Weight column represents the priority vector 
or weight of that activity.  The combined weight for each project manager group adds up 
to 1.0.    
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RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 1 0.083 6 0.067
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 2 0.082 10 0.050
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 3 0.075 4 0.070
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 4 0.074 3 0.074
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas 5 0.073 8 0.058
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 5 0.073 7 0.063
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 6 0.068 14 0.042
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 7 0.062 1 0.097
Formal commitment to maintain budget 7 0.062 2 0.075
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 8 0.053 13 0.043
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 9 0.051 9 0.052
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 10 0.042 11 0.048
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 10 0.042 14 0.042
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 11 0.038 16 0.034
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 12 0.037 5 0.069
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 13 0.031 12 0.047
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 14 0.027 17 0.028
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 15 0.026 15 0.041
Military Civilian
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Military vs. Civilian  
The Military model will be compared to the Civilian model to discern any 
differences in project management values between the two communities.  The civilians 
selected for the experiment primarily have experience in infrastructure and transportation 
projects.  While this differs from military weapon system development, the scope of the 
civilian projects is large enough to validate the comparison.  The strength behind the 
civilian responses is that this group has many years of experience in the field, plus they 
manage for profit in a competitive industry.  If civilian project managers allow cost 
increases to absorb their profit margins, their job and company are in danger.  The 
civilian project management world is competitive with multiple firms bidding for 
projects.  This competition sharpens civilian project managers’ skill set and forces the 
deficient managers out.  Table 37 illustrates how the military and civilian project 
managers ranked the 18 FIST activities.      
 
Table 37:  Military vs. Civilian Activity Ranking 
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The first difference that is immediately apparent is how significantly civilians 
emphasize Formal commitment to maintain deadlines and budget.  Civilians ranked 
maintaining deadlines as their most prominent activity and maintaining budget as their 
second most important activity.  Both these activities tied for seventh place in the military 
model.  This can indicate that civilian project managers are more aware of the schedule 
and budget than their military counterparts.  The military uses schedule delays and cost 
overruns as project management tools to solve problems.  The civilian industry is more 
focused on accomplishing the task in the timeframe given and with the allowable budget.  
One of the civilian responses to the experiment provided the following feedback: 
Project has scope/schedule/budget and quality - all are inter-related.  Based on my 
experience on managing engineers in design, the only way to control the budget 
(cost of the work) is to manage the schedule.  If you give an engineer three 
months to do a design, he will work on it for three months.  You can demand the 
same design be done in two months, and you will get the same level of design, but 
at 2/3rds the cost and in 2/3rds the time. 
  
 This feedback may be the driving force behind why civilians and experts ranked 
Fast as by far the most important FIST value.  The military ranked Simple as the most 
important FIST value.  This value difference could be due to the fact that the military 
does not deal with profits to the extent that transpires the private industry.  The military is 
focused on providing the best capability to the battlefield, whereas civilian project 
managers are determined to complete the project based on the client’s goals.  “As 
consultants, we work for our clients and various clients have various goals - managing a 
project for a client measures success by attaining the client’s goals.”  This feedback, 
provided by another civilian project manager, demonstrates how their priorities change 
based on the client’s needs.  In the military, if a capability is required promptly, project 
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managers’ mindset should change to reflect accomplishing the project as fast as possible.  
However, if the goal of the project is to develop advanced technology, the priority should 
be to increase capability over project pace. 
  Next, the military stressed three tasks that their civilian contemporaries did not 
value as highly:  
 Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 
 Importance of low-cost  
 Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology 
The first reason that may explain this difference could be that the civilians surveyed do 
not develop technology to the extent of the military.  However, if civilians are concerned 
with profits, why do they not value low-cost solutions?  The answer is that the low-cost 
FIST activity may be too vague.  One civilian respondent commented: 
Importance of low-cost can have a few very different interpretations. What is the 
project’s objective: lowest design cost, lowest construction cost, or lowest 
lifecycle cost?  Often getting the lowest lifecycle cost on a highway facility means 
higher capital construction costs - think Portland Cement Concrete (PCC) 
pavement versus asphalt pavement.  PCC will cost more to install, but last and 
perform better over a longer term. 
 
Choosing the lowest cost solution may not always be the best course of action as 
life cycle costs could overwhelm any savings realized during development.  “Experience 
indicates that a large percentage of the total cost for many systems is the direct result of 
the downstream activities associated with the operation and support of these systems, 
whereas the commitment of these costs is based on the engineering and management 
decision made in the early conceptual and preliminary design stages of the life cycle” 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2005:582).  Therefore, low-cost solutions during development 
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may not be optimal if other costs are not taken into consideration such as testing, 
production, training, operations, maintenance, retirement, and disposal.   
For the FIST activity of Heavy reliance on existing technology, one civilian 
project manager responded “… using tried and true existing systems is good, but it stifles 
innovation.”  Civilian project managers commented that they are always looking for 
innovative ways of completing a project better, faster, or for a lower overall cost.  Lastly, 
civilian project managers de-emphasized concrete steps to reduce development time.  
This could be contributed to civilian project managers simply not having a lot of 
experience in development since the nature of their projects mainly encompasses 
infrastructure and transportation that already has established mature technology. 
 It is worth noting that civilian project managers ranked the activities of accepting 
risk lower than the military ranked these activities.  Risks are often viewed as negative 
and should be avoided or mitigated.  In rapid acquisitions, risk taking may be the only 
course of action available to deliver technology to the battlefield.  Additionally, civilians 
greatly highlighted the importance of relying on employee talent.  This leads directly into 
one of the key observations from Lepore et al. (2012).  Based on interview analysis 
conducted in that research, project manager autonomy is vital.  Placing decision-making 
at the lowest level “shortens the process, reduces opportunity for stall time, and fosters 
close relationships” (Lepore et al., 2012:27).  In order to have confidence and trust in the 
low-level project managers, leadership must rely on the talent in their organization.  The 
private industry understands this concept and eliminates some of the time-consuming 
bureaucracy and oversight that plagues the military.  Civilians trust the project managers 
running the program to make the correct decisions.  
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RANK WEIGHT RANK WEIGHT
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 1 0.090 7 0.064
Formal commitment to maintain budget 2 0.077 8 0.057
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation) 3 0.069 2 0.082
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 3 0.069 1 0.084
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines) 3 0.069 6 0.065
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 4 0.068 3 0.080
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution) 5 0.062 6 0.065
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas 6 0.061 5 0.072
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery 7 0.052 9 0.052
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 8 0.051 11 0.042
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent 9 0.049 8 0.057
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 10 0.049 13 0.034
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology 11 0.045 10 0.047
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+) 12 0.044 4 0.074
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation 13 0.040 12 0.037
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 14 0.040 14 0.031
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget) 15 0.036 14 0.031
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective) 16 0.029 15 0.026
SUB-CRITERIA MODEL
Leader Non-Leader
Leaders vs. Non-Leaders 
 This comparison is between both civilian and military project managers who have 
assumed a leadership position and those project managers who have no leadership 
experience.  The purpose of this comparison is to see if there are any disconnects between 
leaders and those carrying out the vision of the leaders.  Table 38 provides a direct 
comparison of the FIST activity rankings between the two groups.   
  
Leaders prefer to have a Formal commitment to maintain deadlines and budget 
while non-leaders favor Concrete steps taken to actually reduced development time and 
the Importance of simplicity.  This observation is characteristic of many organizations in 
which leaders are not heavily involved in the daily activities and judge progress and 
performance based on how well the schedule and budget are being followed.  Workers, 
on the other hand, prefer simplicity in design, documentation, and organization so that 
Table 38:  Leader vs. Non-Leader Activity Ranking 
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they clearly understand the framework for managing the project.  A complicated 
reporting structure with massive amounts of unnecessary documentation buries project 
managers under a mountain of tasks and hinders their ability to manage a project.   
 Non-leaders also have a strong preference for utilizing proven and existing 
technology whereas leaders show exceedingly little emphasis in this area.  This 
disconnect could create problems through leadership expecting more cutting-edge, 
innovative technology to be included in projects.  Non-leaders see the difficulty in 
managing and maturing new technology and prefer proven technology that has known 
capabilities and reduced risks.  Emerging technology will have many unknown flaws 
where proven technology has significantly less unknown problems that negatively affect 
development.  
 Leaders ranked contractual incentives and accepting risks as a higher valued 
activity than non-leaders.  This could be due to the fact that these are activities that upper 
management approves and has input in during the project.  Non-leaders focused in more 
on Relying on employees’ talent and taking Concrete steps to reduce development time 
and cost.  If a project manager can streamline development, the other activities such as 
risks, incentives, and maintaining a schedule will all be positively affected.   
 The conclusion from this comparison shows that leadership is more interested in a 
project that maintains the given schedule and budget while developing innovative 
solutions that use unproven technology.   Leaders are willing to accept risks and provide 
contractual incentives to bring a project in on time and budget.  Non-leaders are focused 
on concrete steps to improve development in both time and cost.  If development can be 
improved, the deadlines and budget will be met, and there is less need to accept risks and 
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provide incentives to complete the project.  Furthermore, non-leaders would rather rely 
on their talent and a simplified process for managing a project.  Leaders view the tried-
and-true project management process and required documentation as a safety net so that 
if the project fails, the blame cannot be placed on them for trying a new method of project 
management.  Adding further evidence to this trend, leaders ranked the FIST value Fast 
as most important and non-leaders ranked Simple as the most crucial value. 
Experts 
The experts’ top five activities for project management are: 
1. Formal commitment to maintain deadlines 
2. Formal commitment to maintain budget 
3. Importance of Simplicity  
4. Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost 
5 (Tied). Importance of Speed  
5 (Tied). Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time 
 
These activities are extremely important to successful project management based 
on experts’ opinion in project management.  Three of these activities fall under the Fast 
category, two under Inexpensive, and one under Simple.  While these activities are not 
unique to FIST, the activities should remain as cornerstones to the FIST model. 
  
The least valued activities by experts are the following: 
12. Accept risk in order to maintain schedule 
13 (Tied). Importance of Small  
13 (Tied). Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs 
14. Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology  
15. Accept Risk to Reduce Cost 
16. System capability less than previous systems  
 
As shown by these activities, experts do not place significance on accepting risks 
to further a project, using contractual incentives, or using proven technology.  Experts 
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agree that the Importance of small is minimal as some projects are inherently large by 
nature.  Across all groups, System capability less than previous systems, was not valued 
or understood.  These activities are candidates for improvement or elimination for the 
FIST model. 
 One interesting note is that both civilians and experts did not value low-cost 
solutions, and instead emphasized employee talent much more than other groups of 
project managers.  As stated earlier, low-cost solutions during development could have 
unforeseen life-cycle cost consequences.  Also, relying on employee talent can speed up a 
project by placing decision-making authority with the front-line project managers.  
Experts, like the civilian model, ranked Fast as the most important FIST value.  Based on 
feedback from the experiment, civilians and experts alike believed controlling the 
schedule would, in turn, control the budget and the program in general.  If the schedule 
allowed time for the development of innovative solutions, the project manager should set-
aside time to explore the new technology. 
Poor FIST Activities 
System capability less than previous systems, was commonly the lowest ranked 
activity and the least understood throughout all the models.  One civilian project manager 
commented, “I also had trouble with the activities that dumbed down and reduced the 
capability of the current widget.  I find it hard to believe that you would want to develop 
a new version of something that would have less capability.”  This activity was difficult 
to understand while completing the alternatives analysis.  It was not clear exactly what 
this activity meant. 
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 Importance of small was the next activity that was ranked low in all models.  This 
activity was part of the Tiny FIST value.  Tiny was ranked last of the four values in all 
models except in the experts’ model where it is essentially tied for last with Inexpensive.  
Overall, the three Tiny activities ranked in the bottom half of the analysis in all project 
manager groups.  Whether this value and activities are misunderstood or not valued, this 
is clearly a weakness in the FIST model.  Obviously, changes will need to be made to the 
Tiny value in order to create a stronger, better-rounded model. 
 Feedback from one expert stated that some activities would negate having to 
complete the other activities.  Therefore, if a project manager took the FIST framework 
and tried to enforce all the activities in an attempt to be FISTy, they would be duplicating 
some efforts and confusing the project team by administering multiple methods of 
achieving the same ends.  For example, using proven technology and accepting risks are 
opposites.  Project managers use proven technology so they have less risk to accept. 
 The last piece of constructive feedback comes from an expert with 36 years of 
experience who stated, “I believe that perhaps this is a bit too academic and generic and 
maybe I have had too much PM [project management] experience.”  The FIST values, 
activities, and framework are hard to criticize because they represent good project 
management ideals.  However, there seems to be little depth to the model that can be used 
to actually run a program.   
Recommendations 
 FIST should be viewed as a rapid development acquisition model.  It is not a 
perfect fit for all programs.  NASA experimented in 1990s with Faster, Better, Cheaper 
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and FIST seems to be a projection of this mentality into the DoD acquisitions.  The 
analysis of historic weapon system development has revealed many strengths and 
weaknesses of the FIST model.  The ranking of FIST values and activities by a wide 
spectrum of project managers has exposed flaws in the FIST ideology.  This section will 
provide recommended changes to the FIST model. 
Inexpensive  
The first two FIST values of Fast and Inexpensive basically translate to the 
concepts of time and cost on the Iron Triangle of project management.  This leaves 
Simple and Tiny to account for the quality aspect of the Iron Triangle.  The only 
recommended change to Inexpensive is under the activity of Importance of low-cost.  
This should have a caveat that project managers should consider the lifecycle costs to 
ensure a tradeoff during development does not create excessive costs in downstream 
phases of the system.  Other than this recommendation, Fast and Inexpensive are straight 
forward project management concepts that are not new to the profession. 
Simple 
 The Simple activity of System capability less than the previous system should be 
eliminated or further expanded so that it can be understood.  Instead of this activity, it is 
recommended to add generational development as a Simple activity.  Generational 
development is described in a technical report on rapid capability by Lepore et al. (2012).  
This concept is similar to incremental development except it is determined to be used 
from the beginning of development as a way for known and unknown technology 
advancements to be seamlessly incorporated into the system.  This technique fits 
perfectly with the FIST mindset because it allows a weapon system to use existing 
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technology in order to rapidly release the product to the war-fighter.  The added benefit is 
the ability to upgrade the system in the future with technology that can mature outside of 
the weapon system program where it will not delay progress.  As Cunningham (2013) 
stated “you might learn something tomorrow that influences design decisions you’ve 
made today. That should be considered a good thing – to be able to take tomorrow’s 
learning and not discard it because you’ve made a decision today.”  In the future, 
generational development will allow platforms to be upgraded instead of the development 
of a new weapon system.  Engineers and project managers need to be aware of the 
technology improvements on the horizon and should target those areas in the system for 
easy incremental upgrades. 
 Awareness of technological breakthroughs leads into the next recommendation.  
To expand the Simple activity of Importance of simplicity, development organizations 
should have an ambidextrous organization.   As previously explained, the organization 
consists of an exploration structure that seeks and matures new technology and an 
exploitation structure that takes the established technology to be assimilated into a 
system.  Each structure communicates frequently with each other to share knowledge on 
advancements and requirements to create a symbiotic relationship.  This consistent 
communication enables the exploration structure to maintain focus on developing 
technology that is needed to fill a capability gap.  At the same time, it allows the 
exploitation structure to understand what technology is available for integration and 
which is too immature to be used in the current system. 
  The next recommendation surrounds the activities of the Reliance on employees’ 
talent and the Tiny activity, Importance of small.  This explanation should be expanded to 
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include a definition of a successful small project team.  It is not adequate to merely state: 
have a small project team.  The project team must consist of people with the right 
background, education, and experience for the project.  Allowing important programs to 
handpick their personnel will ensure the required skill sets for a project are covered by 
experts on the team.  The low-level project managers should be empowered with 
decision-making authority and the freedom to keep the program pace moving rapidly.  In 
a rapid development or FIST program, the employees should be comfortable with taking 
risks and working in an unstructured and ambiguous environment.  Minimize the 
reporting structure and keep it informal to reduce time-consuming oversight reviews.  
Decisions to proceed should not be halted until the weekly leadership meeting but rather 
should occur spontaneously and informally as decisions arise.  One way to reduce 
organizational complexity is to co-locate the project team (Lepore et al., 2012).  Informal 
learning can transpire simply by being located near other members of the project team.   
Employees and leadership should accept that failures and mistakes occur but are 
acceptable in rapid acquisitions as long as the lessons learned are spread throughout the 
community and not repeated.  Technology advances from failed programs can be 
leveraged in future systems.  Lastly, employees should understand the goals of the client 
or war-fighter and design their system, schedule, budget, and risk acceptance level 
accordingly.  Each project should have a different mindset based on the customer’s 
requirements.  
Tiny 
 The Tiny value is predominantly the lowest ranked FIST value and among the 
least emphasized activities.  The Tiny value does not appear to be as well-designed and 
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comprehensive as the other values.  This leaves the possibility for much improvement.  In 
fact, with the correct additions, Tiny could be the key to the FIST model. 
 The most important activity, when starting a project, is to gather the requirements 
from the customer.  Requirements shape the project and provide guidance.  This activity 
is not present in the FIST model.  If a customer needs a rapid capability, they should first 
meet with the exploitation team to develop concrete requirements.  Often customers are 
unaware of the realistic technology available and what capabilities they truly need to 
satisfy the mission.  It will be the job of the exploitation team to develop realistic 
requirements in face-to-face meetings with the customer, using only technology deemed 
mature by the exploration team.  The requirements should be linked to capabilities in an 
operational context.  The requirements should not focus on encompassing a specific 
technology.  The end product may be hampered if specific technology is specified than if 
the design was left open for the project team to develop as they see fit.  Once a minimum 
set of capability-based requirements are developed, the project team needs to lock the 
requirements in and fight any unfeasible changes or additions to the requirements.  
Changing requirements once design progress is underway, destabilizes and weakens the 
scope of the project.  Scope creep negatively impacts cost, schedule, and performance by 
altering the direction and design of the program.  The program team should frequently 
validate requirements with the customer because mistakes become more expensive the 
further in development they are realized. 
 As Lepore et al. (2012) states, rapid programs typically produce 80% solutions or 
less.  This is advantageous in rapid acquisitions because there is not enough time to 
satisfy all of the customer’s needs.  Project teams could spend months and millions of 
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dollars chasing the last 20% of a solution.  At this point, the law of diminishing returns 
takes effect.  Showing the customer the drastic decrease in cost and schedule associated 
with developing the 80% solution, generally receives wholehearted approval.  If the 
customer requires a solution greater than 80%, perhaps their need is not as urgent, and 
they should meet with the exploration team to develop future technology to meet their 
capability in the five to ten year timeframe.   
Incremental development plays a role with developing a customer approved 
solution.  Similar to the A-10 Thunderbolt II program, the project team can present the 
customer with different technology packages along with the cost and time associated with 
developing each.  A rapid system can reach the battlefield with the promise of upgrades 
being included in the future to increase the capability to meet the user’s requirements.  
Initial war-fighter feedback can shape and direct future upgrades in a direction different 
than originally planned. 
 The last recommendation is to manage the technical debt.  Technical debt is 
accumulated as more and more immature technology is designed into the system.  The 
team must, at some point in the future, rework the configuration of the system to 
accommodate the unknown final form of the technology.  The advantage to technical debt 
is postponing uncertain decisions to the future when they may be better understood.  The 
disadvantage is that if too much uncertainty is left to the end of the program, the project 
may fail or never reach production.  It is recommended that if a program is pushing the 
technological boundary with a specific subsystem, such as the V-22 Osprey’s tilt-rotor 
capability, the beyond state-of-the-art technology should be limited to that single area.  A 
single innovation is manageable by using the tools and techniques described.  However, 
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if the program attempts to invent advancements throughout the project, the system will 
never reach completion and the mounting risks will halt the progress until failure ensues.  
Conclusion 
 The FIST model and the FIST-AHP model scrutinize projects solely based on 
their development process.  If a project receives a high FIST score, this only means that 
the development resembled the FIST framework.  The FIST score has no bearing on the 
operational success of the program.  Furthermore, programs could achieve developmental 
success and not follow the FIST model because FIST is not the only feasible rapid 
acquisition model.  A true measure of success for the FIST model would be how close 
FIST developmental success corresponds to operational success.  If a development model 
does not consistently produce operationally successful programs, the model is worthless.   
Merely being able to replicate FIST results utilizing AHP is not as strong of an indicator 
of the FIST model’s usefulness.  As witnessed in this analysis, high scoring FIST 
programs can fail operationally and low scoring FIST programs can succeed. 
Ward’s (2009) original thesis results were able to be replicated by the FIST-AHP 
model.  This is not surprising because the FIST-AHP model is based on the FIST rubric.  
Therefore, programs that scored well based on the FIST rubric correspondingly scored 
well in the FIST-AHP model.  The true value of this comparison is in finding program 
characteristics that determine if a program is a good or poor fit for being developed by 
FIST.   
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The four characteristics of a program that are appropriate for FIST development are: 
 Urgent Need Capabilities 
 Budget Constrained Programs 
 Repeated Programs 
 Not Advancing Technology 
 
The four program characteristics that emerged that show FIST as an inappropriate 
method of development are: 
 Large Systems 
 Inherently Expensive 
 First-of-a-Kind Programs     
 Advancing Technology  
 
Next, the experiment results produced a ranking of the 18 FIST activities in order 
of importance by each project management group.  There are distinct disconnects 
between the military and civilian project managers, as well as leaders and non-leaders.  
These results present many challenges, and although civilians complete different ventures 
than military project managers, civilians must be proficient in order to remain profitable.  
Private industry organizations will not bid on a job if a profit cannot be made on the 
project.  This is a luxury the military is not afforded.  Next, if leaders are developing 
overall strategies but this vision is not being translated and pursued by non-leaders, the 
organization is going to fail.  Both parties must work together to understand the upper 
management view of project management as well as the daily, practical side of running a 
program.   
 The seven project management groups produced rankings that highlighted poor 
FIST activities.  The Tiny activities were not valued nor understood as clearly as the other 
values.  Overall, System capability less than previous systems is the most confusing 
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activity for respondents and was consistently ranked low.  In response to these criticisms, 
the following activities are proposed to be added to the FIST framework to account for 
weak areas. 
Inexpensive 
 Importance of Low Lifecycle Cost Solutions 
 
Simple 
 Generational Development 
 Ambidextrous Organization (Exploring and Exploiting Structures) 
 Empowered, Co-located Employees 
 Manage to the Customer’s Goals (Schedule, Budget, Risk) 
 
Tiny 
 Small, Handpicked, Experienced Team 
 Maintain Stable, Realistic, Needs-Based Requirements 
 Face-to-Face Requirements Agreement with Customer 
 Minimize Scope Creep / Additional Requirements 
 Strive for 80% Solution 
 Minimize Technical Debt 
 
These additions to FIST will organize the program office into an ambidextrous, 
dual structure.  The exploring team develops and matures technology.  The exploiting 
team works with the customer to develop requirements and produces a system utilizing 
only technology regarded as mature by the exploring team.  Next, develop upfront, 
realistic requirements with the customer that are traced to capabilities.  Stable, realistic 
requirements will mean the difference in program success and failure.  Last, utilize 
incremental development to field the basic system rapidly with the future potential to be 
upgraded and fully meet the users’ needs.  System operation may be different once it is 
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used on the battlefield.  Incremental development allows flexibility to gauge the amount 
of improvement that is actually needed to perform the tasks.  
 DoD acquisitions have reached a crossroads where manning and funding are 
drastically being reduced, yet the war-fighter needs remain the same.  The only way to 
survive this changing climate is to adapt to a new way of doing business.  FIST is one 
rapid acquisition model that seeks to be the solution.  By combining FIST with the 
recommendations presented in the research, as well as the conclusions resulting from 
other rapid development studies, a well-rounded successful model can be developed.  The 
solutions do not lie with more oversight, bloated budgets, or increased manning.  It is in 
the best interest of the DoD to correct the current system by following a rapid 
acquisitions model that substantially reduces the development time and accepts risks and 
failures.  All rapid programs will not be successes, but with smaller schedules and 
budgets, the failures will not be catastrophic or insurmountable. 
Future Research  
 This research produced the first intensive theory-testing empirical study of FIST.  
Multiple theory-building and theory-testing empirical studies are required to support the 
scientific basis of FIST as well as generalize its use for a wider range of acquisition 
programs.  This research produced program entry criteria for the use of FIST in 
development and 11 additional FIST activities.  A theory-building empirical study can be 
completed merging FIST with the recommendations in this research as well as testing the 
FIST entry criteria.  Furthermore, a statistical analysis of the results found in this research 
could be completed to evaluate convergent and discriminate validity as well as the 
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reliability of the FIST measures themselves.  Much of the recent FIST literature has been 
completed by Ward and used as exposure and promotion of the model.  Very little 
research has been published that examines and improves the model.         
 Some of the best lessons learned about FIST were from the informal feedback 
project managers included with the experiment.  Feedback was not solicited in the 
experiment but proved to be enlightening when provided.  Future researchers could 
conduct interviews with experienced project managers.  The interviews should focus on 
successful rapid development activities to further refine the framework.  The participants 
could be from different areas of development including space, material, defense 
contractors, and civilian projects.  This could help generalize the theory to be usable in a 
variety of programs. 
Further analysis into ambidextrous organizations, requirements gathering 
techniques, and incremental development could be accomplished to expand these ideas 
into the FIST model.  These three areas proved to be weak or missing areas in the original 
FIST model and important activities in rapid acquisitions.  Providing a more specific 
framework for FIST could help establish the philosophy as more usable.  Many project 
managers commented that FIST was too vague if they were to attempt to use it on their 
next project.  If the values Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny are supposed to direct 
programs during development, there should be tools and techniques on how to do so.  
Also, programs were proven to be FISTy and operational failures.  Unless it can be 
proven that FIST run programs can produce operationally successful programs, there is 
little chance the DoD will adapt the model.    
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Overall, FIST is a starting point that requires additional research into rapid 
acquisition best practices.  As is, FIST is certainly not strong enough to be the cure-all for 
the acquisition woes.  However, it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction to improve 
DoD spending and project development because it questions the status quo and aims to 
prevent complacency.  The better the FIST concept can be explained and understood, the 
better chance project managers will direct future projects under the FIST banner and 
produce actual FIST managed programs for future studies to examine.   
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Appendix A: FIST Rubric (Ward, 2009:106-107) 
 
 
FIST Rubric 
!High ~Iedium Low/No Opposite 
10 PIS 5 PIS 0 PIS -5 PIS 
f ast Is Strong, •'l'licit ~?dest, occasional L~ttle- to no mention Ambivalence or 
Good affirmation of the ffirmation of the of the importmce of antipathy towards 
f'Portance of speed. imP,ortance of speed, speed. speed. 
;\TJtb c-aveats. 
!Formal c-ommitment to 
Modest, informal 
~o commitment Explicit support for 
lt_naiutaining deadline- (beyond the ordinary) "taking as muc.h time 
contractual, etc). ODlDlltment to o maintain deadline-. as we-need" 
maintain or reduce-
jcoutractual incentives No steps taken to eadline. Active-attempts to 
o reward early educe-timeline or increase timeline-. 
~elivery. Contractual eward on-time I 
jcouc:rete steps taken to 
incentives to reward arly delivery. Accepts schedule 
on-time delivery. delays rather than 
actually reduce 
~ew steps taken to 
aooept risks. 
~evelopment time line. 
educe-time line. 
"-ccepts significant 
!risks in order to 
~iutain schedule-. 
:1\.ccepts moderate 
risks in order to 
maintain schedule 
lnexpensin Strong, •'l'licit Modest, occasional ittle-to no mention Ambivalence or 
l s Good affirmation of the ffirmation of the of the importmce of antipathy towards 
~ortance- of low-cost. ~ortance- of low- O\\" cost. low-cost. 
!Formal c.ommitment to 
ost, with caveats. 
~o commitment 
Modest, informal 
Explicit support for 
!maintain budget (beyond the ordinary) "spending as much 
contractual, etc) ommitment to o maintain budget. money as we-need 
maintain or reduce- o" 
jcontrac.tual incentives udget. No steps taken to 
o reward c.ost \utder- educe-cost Active-attempts to 
!nms. ew concrete steps increase budget. 
aken to reduce cost. 
jcoucrete steps taken to Aooepts cost 
ac-tually reduce :1\.ccepts moderate increases rather than 
~evelopment c.ost. risks in order to aooept risks. 
maintain costs. 
"-ccepts significant 
!risks in order to reduce 
kosts. 
Simple l s Strong, •'l'licit and M_?dest, occasional L!ttle-to no mention Ambivalence or 
Good ~equent affirmation of ffirmation of the of the importmce of antipathy towards ~ importance of ~ortance- of simplicity. simplicity. 
simplicity. simplicity, with 
No mention of steps aveats. Explicit support for I 
!Deliberate-steps taken aken to reduce pride in complexity. 
o actually reduce- Modest attempts to omplexity. 
komplexiiv in mauv educe complexity in Ac.tive-attempts to 
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areas (organization, some-areas. No mention of increase c-omplexity. 
ed mology, echnology maturity 
!communication, etc). Primarily relies on evels. Heavy reliance on 
jHeavy reliance on 
matll!e technologies, 
~o mention of the 
new developments 
;\~th some new and technology 
!existing. mature, provell developments. mportance of and breakthroughs 
echnology (lRL 7+). eliance-on talent. 
S)~tem capability Sy~tem capabilities 
~em capability Jess nloderately less than Sy~tem capabilities significantly exceed 
pre-\>lous systems. previous systems. match or moderately pre\~ous systems. 
!Frequent emphasis on 0~-asional mention 
xceed pre-\>ious 
systems. Explicit reliance on 
~ importance of and of the importance of fonnal, struc.nl!ed 
eliance-on talent. and reliance on talent. process, control and 
compliance. 
Tiny Is Strong, e'-plicit Modest. occasional ittle-to no mention Ambivalence or 
Good affirmation of the ffirmatiou of tbe of tbe importance of antipathy towards 
~ortance- of small ~ortance- of small. small small, lean or 
;\TJth c-aveats. streamlined 
!Formal c-ommitment to 
Modest, informal 
~o commitment approaches. 
!maintain or reduce-size. (beyond tbe ordinary) 
ommitment to o maintain size-. Explicit support for I 
jcoucrete steps taken to maintain or reduce-
No steps taken to 
pride in bigness. 
ac.nttlly reduce size (of size. 
jorg. process. sys, 
~ocumentation, etc). ew steps taken to 
educe-size. 
educe size. Ac.tive-attempts to 
increase size-. 
Outcome A f 
jMet or slupassed all or most operational Mission failed to meet or Slupass a significant 
equirements, including maintainability umber of requirements 
and reliability 
System rejected by users 
~elivered operational capability 
Program cancelled before delivery 
fusers expressed satisfac.tion 
Delivered after adding substantial ftmding and 
~elivered within a reasonable margin of substantial schedule-increase 
~riginal cost and schedule baseline 
?,p~rational use is severely restricted to a subset 
~ogram replicated or imitated by f original operational \>i sion or requirement set. 
subsequent projects 
~ 
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Appendix B: Project Scores and Grades (Ward, 2009:61) 
  
System Name F-Score I .Score s-score T-Score FIST Score Outcom e 
NASA Pathfinder Mission 10 10 10 10 40 A 
F-16 Falcon 10 10 10 10 40 A 
NASA NEAR Mission 10 10 10 10 40 A 
Skunkworks 10 10 10 10 40 A 
Pave Low Ill 10 10 10 10 40 A 
P-51 Mustang 10 5 10 10 35 A 
F-5 Freedom Fighter 5 10 10 10 35 A 
A-1 0 Thunderbolt 10 10 10 5 35 A 
F-20 Tigershark 5 10 10 10 35 F 
AD Skyraider 10 5 10 5 30 A 
XP-75 Eagle 10 10 5 0 25 F 
MRAP 10 0 5 0 15 A 
E-3 Sentry (AWACS) 5 0 0 0 5 A 
NASA Viking Mission 0 -5 -5 0 -10 A 
C-5 Galaxy 0 -5 -5 -5 -15 A 
Crusader Artillery -5 -5 0 -5 -15 F 
F-15 Eagle -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 A 
V-22 Osprey -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 A 
F-22 Raptor -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F 
RH-66 Comanche -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F 
Future Imagery Architecture -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F 
Division Air Defense (DIVAD) -5 -5 -5 -5 -20 F 
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1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Value
1
3
5
7
9
2,4,6,8
1/9, 1/8, 
1/7, 1/6, 
1/5, 1/4, 
1/3, 1/2
Intermediate Values Between the two Adjacent Judgments
If Red Activity is more Important than the Green Activity, Use the 
Reciprocal (Fraction) Value                                                              
Example: (1/9 = Red Activity Extreme Importance over the Green Activity)
Definition
Equal Importance Between Green Activity and Red Activity
Moderate Importance of  Green Activity over Red Activity
Strong Importance of  Green Activity over Red Activity
Very Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity
Extreme Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity
Appendix C: Experiment Directions 
DIRECTIONS 
-Please fill out the BLUE cells in the attached Excel spreadsheet based on your 
experience and judgment in project management.  There are 2 TABS to complete (Tab 1 
and Tab 2).  
 
-Select the appropriate cell and use the drag-down menu in each BLUE cell to select your 
ranking.   
 
-Two activities will be presented, a “Green Activity” and a “Red Activity”.  Rank your 
preference of the Green Activity over the Red Activity in respect to importance to 
successful acquisition system development and delivery. Only judge the two activities 
compared to each other and do not let previous judgments influence your decision.  The 
below table describes the rankings: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Red Activity Most Important             Equal Importance   Green Activity Most Important  
Example 
The BLUE cell below would be read: Hamburger is _______ favorable to Pizza.  In 
the BLUE cell, you would select the “down arrow” to select your rank.  If you highly 
prefer Hamburgers, you would select 7, 8, or 9.  If you highly prefer Pizza, you would 
select 1/7, 1/8, or 1/9.  If you prefer them equally, you would select 1.  
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INEXPENSIVE SIMPLE TINY
FAST
INEXPENSIVE
SIMPLE
Have you ever been in an Official Leadership Position?
What is/was your highest Rank while in Project Mgmt?
Number of Years Experience in Project Management?
Green 
Activity
Red Activity
DIRECTIONS
Please Complete the 9 Blue Cells.  See 
Below for Definitions
<Insert Green Activity>
is _____ Favorable to
<Insert Red Activity>
DEFINITIONS
Fast: Programs emphasize staying on schedule and maintaining deadlines.  
Program managers seek short development timelines, incentivize contractors 
for early delivery, and do not use schedule slips as an option.
Inexpensive: Programs pursue low-cost solutions and are willing to sacrifice 
performance and accept risks to maintain cost / budget.  Contractors are 
incentivized for cost under runs. 
Simple: Programs seek to reduce complexity in their developing technology, 
design, documentation, and organization.  The project focus is on a narrow set 
of stable and attainable requirements utilizing existing technology to meet the 
operational need rather than high-tech, complex solutions.
Tiny: Programs utilize small project teams, minimum documentation, and 
develop smaller systems.
Example (Cell D4): 
Fast is __________
Favorable to Inexpensive
Value
1
3
5
7
9
2,4,6,8
1/9, 1/8, 
1/7, 1/6, 
1/5, 1/4, 
1/3, 1/2
Intermediate Values Between the two Adjacent Judgments
If Red Activity is more Important than the Green Activity, Use the 
Reciprocal (Fraction) Value                                                              
Example: (1/9 = Red Activity Extreme Importance over the Green Activity)
Definition
Equal Importance Between Green Activity and Red Activity
Moderate Importance of  Green Activity over Red Activity
Strong Importance of  Green Activity over Red Activity
Very Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity
Extreme Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity
Appendix D: Experiment Tab 1  
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Accept risk to 
reduce costs
Importance of Speed 
(Project Pace, Schedule, 
Deadlines)
Emphasis on the 
importance of and 
reliance on talent
Concrete steps taken to actually 
reduce size of: (Project Team, 
Process, Documentation)
Contractual incentives to 
reward early delivery
Importance of Simplicity 
(Design, Organization, 
Documentation)
Formal commitment to maintain or 
reduce size of: (Design, 
Requirements, Technology)
Concrete steps taken to 
actually reduce 
development cost
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce 
complexity in many areas (Technology, 
Communication, Organization)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce 
development time
Formal commitment to 
maintain deadlines
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, 
proven technology (TRL 7+)
Importance of Small (Design,  Minimum 
Documentation, Current Technology)
Accept risk in order to 
maintain schedule
Contractual incentives to reward 
cost under-runs
System capability less than 
previous systems (Design 
Optimized for Single Task)
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a 
Low Cost Design / Solution)
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
             Red Activities
Green Activities
DIRECTIONS
Please Complete all the Blue Cells.  
Accept risk to 
reduce costs
Importance of Speed 
(Project Pace, Schedule, 
Deadlines)
Emphasis on the 
importance of and 
reliance on talent
Concrete steps taken to actually 
reduce size of: (Project Team, 
Process, Documentation)
Contractual incentives to 
reward early delivery
Importance of Simplicity 
(Design, Organization, 
Documentation)
Formal commitment to maintain or 
reduce size of: (Design, 
Requirements, Technology)
Concrete steps taken to 
actually reduce 
development cost
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce 
complexity in many areas (Technology, 
Communication, Organization)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce 
development time
Formal commitment to 
maintain deadlines
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, 
proven technology (TRL 7+)
Importance of Small (Design,  Minimum 
Documentation, Current Technology)
Accept risk in order to 
maintain schedule
Contractual incentives to reward 
cost under-runs
System capability less than 
previous systems (Design 
Optimized for Single Task)
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a 
Low Cost Design / Solution)
Formal commitment to maintain budget
Importance of low-cost (Choosing a Low Cost Design / Solution)
System capability less than previous systems (Design Optimized for Main Objective)
Contractual incentives to reward cost under-runs
Accept risk in order to maintain schedule
Importance of Small (Small Design, Minimum Documentation, Small Budget)
Heavy reliance on existing, mature, proven technology (TRL 7+)
Formal commitment to maintain deadlines
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development time
Deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity in many areas (Technology, Communication, Organization)
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce development cost
Formal commitment to maintain or reduce size of: Design, Requirements, Technology
Importance of Simplicity (Design, Organization, Documentation)
Contractual incentives to reward early delivery
Concrete steps taken to actually reduce size of: Project Team, Process, Documentation
Emphasis on the importance of and reliance on employees' talent
Importance of Speed (Project Pace, Schedule, Meeting Deadlines)
             Red Activities
Green Activities
DIRECTIONS
Please Complete all the Blue Cells.  
Example (Cell D4): 
Formal Commitment to 
Maintain Budget
is __________ Favorable to 
Accept Risk to Reduce Cost
Value
1
3
5
7
9
2,4,6,8
1/9, 1/8, 
1/7, 1/6, 
1/5, 1/4, 
1/3, 1/2
Intermediate Values Between the two Adjacent Judgments
If Red Activity is more Important than the Green Activity, Use the 
Reciprocal (Fraction) Value                                                              
Example: (1/9 = Red Activity Extreme Importance over the Green Activity)
Definition
Equal Importance Between Green Activity and Red Activity
Moderate Importance of  Green Activity over Red Activity
Strong Importance of  Green Activity over Red Activity
Very Strong Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity
Extreme Importance of Green Activity over Red Activity
<Insert Green Activity>
is _____ Favorable to
<Insert Red Activity>
Appendix E: Experiment Tab 2 
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Appendix F: Alternatives Analysis 
Each mission is analyzed according to each of the 18 FIST activities and receives 
a Poor, Average, Good, or Excellent rating.  The rating is based on how well the program 
incorporated the activity in the development and not necessarily the outcome.  A large 
portion of this alternatives analysis builds off the examination already completed by Dan 
Ward in his 2009 AFIT thesis.   
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NASA VIKING MISSION 
 
Sources:  -McCurdy, 2001  
-NASA Case Study: Searching for Life on Mars 
-Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Poor: Used redundancy to mitigate risk.  “Viking was a classic NASA mission: complex, 
redundant and expensive” (McCurdy, 2001:61). 
 
“The Viking team was committed to taking as much time as necessary to ensure optimal 
performance and minimize risks on this very difficult mission” (Ward, 2009:169). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Poor: “By 1971 Viking’s launch date had already been pushed back from 1973 to 1975 
due to Congressional budget cuts” (NASA Case Study:1). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Poor: “It didn’t help that Viking was running well over initial planning estimates for the 
mission to Mars” (NASA Case Study:1). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
None found. 
 
Importance of Speed 
Poor: “The Pathfinder team, moreover, was asked to design, build, and prepare their 
spacecraft for launch in just 3 years. The Viking team had taken 6” (McCurdy, 2001:61). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Poor: “When the project began, Viking managers estimated that the imaging system 
could be designed and built for $6.2 million. The actual cost ($27.3 million) was 4 times 
that amount” (McCurdy, 2001:70). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Poor: “NASA officials originally estimated that they could develop the biology package 
for $11.3 million. The actual cost was $59.5 million” (McCurdy, 2001:72). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
None Found. 
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Poor: “When the project began, Viking managers estimated that the imaging system 
could be designed and built for $6.2 million. The actual cost ($27.3 million) was 4 times 
that amount” (McCurdy, 2001:70).  
 
“NASA officials originally estimated that they could develop the biology package for 
$11.3 million. The actual cost was $59.5 million” (McCurdy, 2001:72).  
 
“[the Viking’s computer’s] cost grew from $3.4 to $28.1 million” (McCurdy, 2001:74). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Poor: Used expensive solutions instead of accepting any risk.  “Viking team members 
designed an elaborate landing system, with computers, parachutes, radar altimeters, and a 
throttleable rocket engine. They developed a redundant radio communication system…” 
(McCurdy, 2001:65). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Poor: “The Viking landers had more capability than the Pathfinder spacecraft” 
(McCurdy, 2001:68). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Poor: Simple designs proposed were rejected in favor of complex solutions. “The 
technical challenges for Viking were no less daunting than the fiscal ones.  Nobody had 
landed on Mars before, so the spacecraft itself required significant innovative technology.  
The opportunity to conduct experiments on the planet’s surface led to an extremely 
ambitious scientific agenda featuring thirteen instruments” (NASA Case Study:1). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Poor: “Scientists recommended that project engineers incorporate a simpler design with 
less capability… The technically sophisticated design was retained” (McCurdy, 2001:71). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Poor: Complex designs and solutions were preferred. 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
No explicit comments found but mission was successful and completed a difficult task. 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Poor: “The biology package weighed 33 pounds and contained 40,000 parts” (McCurdy, 
2001:72). 
 
“The Viking cameras were bulky affairs… Each lander had two” (McCurdy, 2001:70). 
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Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Poor: “The only way to pack four experiments into a small, lightweight container was to 
make the package complex. In an instrument this complex, any single-point failure 
threatened the whole system” (McCurdy, 2001:72). 
 
“The computer on the Viking lander weighed 52 pounds… The Viking lander required 17 
times as much electric power as the Pathfinder lander” (McCurdy, 2001:74). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Poor: “The Viking project, at the height of its activity, employed 538 people at the 
Langley Research Center, 1,650 people at the Martin Marietta Aerospace Center, an 
unknown number of people at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and 69 scientists on 13 
advisory teams” (McCurdy, 2001:75). 
 
OUTCOME 
Success: “The program was clearly successful, as Viking operated for years in one of the 
most difficult environments NASA has ever attempted” (Ward, 2009:169) 
 
“Although the resulting images were spectacular, Viking program managers paid for this 
decision with substantial cost overruns” (McCurdy, 2001:71).   
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NASA PATHFINDER MISSION 
Sources:  -McCurdy, 2001 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Excellent: “Simplicity demanded that the team be willing to take risks that are not 
common on interplanetary missions” (Ward, 2009:115). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Excellent: “The Pathfinder team, moreover, was asked to design, build and prepare their 
spacecraft for launch in just 3 years. The Viking team had taken 6” (McCurdy, 2001:61). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Excellent: “To leave time for testing, Spear insisted that contractors and subsystem 
managers deliver their hardware no later than halfway through the development cycle. 
This was a demanding requirement inasmuch as the development phase had already been 
cut to just three years” (McCurdy, 2001:130). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
Poor: “No evidence was presented that contractual incentives were made to deliver on 
time” (Ward, 2009:114). 
 
Importance of Speed 
Excellent: “Within aerospace circles, the cost and schedule goals given to the Pathfinder 
team were widely thought to be impossible” (McCurdy, 2001:61). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Excellent: “The Viking team spent $27.3 million to develop the cameras for their landers, 
approximately $100 million in inflation-adjusted dollars. The Pathfinder team spent just 
$7.4 million” (McCurdy, 2001:70). 
 
“Proponents of the ‘faster, better, cheaper’ initiative asked the Pathfinder team to put a 
lander and a rover on the surface of Mars for one-fourteenth of the inflation-adjusted cost 
of the 1976 Viking mission” (McCurdy, 2001:61). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Excellent: “They called it ‘Pathfinder’ because the project blazed the trail for a new 
generation of low-cost spacecraft” (McCurdy, 2001:62). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
None Found 
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Excellent: “The Pathfinder team clearly saved money by reducing capability” (McCurdy, 
2001:69). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Excellent: “To further reduce mission costs, the Pathfinder team accepted risks that 
Viking team members had been unwilling to endure” (McCurdy, 2001:65). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Excellent: “The Pathfinder team clearly saved money by reducing capability” (McCurdy, 
2001:69).  
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Excellent: “[Donna] Shirley promised to build a free-ranging rover and stay within 
NASA’s $25 million cap. To avoid cost overruns, she relied heavily on existing 
technology” (McCurdy, 2001:73). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Excellent: Sacrificed performance, and the number and type of instruments on the 
mission to stay simple.  The landing concept on an inflatable airbag was extremely 
simpler than previous methods. 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Excellent: “The concept for actually landing the Pathfinder on Mars is the paragon of 
simplicity” (Ward, 2009:115). 
“Inexpensive was the primary driver, and simplicity had to be enforced to bring the 
program in on budget. Simplicity was implemented, but forced a reduction in capability” 
(Ward, 2009:115). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
Average: No explicit comment but the team was collocated and could not solve problems 
by pulling in more people or spending money.  The team’s talent had to create solutions. 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Excellent: “Pathfinder was a small spacecraft, deliberately made so in order to fit on the 
most inexpensive launch vehicle possible (Delta II)” (Ward, 2009:115). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Excellent: “The Pathfinder development and operations teams were deliberately kept 
small, with most of the development work done in-house at JPL. This allowed the team to 
avoid hiring people to coordinate the dispersed activities and further reduced the size of 
the management and advisory teams. The intentionally short duration and simple design 
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of the mission allowed the operations team to be kept to a few dozen people” (Ward, 
2009:115). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Excellent: “The Mars Pathfinder team also saved money by employing fewer people” 
(McCurdy, 2001:74). 
 
OUTCOME 
Success: “The Pathfinder program’s embodiment of the FIST principles resulted in a 
successful mission, according to the requirements and expectations. The team met its 
budget, timeline, and mission parameters” (Ward, 2009:115).  
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MRAP 
Sources:  -Sullivan, 2008 
  -Jones, 2007 
  -Ward, 2009 
  -Sisk, 2012 
  -Rogers, 2012 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Good: “DOD recognized that no single vendor could provide all of the vehicles needed to 
meet requirements quickly enough and invited vendors to offer their nondevelopmental 
solutions” (Sullivan, 2008:5).   
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Excellent: The program also undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and 
fielding the vehicles. To expand limited existing production capacity, the department 
awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts to nine commercial 
sources for the purchase of up to 4,100 vehicles per year from each vendor” (Sullivan, 
2008:2). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Excellent: “DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP 
vehicles” (Sullivan, 2008:2).   
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
Not explicitly mentioned: “The IDIQ contracts required these initial vehicles to be 
produced within 60 days. However, in less than three weeks, five of the vendors 
demonstrated their reliability to produce vehicles meeting Marine Corps survivability 
requirements, production numbers and delivery timelines” (Jones, 2007). 
 
Importance of Speed 
Excellent: “DOD designated the MRAP program as DOD’s highest priority acquisition, 
which helped contractors and other industry partners to more rapidly respond to the 
urgent need…” (Sullivan, 2008:2). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Poor: “The cost for individual production models of the MRAP ranged from $535,000 to 
$600,000, but field models including spare parts and upgrades came to an average of 
$1.29 million” (Sisk, 2012). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Poor: “To date, more than $22 billion has been appropriated to acquire more than 15,000 
MRAP vehicles…” (Sullivan, 2008:1). 
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Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
Average: “…using 9 different IDIQ contracts could foster competition between vendors, 
which is precisely the kind of thing a project leader would do to express the Inexpensive 
value” (Ward, 2009:162). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Poor: “MRAP leaders emphasized speed and sacrificed cost, potentially driving up costs 
to a greater degree than necessary” (Ward, 2009:161). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Poor: “MRAP leaders emphasized speed and sacrificed cost, potentially driving up costs 
to a greater degree than necessary” (Ward, 2009:161). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Good: Utilized commercially available components and a not complex technology. 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Good: “…relied heavily on commercially available products” (Sullivan, 2008:2). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Good: “DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP 
vehicles. The program established minimal operational requirements and relied heavily 
on commercially available products” (Sullivan, 2008:2).  
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Average: “Unfortunately, the vendors are not working from a common blueprint and each 
type of MRAP is different from the others, making maintenance and operations slightly 
more complicated” (Ward, 2009:162). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
Good: “…invited vendors to offer their nondevelopmental solutions” (Sullivan, 2008:5).   
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Poor: “Five versions of the MRAP were produced, weighing from 13–28 tons” (Sisk, 
2012). 
 
“Back in 2007, General Jim Conway, then the Marine commandant, questioned the need 
for so many of the heavy vehicles. “Those vehicles weigh 40,000 pounds each in the 
larger category,’ he said. ‘Frankly, you can’t put them in a helicopter and you can’t even 
put them aboard ship.’ As for their use after these wars? ‘Wrap them in shrink wrap and 
put them in asphalt somewhere is about the best thing that we can describe at this point,’ 
he said. ‘And as expensive as they are, that is probably not a good use of the taxpayers’ 
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money’.” (Rogers, 2012). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Poor: “27,740 MRAPs rolled off the assembly lines of seven manufacturers” (Sisk, 
2012). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Good: Reduced acquisition process for rapid acquisition of vehicle. 
 
OUTCOME 
Mixed: “MRAPs with their V-shaped, blast-deflecting hulls are ‘one of the most 
important acquisitions to come off the line since World War II,’ [Deputy Defense 
Secretary Ash] Carter said. It is, he added, the Defense Department’s most important 
program ‘in the last decade’.” (Rogers, 2012). 
 
“The $47.7 billion era of the MRAP came to an official close Monday [1 October 2012]” 
(Sisk, 2012). 
 
“Marine Lt. Gen. Richard Mills testified that ‘The Marine Corps has a little over 4,000 of 
them. We intend, as we come out of Afghanistan, to retain about 2,500’.” (Sisk, 2012). 
 
“In 2010, USA Today reported that MRAPs cut casualties from 2000 to 2010 by 30%, 
perhaps saving dozens of lives each month. In 2011, the Pentagon MRAP shop estimated 
that MRAPs saved up to a stunning 40,000 lives — 10,000 in Iraq and 30,000 
Afghanistan” (Rogers, 2012). 
 
“Chris Rohlfs and Ryan Sullivan wrote in Foreign Affairs that ‘the heavily-protected 
vehicles were no more effective at reducing casualties than the medium armored 
vehicles.’ And the MRAPs are ‘three times as expensive as medium protected vehicles’.” 
(Rogers, 2012). 
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P-51 MUSTANG 
Sources:  -Baugher, 2012 
  -Bjarnoe, 2006 
  -Carson, 1985  
  -Nelson, 1944 
-Saunders, 1942 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Good: Implicit that risk was accepted rather than creating a schedule delay in order to 
maintain delivery agreement of September 1941. 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Excellent: “… North American promised to deliver 320 of the new aircraft before 
September 1941, only 17 months after the signing of the agreement…” (Carson, 
1985:33). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Excellent: “… when developing the P-51 a kind of modularization and parallelization of 
the sub-processes was applied. The airframe was for example divided into sections which 
could be developed independently as the interfaces were defined from the beginning 
which is the same principle used in contemporary modular product-architectures. This 
made it possible to execute parallel product development and set-based design, which 
means that several designs of the same module were developed concurrently and 
consequently the decision about the final design could be postponed. The result of this 
made it possible to work with new, advanced designs in a very limited time frame” 
(Bjarnoe, 2006:44). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
None Found 
 
Importance of Speed 
Excellent: “The P-51 was designed and built in 117 days” (Ward, 2009:136). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Average: “…the Mustang’s economy is an implicit value rather than an explicit” (Ward, 
2009:137). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Good: “…the Mustang is consistently described in terms of its ‘economy of operation,’ 
and praised for being ‘economical to produce’.” (Ward, 2009:136). 
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Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
None Found 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Good: “The record of North American’s P-51 Mustang fighter proves, however, that it is 
both possible and practical to create a single basic design that can be modified, as 
military needs dictate, to keep abreast of requirements.” (Nelson, 1944:127) 
“…does not to any extent embody previously unknown engineering features, but rather 
employed refinements of known accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Good: “During the P-51B-10-NA and P-51C-1-NT production run, it was decided to omit 
the olive drab camouflage and to deliver the aircraft in their natural metal finish. The 
objective was now to try and bring the Luftwaffe into battle, not to hide from it. This 
move saved extra cost, weight, and drag” (Baugher, 2012). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Excellent: “These achievements are, from an engineering standpoint, remarkable—
because they were accomplished by a plane that does not to any extent embody 
previously unknown engineering features, but rather employed refinements of known 
accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Excellent: “…does not to any extent embody previously unknown engineering features, 
but rather employed refinements of known accepted practices” (Nelson, 1944:129). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Excellent: “The record of North American’s P-51 Mustang fighter proves, however, that 
it is both possible and practical to create a single basic design that can be modified, as 
military needs dictate, to keep abreast of requirements” (Nelson, 1944:127). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Excellent: “It is an extremely simple airplane and has such perfect handling qualities as to 
put a smile of joy on the face of any fighter pilot” (Sanders, 1942). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
None found but due to the success of the project, the team must have relied on talent to 
maintain the performance and schedule constraints. 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Excellent: “The P-51 is requested in preference to the P-47 because of its smaller size, 
ease of maintenance, economy of operation, range and because many of the accessories 
for it are already available in this area [Karachi Air Base, India]” (Sanders, 1942). 
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Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Excellent: “The problem of supply of a new airplane is not as great as it first seems due to 
the fact that engines, guns, radios, instruments, and man [sic] other parts are the same as 
those used on P-40s” (Sanders, 1942). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Excellent: “…the P-51 could be maintained easily with existing supplies and tools” 
(Ward, 2009:136).  
 
“… they already had a clear idea of what they wanted and… they used the data from 
Curtis… to cut trial and error time and to find tune their own concept of what a modern 
fighter should be” (Carson, 1985:33). 
 
OUTCOME 
Success: “The P-51 Mustang is one of the most famous and successful fighter aircraft of 
the WWII era, both operationally and programmatically.  It was an engineering, logistical 
and operational success, and sets an example we would do well to follow even today” 
(Ward, 2009:135-136).   
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XP-75 EAGLE 
Sources:  -Holley, 1987 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Excellent: “One can only speculate that it was the urgent necessity of getting a superior 
fighter into production as rapidly as possible that led to the experiment” (Holley, 
1987:592). 
 
“To make matters worse, the Allison engine, which had been rushed into production 
before it was thoroughly debugged, was not performing up to expectations…” (Holley, 
1987:590). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Poor: “When air force [sic] officers estimated that it would take at least six months to 
eliminate these problems, pushing the projected date for reaching peak production past 
the middle of 1945, it was clear that the time had come to kill the whole project” (Holley, 
1987:591). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Excellent: “… the air force [sic] took steps to shorten the delays—first, by increasing the 
number of experimental models to be procured from two to eight to be sure there would 
be a sufficient number to carry out exhaustive flight tests, and second, by issuing a letter 
of intent to contract for a mass-production order for 2,500 P-75’s” (Holley, 1987:588). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
Poor: Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract (Holley, 1987:587). 
 
Importance of Speed 
Excellent: “Deliveries were expected to begin by May 1944, approximately nine months 
hence, a phenomenally short time for such a complex undertaking” (Holley, 1987:588). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Average: “Total cost of the production contract was estimated at $325 million with a unit 
cost of approximately $100,000” (Holley, 1987:588). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Average: “… the Materiel Command signed a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for two 
experimental fighters, XP-75, at the relatively modest estimated cost of $428,271, for 
delivery in six months” (Holley, 1987:587). 
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Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
Average: “…a fixed fee of no more than $75,163 or 2.65 percent of the original estimated 
total, a figure well below the usual 4 or 5 percent fee” (Holley, 1987:589). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Good: “Only the main fuselage itself would have to be developed anew. By such short-
cuts, the plane was expected to be ready for flight testing in six months” (Holley, 
1987:587). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Good: “In September 1941, the corporation [General Motors] approached Maj Gen O.P. 
Echols, the commanding general of Materiel Command, with a proposal to develop a 
fighter aircraft in a remarkably short time by using, as far as possible, structures, controls, 
and accessories already in full production for other aircraft in order to obviate the need 
for long delays in tooling up for production” (Holley, 1987:587). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Average: “Project leaders severely underestimated the complexity involved with 
integrating pieces of existing airframes into a new airframe. Each of those pieces had 
been optimized for the original aircraft, and most had to be modified before they could be 
used on the P-75. The designers seemed to have aimed for simplicity but instead achieved 
simplisticness” (Ward, 2009:158). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Excellent: “Only the main fuselage itself would have to be developed anew. By such 
short-cuts, the plane was expected to be ready for flight testing in six months” (Holley, 
1987:587). 
 
“… more and more evidence emerged to indict the whole scheme to use off-the-shelf 
stock components to build a superior high-performance aircraft” (Holley, 1987:591). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Good: “…structures, controls, and accessories already in full production for other aircraft 
in order to obviate the need for long delays in tooling up for production” (Holley, 
1987:587). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Good: “By enlarging the tail surface, most of the apparent instability could be overcome, 
but this meant it would no longer be possible to use the ready-built, off-the-shelf stock 
design already in production…” (Holley, 1987:590). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
None Found 
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TINY 
Importance of Small 
Poor: “Each such modification added weight…” (Holley, 1987:590). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Poor: “Echol’s espousal of the XP-75 is all the more curious in view of the massive size 
of the plane. With its 49-foot wingspan, it was substantially heavier than virtually any 
other successful World War II fighter” (Holley, 1987:592). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Poor: “The remedy, eventually devised, was to extend the ailerons out to the wingtips to 
insure greater stability and control. But this, too, required reworking the standard ready-
built wings…” (Holley, 1987:590).  
 
OUTCOME 
Failure: “Every new model aircraft has bugs which have to be ironed out; this was to be 
expected. But the faults encountered in the XP-75 were more than minor. The test pilot 
reported that the plane lacked stability and displayed a distressing tendency to stall and 
spin when making tight turns, the maneuver most essential to fighter aircraft” (Holley, 
1987:589).  
 
“On October 4, 1944, the chief of air staff, Lt. Gen. B.M. Giles, signed the order 
terminating the contract” (Holley, 1987:591).  
 
“The XP-75 / P-75 Eagle project failed to deliver the promised performance, and so the 
project was cancelled shortly before World War II ended” (Ward, 2009:157).  
146 
V-22 OSPREY 
Sources:  -Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008 
-Thompson, 2007 
-Thompson, 2011 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Poor: “Probes into the deadly 2000 crashes revealed that in a rush to deploy the aircraft, 
the Marines had dangerously cut corners in their testing program. The number of 
different flight configurations… flown by test pilots to ensure safe landings was reduced 
by half to meet deadlines. Then only two-thirds of those curtailed flight tests were 
conducted” (Thompson, 2007:3). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Poor: “… the V-22 has been 25 years in development, more than twice as long as the 
Apollo program that put men on the moon” (Thompson, 2007:1). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Poor: “Not only did the project take 25 years to deliver an operational capability, but in 
the few instances when project leaders attempted to accelerate the project, they did so by 
cutting corners on flight tests” (Ward, 2009:183). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
None Found  
 
Importance of Speed 
Poor: 25 year development 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Poor: “It wasn’t about saving a bunch of money – it was about doing it” (Ward, 
2009:181). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Poor: “The aircraft is currently five times more expensive than the system it replaces…” 
(Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:24). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
Poor: “There is also no evidence project leaders embraced the Inexpensive value” (Ward, 
2009:183). 
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Poor: “The Pentagon has put $20 billion into the Osprey and expects to spend an 
additional $35 billion before the program is finished. In exchange, the Marines, Navy and 
Air Force will get 458 aircraft, averaging $119 million per copy” (Thompson, 2007:1). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
None Found 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Poor: “It is intended to execute a variety of missions for the Marine Corps, the Navy and 
the Air Force, including troop and equipment transport, amphibious assault, search and 
rescue, and special operations” (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:24). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology 
Poor: “Simpler, mature alternatives are available, such as the EH-101” (Ward, 
2009”184). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Poor: “…the Osprey is not a simple machine, and there is no evidence the project leaders 
valued Simplicity” (Ward, 2009:184). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Poor: “It was very organizationally complex initially, which led to communication 
troubles” (Ward, 2009:181). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
None Found 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Poor: “The Osprey is also three times heavier than the helicopter it replaces” (Cordesman 
& Kaeser, 2008:24). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Poor: “Throughout its development, however, the V-22 enjoyed broad and persistent 
congressional support. The V-22 program has nearly 2,000 suppliers in over 40 states and 
created jobs in 276 congressional districts” (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:26). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Average: “… the Navy and Marine Corps reduced some requirements to allow the 
aircraft to reach operational readiness” (Cordesman & Kaeser, 2008:25).  
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OUTCOME 
Success: “But as Osprey backers point out, the V-22 can also do more than a 
conventional helicopter, so much more that there is a credible case it actually is more 
cost-effective. That case is especially compelling in scenarios where the current search-
and-rescue fleet would have trouble reaching distressed pilots in a timely fashion” 
(Thompson, 2011).  
 
“…the V-22 is the only aircraft in the world that can fly as far and fast as a turboprop 
airplane, and then hover or land like a helicopter. Within 90 minutes the downed pilot 
was safely retrieved, opening a new chapter in the expanding chronicle of Osprey 
successes. The V-22s used in the Libyan rescue mission had been sent to the 
Mediterranean from a Marine unit operating in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, where 
local commanders have praised the agility and resilience of the aircraft” (Thompson, 
2011).  
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E-3 SENTRY AWACS 
Sources:  -Cowdery & Skillman, 1995 
  -GAO, 1973 
-Grier, 2002 
-Ulsamer, 1974 
-Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Good: “…the AWACS test program focused on two key objectives from the very 
beginning: To identify the most difficult task and to ensure that it is being tested early” 
(Ulsamer, 1974:76). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Good: “On November 7, 1972, Boeing successfully completed the Airborne Tracking 
Demonstration, 4 months ahead of schedule” (GAO, 1973:1). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Good: “Because of the ‘crash’ nature of the program, most of the system debugging 
occurred at Boeing” (Cowdery & Skillman, 1995:5). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
None Found 
 
Importance of Speed 
Good: 11 year development.  “The Brassboard radars were designed, fabricated, tested 
and installed in the flight test aircraft at Boeing in less than two years… This was rather 
incredible considering the complexity of the radar and instrumentation” (Cowdery & 
Skillman, 1995:5). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Excellent: “… in January 1973, the approved program was based on a 4 engine rather 
than an 8 engine configuration; had a program cost of $2,467 million, for a total 
reduction of $194 million…” (GAO, 1973:2). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Excellent: “As of January 19, 1973, the approved program cost estimate was reduced to 
$2,467 million” (GAO, 1973:3). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
None Found 
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Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Excellent: “… some reduction in time-on-station was more than made up for by the lower 
cost of using TF33 engines already in the Air Force’s inventory in surplus quantities” 
(Ulsamer, 1974:76). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Good: “Because of the success of the radar test program, it became possible to speed up 
the AWACS test and evaluation schedule across the board” (Ulsamer, 1974:76). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Poor: “‘The total complexity of this system… far exceeds things I’ve worked on before,’ 
said Ed Froesse, Boeing’s vice president for the AWACS program” (Grier, 2002:5). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Excellent: “There is no compelling reason for lengthy airframe and engine testing 
because the AWACS aircraft is a modified Boeing 707-320… AWACS engines are those 
of the Air Force’s C-141, similarly proved in many years of service” (Ulsamer, 1974:70). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Good: “Budgetary constraints at the time of AWACS’s first DSARC in July 1970 caused 
the Air Force to ‘trade down’ to a basic AWACS system…” (Ulsamer, 1974:76). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Average: “… the Pentagon treated development of the system as a high-priority effort. 
For example, AWACS had its own streamlined procurement rules…” (Grier, 2002:2) 
“…the aircraft’s avionics was often described as highly complex” (Ward, 2009:165). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
None Found 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Poor: Large project team, large aircraft crew requirement, large airframe, expanding to 
NATO and allies. 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Average: “There is no compelling reason for lengthy airframe and engine testing because 
the AWACS aircraft is a modified Boeing 707-320… AWACS engines are those of the 
Air Force’s C-141, similarly proved in many years of service” (Ulsamer, 1974:70). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Good: “… in January 1973, the approved program was based on a 4 engine rather than an 
8 engine configuration; had a program cost of $2,467 million, for a total reduction of 
$194 million…” (GAO, 1973:2).  
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OUTCOME 
Success: “Twenty-five years ago, on March 24, 1977, Boeing delivered the first basic 
production version of the E-3 Sentry to Air Force officials at Tinker AFB, Okla. The 
ensuing quarter century has shown the AWACS to be indispensable, often the first 
system to go into action when a threat arises and the last to leave once operations cease” 
(Grier, 2002:1).  
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RAH-66 COMANCHE 
Sources: -CBO, 1997 
  -Global Security, 2008 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Poor: No evidence of accepting risks to maintain schedule. 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Poor: “…the actual cost and schedule far exceeded estimates” (Ward, 2009:194). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Poor: “The helicopter is still in the development stage, which will continue at least 
through 2004. As recently as 1992, the Army had planned to start buying Comanches in 
1996, but it has since delayed the start of production until 2005” (CBO, 1997). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery  
None Found 
 
Importance of Speed 
Poor: “The first helicopter will be combat-ready in September 2009, three years behind 
the previous schedule. Production and purchase of the first helicopters would begin in 
fiscal 2006, one year later than planned under the previous schedule” (Global Security, 
2008). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Poor: “The project was cancelled after spending nearly $7B over two decades” (Ward, 
2009:194). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Poor: “There is no evidence project leaders deemed it important to deliver a low-cost, 
simple solution on a short timeline” (Ward, 2009:194). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
None Found 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Poor: “The new Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) formally approving the plan 
added about $3.4 billion to the Comanche’s $3.1 billion development program” (Global 
Security, 2008). 
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Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Poor: No evidence found that risks were accepted to reduce costs. 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Poor: “Skeptics of the program suggested that unmanned planes capable of performing 
the Comanche’s surveillance and precision-strike role will be available to the Army prior 
to the maturing of the Comanche system” (Global Security, 2008). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Poor: “…evidence suggests they were more than willing to sacrifice cost, schedule and 
usability in order to ensure the Comanche’s technologies were cutting-edge, however 
unproven or unreliable” (Ward, 2009:194). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Poor: Extremely complex program and design. 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Poor: “According to the DOT&E, technical challenges remained for software integration 
and testing of mission equipment, weight reduction, radar signatures, antenna 
performance, gun system performance, and aided target detection algorithm 
performance” (Global Security, 2008). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
None Found. 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Poor: Large aircraft, high level of technology, large project team.  
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Poor: “Empty weight projections for Block I, II and III aircraft were slightly higher than 
weight goals for each block” (Global Security, 2008). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Poor: No evidence found 
 
OUTCOME 
Failure: Program cancelled after 21 year development and $39 billion spent.  Not a single 
Comanche was produced.  
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A-10 THUNDERBOLT II 
Sources: -Burton, 1993 
-Jacques & Strouble, 2008 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Good: “The required IOC of December 1970 was considered high risk with respect to 
cost and schedule, but achievable if the concept definition phase was reduced to a four 
month contract definition followed by competitive source selection…” (Jacques & 
Strouble, 2008:21). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Good: “The change to a competitive prototyping approach had a significant effect on 
IOC, with the new projected IOC now in FY76” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:30). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Good: “The A-X request for proposal (RFP), including all attachments and ‘boiler plate’ 
was 104 pages, and it limited each contractor’s response to 585 pages. This represented a 
sizeable reduction in the RFP for its time…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:32). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
Good: “Contractors would have 3 months to respond to the RFP and the government 
intended to complete its evaluation of proposals and make award within a 75 day period” 
(Jacques & Strouble, 2008:32). 
 
Importance of Speed 
Good: “The Air Force also believed the A-10 to be closer to production, thus allowing for 
faster progress…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Good: “…the simpler design of the A-10 was more likely to allow achievement of the 
$1.4M flyaway cost…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Excellent: “In a force cost analysis, the A-X had the lowest total force cost due to the 
small force required, which could be traced to high availability over the battlefield, high 
sortie rates and high sortie effectiveness” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:27). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
Excellent: “…with contractual incentives to achieve or come under the cost goal” 
(Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39). 
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“…the Air Force awarded a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for approximately $160M” 
(Jacques & Strouble, 2008:39). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Excellent: “In order to achieve cost savings, the specified performance requirements were 
not to be considered firm specifications but goals…” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:33). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Excellent: “The required IOC of December 1970 was considered high risk with respect to 
cost and schedule, but achievable if the concept definition phase was reduced to a four 
month contract definition followed by competitive source selection…” (Jacques & 
Strouble, 2008:21). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Excellent: “The avionics for the A-X were specified in terms of a ‘skeleton’ package 
(below minimum requirements), a ‘lean’ package (met only minimum requirements), and 
three add-on packages that would supplement the ‘lean’ package” (Jacques & Strouble, 
2008:20). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Excellent: “The A-X was to use an existing state-of-the-art engine in order to achieve an 
early IOC [Initial Operating Capability]… The A-X would also use existing state-of-the-
art equipment for avionics” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:18). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Excellent: “In order to reduce these costs, the Air Force was to provide guidance 
stressing simplicity of design, ease of maintenance, and the importance of keeping costs 
of the A-X to a minimum” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:33). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Excellent: “… it was intended that simplicity of design would lead to a shorter 
development time, lower life cycle cost, reduced maintenance times, increased sortie 
rates and the ability to operate from austere bases” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:22). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
Average: Not explicitly stated however, the project team was small and had to rely on 
talent to accomplish development. 
 
“In keeping with the philosophy of minimum documentation for the Parallel 
Undocumented Development phase, the SPO [System Program Office] was to be manned 
on an austere basis” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:32). 
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TINY 
Importance of Small 
Good: “The representative A-X from DCP-23A [Development Concept Paper] was 
slightly smaller, lighter and cheaper than that of DCP-23” (Jacques & Strouble, 2008:30). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Good: “Dr. John Foster [DDR&E] stated that ‘the proposed aircraft seems to be too 
large… A smaller, less-costly, quick reaction aircraft seems more appropriate” (Jacques 
& Strouble, 2008:29). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Excellent: “In October 1969, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Seamans chose an 
alternative that was termed ‘Parallel Undocumented Development.’ This approach would 
require a minimal amount of documentation during the competitive prototyping phase to 
encourage innovation and initiative on the part of the contractors” (Jacques & Strouble, 
2008:30).  
 
OUTCOME 
Success: “The A-10s turned out to be one of the true success stories of the [first Gulf] 
war. They represented only 15 percent of the combat aircraft in the war, yet, according to 
the Air Force Times, ‘flew about a third of the total sorties and were responsible for more 
than half the confirmed bomb damage’ against the enemy. Put another way, the A-10 was 
responsible for more damage to the enemy than all the other combat aircraft put 
together…” (Burton, 1993:242).   
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F-20 TIGERSHARK 
Sources:  -Martin & Schmidt, 1987 
  -Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Average: Rapid aircraft testing (Martin & Schmidt, 1987). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Excellent: “The rollout of the first F-20 Tigershark occurred 32 months after the program 
go-ahead—it came out a month ahead of schedule” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:5). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Good: “Northrop rapidly tested the Tigershark through its flight envelope in order to 
enable foreign air force pilots to fly the aircraft as soon as possible for marketing 
reasons” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:6). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
None Found 
 
Importance of Speed 
Good: One month ahead of schedule (Martin & Schmidt, 1987). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Excellent: “The problem was to make this leap while still fielding a relatively 
inexpensive aircraft, and one that maintained the old F-5 emphasis on reliability and 
maintainability” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:2-3). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Excellent: “The proposed fixed price for the F-20s was $15 million with support (1985 
dollars), substantially less than GD’s going price of $18 million for the F-16C” (Martin & 
Schmidt, 1987:17). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
None Found 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Excellent: “It is evident that from early on in the program, Northrop was concerned over 
the cost-effective producibility of the Tigershark. They took great steps towards ensuring 
that they would be able to produce a quality product that could be sold for a reasonable 
price” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:9). 
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Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Excellent: “Northrop management reasoned that the trend of electronic technical progress 
in the 1970s, in general, had been more performance at less cost with greater 
dependability…Northrop believed that they would be able to translate these advantages 
of high technology into the advanced avionics systems of the F-20.  The new aircraft 
would have the extra capabilities associated with a ‘top of the line’ plane, but at less cost” 
(Martin & Schmidt, 1987:3). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Average: “The FX program’s F-5G Tigershark had represented a significant leap forward 
from the old F-5E in terms of technical sophistication and performance.  The F-20 
Tigershark would be going even further forward” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:3). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology  
Good: “Northrop put these principles into practice by selecting F-20 subsystems which 
were either proven, or which had good paper ‘specs’ with respect to reliability” (Martin 
& Schmidt, 1987:4). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Excellent: “A corollary to the Northrop philosophy stated above is a willingness to give 
up a little extra performance in order to make significant gains in terms of affordability, 
reliability, maintainability, and operability” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:4). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Excellent: “Northrop’s export fighter program has been characterized by a consistent 
philosophy. In designing and developing an aircraft, performance must not outweigh cost, 
reliability, maintainability, and operability… Their typical client country hasn’t had the 
kind of support structure to operate and maintain a ‘Ferrari’ level aircraft, but has done 
well with a ‘Ford Escort’ aircraft” (Martin & Schmidt, 1987:3). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
Good: Northrop challenged the team to build a fighter with 80 percent the capability of 
the F-16 at half the price.  The F-20 was a self-funded venture meant for foreign export 
sales.  They had to rely on their talent to make the program a success (Martin & Schmidt, 
1987).  
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Good: “Their typical client country hasn’t had the kind of support structure to operate and 
maintain a ‘Ferrari’ level aircraft, but has done well with a ‘Ford Escort’ aircraft” (Martin 
& Schmidt, 1987:3). 
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Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Good: “…there was less documentation than what would have accompanied a 
government sponsored program and the initial CEO design philosophy was kept to just 
one page” (Ward, 2009:149). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Good: “…the redesigning of the production center to decrease the size and bureaucracy 
of production” (Ward, 2009:149). 
 
OUTCOME 
Failure: “The F-20 program was a resounding failure—Northrop was not able to sell even 
a single F-20. The Tigershark’s limited performance was certainly a contributing factor, 
as was the change in U.S. policy on weapon exports. However, the primary reason 
appears to be the striking mismatch between Northrop’s design values and the values of 
its potential clients” (Ward, 2009:148). 
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C-5 GALAXY 
Sources: -AF Studies Board, 2008   
  -Gregory, 1989 
-Griffin, 2005 
-Ward, 2009 
 
FAST 
Accept Risk to Maintain Schedule 
Average: “The SPO’s performance in exercising their responsibility to balance the 
requirements with the design risk was less than stellar” (Griffin, 2005:20). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Deadlines 
Good: “…the whole process took seven years, starting with the early vision, to build the 
program consensus, develop the budget plan, and define the requirements” (Griffin, 
2005:16). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Reduce Development Time 
Average: “The schedule manager presented a list of over 500 tasks that were to be 
accomplished that week.  The manager reported that all items were on track except for 
some small number of items.  Of the late items, most had been resolved and there was a 
plan to finish the work and get back on schedule.  For those unresolved items for which 
there was no current work-around, the names of the engineers responsible for correcting 
these problems were shown.  On Thursday, the chief engineer visited the desks of the 
engineers and all the problems had been resolved!” (Griffin, 2005:13). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Early Delivery 
Good: Fixed-Price, Incentive Fee Contract (Griffin, 2005:vii). 
 
Importance of Speed 
Average: “The first flight of the C-5A occurred on 28 June 1968, 33 months after 
contract award” (Griffin, 2005:14). 
 
INEXPENSIVE 
Formal Commitment to Maintain Budget 
Poor: “The Air Force spent over $2 billion more than the original budget, and it took 10 
years longer to finish the production with fewer aircraft than originally planned” (AF 
Studies Board, 2008:38). 
 
Importance of Low-Cost 
Poor: “As for the C-5A, it was a watershed. Its cost overrun crossed the billion-dollar 
line, thus engineering the transition of public perception of the military-buying system 
and the defense industry from a team that could invent anything, that could turn 
technology into first-rate hardware unequalled anywhere, to an apparatus that was 
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wasteful, dishonest and incapable of producing anything that worked or stayed within 
cost targets” (Gregory, 1989:107-108). 
 
Contractual Incentives to Reward Cost Under-Runs 
Good: Fixed-Price, Incentive Fee Contract (Griffin, 2005:vii). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Development Cost 
Average: “Originally structured to concentrate efforts on monitoring and controlling 
weight growth, it evolved into a plan dedicated primarily to reduce weight and cost” 
(Griffin, 2005:28). 
 
“C-5A program was plagued by cost overruns from the very beginning. The cost overrun 
was not unexpected by either the Air Force or the contractor” (Griffin, 2005:22). 
 
Accept Risk to Reduce Costs 
Average: “The SPO’s performance in exercising their responsibility to balance the 
requirements with the design risk was less than stellar” (Griffin, 2005:20). 
 
SIMPLE 
System Capability Less Than Previous Systems 
Average: “The study outcome narrowed the range of the aircraft weight to between 
650,000 and 750,000 pounds, a large increase over the state of the art, but not a quantum 
leap over vehicles in the inventory or in development during the mid-1960s” (Griffin, 
2005:18). 
 
Heavy Reliance on Existing, Mature, Proven Technology 
Good: “With respect to the airframe, there is no large advance in the current state-of-the-
art, and the technological building blocks are in hand.  The Air Force is able to specify 
the desired performance with precision and with reasonable expectation that this 
performance can be achieved” (Griffin, 2005:21). 
 
Deliberate Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Complexity in Many Areas 
Good: “…the landing gear was somewhat simplified by removing the crosswind feature” 
(Griffin, 2005:18). 
 
Importance of Simplicity 
Good: “Creep comes from “over perfect” engineering: continuously trying to improve an 
acceptable design to make it better.  Systems engineers must follow the mantra of “better 
is the enemy of good enough.” The greatest contributor to requirements creep, however, 
is often the user.  If personnel from the user community have constant access to the 
contractor, design changes will be continuous and never ending.  The C-5 SPO team 
managed the inputs of non-SPO people by controlling all changes via the SPO’s 
Configuration Control Board (CCB)” (Griffin, 2005:20). 
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“… the C-5 was to have an unusual drive-through main cabin, with vast cargo doors at 
both front and rear. In fact, the whole nose section of the airplane swung up and over the 
cockpit. And the landing gear could kneel, adjusting on the ground for differing loading-
ramp heights. On top of that complexity, the C-5A looked like a winged centipede on the 
ground because of short but heavy struts supporting a couple of dozen balloon tires to 
allow it to land on grass fields” (Gregory, 1989:109). 
 
Emphasis on the Importance of and Reliance on Employees’ Talent 
Excellent: “The SPO had the power, ability, priority, and senior leadership support to 
quickly rally the best minds in the nation” (Griffin, 2005:43). 
 
TINY 
Importance of Small 
Average: “But building a big airplane like the C-5A was not just a matter of scaling up 
the smaller C-141. When the increase in size passed a certain point, technical challenges 
and changes cropped up” (Gregory, 1989:110). 
 
Formal Commitment to Maintain or Reduce Size 
Good: “…a well-balanced, well-understood set of requirements that fundamentally 
remained unchanged throughout the program” (Griffin, 2005:42). 
 
“Requirements were controlled exceptionally well during development” (Griffin, 
2005:20). 
 
“When the C-5 aircraft first entered the inventory in 1970, it was the largest aircraft in the 
world, and it is still the largest transport cargo aircraft in our inventory. It was the first of 
the behemoths” (Griffin, 2005:v). 
 
Concrete Steps Taken to Actually Reduce Size 
Good: “The Air Force included the weight empty guarantee in the systems specification 
as an attempt to control potential future growth of the aircraft weight empty during 
development” (Griffin, 2005:43). 
 
OUTCOME 
Success: “The success of the C-5 transport aircraft is underscored by the performance of 
the fleet as an operational system and its heavy lift support in all of our conflicts from 
Vietnam to Iraq. It still accomplishes tasks that no other military aircraft, such as the new 
C-17 or any derivative of commercial cargo aircraft, can perform, and has consistently 
carried more cargo than any other aircraft in the time of war” (Griffin, 2005:vi). 
 
“The C-5A fleet has demonstrated success in operation, but, as will be discussed, the 
development of the aircraft was plagued by a major technical failure in the design of the 
structure, most notably the wing and pylon” (Griffin, 2005:5-6). 
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Appendix G: Alternatives Pairwise Comparisons   
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